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This study examines whether there has been a change in the relationship between print 
journalists who cover government and official sources after the 9/11 attacks. The analysis 
focuses on what happened from 2001 to 2005, and it takes only journalists’ experience on 
the subject. The research is based on in-depth interviews with newspaper reporters who 
were covering official beats during the time, and with representatives from organizations 
that have been studying media issues. It is also based on literature from media-specialized 
publications. The investigation’s goal is to group examples and opinions on how the 
relationship between reporters and official sources changed during this period. 
Additionally, it gives context on what this relationship is supposed to be, on how it used 
to be before the studied period, and on the effects that changes to this relationship may 
have, according to journalism studies and literature.  The investigation showed that the 
relationship between reporters and official sources changed during the time studied, but it 
also suggests that this change is not unique to the period after 9/11, as it had happened 
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In the days following September 11, 2001, the United States began to change. So 
did American journalism, according to many reporters who were covering the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For some, there was 
a slow yet constant change toward an atmosphere of secrecy, especially among official 
sources. For others, change had begun with the Bush administration and 9/11 just 
accelerated or even validated this tendency. For a few, this kind of secrecy around official 
information was common during times of war, and each administration has dealt with it 
in its own way, maybe not so different from the current one. Nevertheless, among many 
journalists there was a sort of common perception that the relationship with official 
sources was affected in some way after the attacks of 9/11. 
The study seeks to take a primarily analytical approach to answer the question of 
whether the relationship between print reporters and official sources based in 
Washington, D.C, changed in any way between the 9/11 attacks and 2005. The study 
looks to give concrete examples of how this relationship changed. Those examples and 
situations, described by the sources who were interviewed for this research, should be 
compared with the prevalent concept of how this relationship between reporters and 
sources is supposed to be, and how it used to be in previous administrations before 9/11, 
in order to put any change into context. That context lets us consider why a change in this 
particular relationship between reporters and official sources may be important or have an 
effect in the flow of information received by the society. 
Before explaining the methodology followed for this study, it is important to 
clarify that the research does not attempt to exhaust every angle of the topic. The main 
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goal is to give an approach primarily from the point of view of journalists, who showed 
their concern over the issue, according to the media literature from the period chosen. 
The idea is to analyze this perception. For that reason, I decided to narrow the research in 
the way I did, hoping to be able to add a different approach that perhaps in the future 
could be used by others to do further research from other angles. 
The reason to restrict this study from September 11, 2001 to the end of 2005 is 
because it is reasonable amount of time to track any possible change in the relationship 
between reporters and official sources. On the other hand, during these years several 
things happened that challenged this relationship: the war on terrorism, the Iraq war and 
President Bush’s re-election. These “turning points” affected the press in some way.   
The study also centers on the reporters’ views on the topic, and does not explore 
opinions and perceptions from official sources. It is a methodological option, as I decided 
to focus on one of the parts involved, the reporters, aiming to do research on their 
perception of a change in their relationship with governmental sources, on how they 
expressed that feeling, on where they based their belief, and on how they defined the 
relationship between the press corps and official sources before 9/11. My intention has 
been to frame this study in a journalistic area, because it is the one that I was interested in 
exploring, and, as I said before, this study does not intend to exhaust the topic, which is 
why I chose to confine the investigation only to reporters’ perspective. Even though 
governmental sources would have added a valuable and particular insight to this study, it 
would have lead to more broad and time-demanding investigation. Future studies may 
want to explore those areas and this study may be helpful for that purpose.  
 3 
The research also concentrated on journalists who are working in Washington, 
D.C. Being the capital of the United States and the place where the government has most 
of its offices, it is the natural place to explore the relationships between reporters and 
official sources in all governmental levels, from the White House to a specific office 
inside the State Department, not to mention the Congress or the Supreme Court. Most of 
the reporters based in Washington, D.C., have to deal with official sources all the time. If 
there were a change in the relationship, they would notice it in concrete examples and 
probably before any other reporter who is not working at the capital. 
In addition to covering Washington, D.C., journalists interviewed for this study 
were all from print media. The decision to focus on their experiences and not on 
television and radio reporters was based on the fact that there is a difference in the kind 
of relationship both reporters’ groups can develop with their sources. Because of the 
immediacy needed in broadcast media or even the necessity to have a voice or a face to 
actually broadcast news, television and radio reporters usually face other challenges in 
their relationship with their sources. Print reporters for the most part have more time to 
invest in developing a closer relationship with sources, and they can offer to their 
potential sources other ways to build the trust and confidence to give information. I am 
not saying that broadcast reporters cannot do that; but they have different demands in the 
way they can use the information and their sources. In other words, considering the kind 
of relationship a print reporter can develop with an official source, they are more likely to 
notice a real change, such as more secrecy among official sources, or to have more 
examples of the way the relationship became different.  
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Taking all these elements into account, and considering the goal of this study – 
doing an approach on the topic primarily from reporters’ point of view, the methodology 
used in the research involved quality and in-depth interviews with print reporters, 
readings of media specialized publications, journalism books and history books. Human 
relationships in general are difficult to measure with quantitative methods, but this one in 
particular, the relationship between a reporter and a source, can be quite complex. Most 
of the rules on how this relationship should be are not written anywhere, nor are there 
laws that deal with this matter. Every journalist can have a particular way to interact with 
a particular source, which might not be the same with any other of his sources. It could be 
different according to the kind of information the source handles, or even according to 
the person or even according to the reporter. It is, indeed, one of the most complicated 
relationships because it is surrounded by subjective elements and by certain contexts that 
may change over time, both of which make difficult to measure how this relationship 
may have changed and how it changed in a quantitative way.  
On the other hand, the proposed topic of exploring this possibility of change in 
such a complex relationship can be approached from a qualitative point of view. Context 
and subjective elements framed in a certain period of time can be obtained from in-depth 
interviews with a group of reporters talking about their first-hand experiences and 
impressions on the topic. They can also be taken from the literature on the matter in order 
to establish how this relationship is supposed to be or expected to be in theory, how it 
was in the past, and how it was during the period under study. Specialized studies, media-
specialized articles and books related to the time-frame that was established for this 
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research also can help to track if there has been a change or not in the relationship 
between print journalists and official sources from 2001 to 2005. 
Thereby, the methodology used for this investigation involved readings on how 
the relationship between reporters and sources should be or is expected to be and why, 
which kind of elements should be taken into account to describe the relationship, which 
kind of possible ethical dilemmas reporters and sources have to deal with in a 
hypothetical situation, how and why this relationship can and may change, among others.  
An issue to consider for this study was the importance of a change in this 
relationship: Why is it important if this relationship changes? What would be affected? In 
which way can freedom of expression be compromised by a change in this relationship? 
These kinds of readings helped to set the frame of what is considered -in theory- regular, 
normal, common or frequent in a relationship between journalists and sources, so that it 
could be compared later with the kind of relationship journalists said they were having 
with official sources from 9/11 to 2005. 
Another step in this research was to investigate how the relationship between 
reporters and official sources used to be in the past. The historical perspective was a key 
element for the study. Since the goal was to see if reporters’ belief of a change in how 
they connected with their sources in the government was possible, how this relationship 
was in the past with sources from other administrations was a component that had to be 
explored. It was important to particularly look for administrations facing similar 
challenges  - for example, war conflicts- than the one taken into consideration for the 
study. These readings gave a substantial level of comparison, since they helped to build 
the context where the analysis of the topic should be done.  
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The last step in terms of readings was the one related to the period considered for 
this study: books, articles, and specific studies on the topic published from 2001 to 2005. 
A good number of books analyzing the press’ role after the 9/11 and how reporters kept 
their sources afterwards, were published during these years and were considered for this 
research. Articles from Nieman Reports and American Journalism Review, plus others 
written by media specialists, were also part of the investigation and supplied several 
diverse points of view and useful approaches to analyze the topic of this research. In 
addition, special studies about different angles of the relationship with official sources or 
access to information from the government were also explored for this study. 
The in-depth interviews, arranged and made during May 2007, were divided in 
two kinds: some were journalists who were reporting or used to report governmental 
information from Washington, D.C; and then there were a few interviewers who were not 
covering governmental information, but they were following what was happening in the 
media, either for a newspaper or for a specific organization.  
Two of the reporters interviewed for this study were covering national security 
issues: Walter Pincus (The Washington Post), and Josh Meyer (Los Angeles Times). 
Pincus’ testimony was relevant for this study since he has been covering that beat for the 
past 30 years, while Meyer started covering it after 9/11 and his experience was 
completely different from Pincus’. John Harwood (The Wall Street Journal), who has 
been covering politics in Washington, D.C, for more than a decade, offered an insight to 
the relationship with government and political sources. Matt Wald (The New York Times) 
was covering nuclear power and commercial aviation from Washington, D.C, before and 
after 9/11. His experience brought the perspective of the relationship with official sources 
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working in hot spots for breaking news after 9/11, but less directly related to policy 
making. Deborah Nelson, investigative reporter at Los Angeles Times during the period 
covered by this study, provided her vision on the relationship with official sources and 
the access to information along the years after the terrorist attack. Glen Justice (ex 
reporter based in Washington, D.C, for The New York Times) used to cover campaign 
finance and lobbying and had to deal with official sources during 2004 campaign. Rafael 
Lorente (ex Washington correspondent for the South Florida Sun-Sentinel) covered two 
presidential elections (2000 and 2004) and specialized in U.S.-Cuba relations. Lorente 
was part of a two-person bureau and both journalists had to get most of the government 
information, especially from the State Department. David Lightman was the Hartford 
Courant’s Washington Bureau Chief for 23 years until October 2007. His knowledge, in 
terms of dealing with official sources, was useful since he had to look for a regional 
approach for news, instead of a national one. 
Beside the mentioned journalists, other voices that helped to analyze the topic 
were related to journalism but from a different point of view. Lucy Dalglish, executive 
director of  Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, gave her perspective and 
experience on how the relationship between reporters and official sources had change, 
and how the access to information from the government had also changed. Bill Kovach, 
acting director from Project for Excellence in Journalism, explained and provided 
opinion about the experience collected by his organization on the matter. As a media 
reporter, Howard Kurtz (The Washington Post) followed media’s work through the 
period proposed for this study, and commented on the flow of information and the 
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relationship between journalists and official sources, all of which made him a valuable 
interview. 
The combination of all these elements described above made the core of the study. 
Both journalists and official sources are vital to assure the flow of information within a 
democratic society. If their relationship is disturbed somehow and that change leads to 
more secrecy or to less checks and balances from the press, the flow of information 
people receive can be seriously affected, which may affect their decision-making process. 






Considering the goal of this research, it is necessary to establish a frame of 
definitions in order to contextualize the topic and the analysis proposed.  
 
Purpose. There is little consensus on a definition of journalism. Many journalists 
find it hard to define, believing that a definition of the activity will limit what it is or will 
make it resistant to change over time. However, in The Elements of Journalism, Bill 
Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel say that a common ground of agreement is more likely to be 
found on the purpose of journalism. It is not defined by technology, or by journalists, or 
by the techniques they employ, but by the function news plays in the life of people, they 
say. Therefore, “the purpose of journalism is to provide people with the information they 
need to be free and self-governing.” 1 
The American Society of Newspapers Editors gives a similar definition of the 
purpose of journalism: “The primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and 
opinions is to serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to 
make judgments on the issues of the time.” 2 
Furthermore, in a democratic society information gives people what they need to 
know in order to watch what the government does, to assume their personal 
responsibilities, and to reach their own conclusions according to their values, says Tomás 
Linn in Pasión, rigor y Libertad (Passion, rigor and freedom).3  
                                                
1 Kovach, Bill and Rosenstiel, Tom, The Elements of Journalism, p 12- 17. 
2 Hulteng, John L., Playing it Straight, p.5. 
3 Linn, Tomás, Pasión, rigor y libertad, p. 32 
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These definitions of the purpose of journalism focus on the same element and 
consequence: journalism provides information to people, so that they can freely decide on 
the issues related to their personal and community lives. Regarding this last point, the 
definition is also showing how news media help to define communities, to create a 
common language and to build common knowledge about what happens in a society and 
in the world.4 In Deciding what’s news, sociologist Herbert J. Gans says that like other 
empirical disciplines, news contain values, or what he called “preference statements.” 
This actually leads him to suggest that “there is, underlying the news, a picture of nation 
and society as it ought to be.”5 
According to Kovach and Rosenstiel, it is difficult to separate the concept of 
journalism from the concept of creating community and later democracy. “The more 
democratic the society, the more news and information it tends to have.”6 In other words, 
journalism is so fundamental to the purpose of building democracies that “societies that 
want to suppress freedom must first suppress the press,” they say.7 
Moreover, in Political Power and the Press, William J. Small says:  
“The freedom of the word – freedom to speak it or print it or broadcast it but most 
especially, freedom of others to hear it -- is crucial to any democratic state. It is, 
as Mr. Walter Lippmann once observed, not so much a privilege as an organic 
necessity in a great society. Each time a branch of the press fails to publish the 
word, to hear the word and pass it on, then society is deprived of one of the 
essential to its very being.”8  
 
                                                
4 Kovach and Rosenstiel. The Elements of Journalism, p. 17 
5 Gans, Herbert, Deciding What’s News, p. 39 
6 Kovach and Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism, p. 21 
7 Ibid, p. 18 
8 Small, William J, Political Power and the Press, p. 16 
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Kovach and Rosenstiel also quote Lippmann when he wrote: “There can be no 
liberty for a community which lacks the information by which to detect lies”.9 
Hence, authors agree that journalism is an essential tool for democracies, as it 
provides people with the information they need to build their communities through taking 
their own free decisions.  
 
Truth. But for this to happen, people have to believe that the information they are 
receiving is truthful. Kovach and Rosenstiel say that the first obligation of journalism is 
to the truth. “Since news is the material that people use to learn and think about the world 
beyond themselves, the most important quality is that it be useable and reliable”.10   
However, among journalists there is not a unique idea of what truth means.  Most 
authors concede that it is a goal of every reporter. Yet, some journalists talk about 
accuracy and fairness, as they believe that truth is an ideal difficult to reach in an absolute 
way.  
Lippmann wrote in Public Opinion (1922) that news and truth are not the same 
thing. While the function of news is to highlight an event or make people aware of it, the 
function of truth is “to bring light to the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each 
other, and make a picture of reality upon which men can act.”11 
Kovach and Rosenstiel say that the search of truth is a goal for journalists, even 
when it is elusive. Although reporters might not get to the truth in their first story, by 
                                                
9 Kovach and Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism, p. 72 
10 Ibid, p.38 
11 Ibid, p.40 
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building a second and a third story – where mistakes are corrected, missing elements are 
added and more sources are quoted, the search for truth becomes a conversation.12 
“The truth here, in other words, is a complicated and sometimes contradictory 
phenomenon, but seen as a process over time, journalism can get at it.” 
The authors also say that the job of the media is to give its public what it needs “to 
sort out the truth for itself over time”.13 
Eugene Goodwin in his book Groping for Ethics in Journalism, on the other hand, 
talks about accuracy and fairness as the most important of journalism professional 
standards. “The facts that journalists can produce sometimes add up to the truth, but 
journalists are seldom able to put sufficient facts together at a given time to be able to tell 
the truth about some news subject,” he says.14 
But Goodwin talks about truth too, since he defines the accuracy standard as 
“being truthful both in gathering and presentation of facts and information; not lying, not 
plagiarizing.” 
ASNE’s statement of principles says that “every effort must be made to assure 
that the news content is accurate, free from bias and in context, and that all sides are 
presented fairly.” The same applies to editorials and commentary articles, as they should 
be held “to the same standards of accuracy with respect to fact as news reports.”15 
According to Leo Bogart in La Prensa y su Público (The Press and its public), the 
value that American managing editors concede to truth and accuracy of the information 
                                                
12 Ibid, p. 44-45 
13 Ibid, p. 29 
14 Goodwin, Eugene, Groping for Ethics in Journalism, p. 11. 
15 Hulteng, Playing it Straight, p. 35 
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goes all the way back to the times when there were no cameras or tape recorders, and 
reporters had to be able to give an independent version of the facts they saw or covered.16 
Linn also talks about veracity, credibility and truth as a net that defines 
journalism. “The independence of news media is related to the credibility the public gives 
to it. That credibility does not imply news media information is truthful, but that people 
believe in that information”. 17 
Truthful information is not necessarily the truth. Even if reporters do their best to 
gather all the details and ask all the sources about that information, it does not mean they 
have obtained the truth. “Veracity is, indeed, the best way to reach the truth,” Linn says. 
In other words, journalists should work to be accurate and truthful when they 
gather the information, and when they present it to their audience or readers. It does not 
matter what it is called – truth, accuracy -- in the end what matters is that the information 
people receive should be accurate and truthful, so that they can make their decisions. 
Kovach and Rosenstiel make a point of this issue, when they say: 
“As citizens encounter an ever-greater flow of data, they have more need – not 
less – for identifiable sources dedicated to verifying that information, highlighting 
what is important to know and filtering out what is not. Rather than expand the 
time they spend sorting through information themselves, a task that becomes 
increasingly time-consuming as outlets expand in number, people need sources 
they can go to that will tell them what is true and significant.”18 
 
Taking all these ideas into account, it can be said that journalism’s essential space 
is freedom; the final addressee of its work is the public; the crucial instrument of its work 
is rigor, in order to obtain the information in the conditions described above, Linn says.19 
                                                
16 Bogart, Leo, La Prensa y su Público, p. 367 
17 Linn, Pasión, rigor y libertad, p. 60 
18 Kovach and Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism, p. 44-45 
19 Linn, Pasión, rigor y libertad, p. 22 
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Truth is considered such an indispensable value for the delivery of news to the 
people, that many newspapers make it explicit and foremost in their codes of ethics or 
conduct, in the United States and worldwide.  
For example, after Eugene Meyer bought The Washington Post in 1933, he 
published “These Principles,” which said: “The first mission of a newspaper is to tell the 
truth as nearly as the truth may be ascertained. The newspaper shall tell ALL the truth so 
far as it can learn it, concerning the important affairs of America and the World.”20 
In its Ethical Journalism (2004) handbook, the New York Times says something 
similar: “The Times treats its readers as fairly and openly as possible. In print and online, 
we tell our readers the complete, unvarnished truth as best we can learn it.”21  
The Associated Press Statement of News Values (2005) says:  
“For more than a century and a half, men and women of The Associated 
Press have had the privilege of bringing truth to the world. They have gone to 
great lengths, overcome great obstacles – and, too often, made great and horrific 
sacrifices – to ensure that the news was reported quickly, accurately and 
honestly.”22 
 
The Dow Jones Code of Conduct also brings the truth as the main value of their 
reporting: “it is an essential prerequisite for success in the news and information business 
that our customers believe us to be telling them the truth.”23 
In its stylebook, El País de Madrid, from Spain, says that the newspaper will try 
to daily present truthful, complete, interesting, current and high-quality information, so 
that it can help readers to understand reality and to build their own criteria.24 
                                                
20 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/washingtonpost.htm. 
21 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/files/newyorktimesethics.pdf. 
22 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=6120.  
23 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=3555.  
24 El País de Madrid, Libro de Estilo, p.21 
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In Argentina, the newspaper La Nación says that the reader has the right to 
demand that the information published by the media is truthful.25 
Considering the value of the truth and how it is part of what journalism should 
seek, it has to be explained which methods reporters use to get information that people 
can trust to make their decisions. 
Gans, for example, considers that information gathered by reporters is not only the 
result of what they find through an empirical investigation, but it is also the result of 
concepts and methods they use to do that inquiry, and the assumptions that are usually 
behind those methods and concepts.26 Gans summarizes how reporters obtain the 
information in the following way: “from sources they observe or interview.” 27  
Kovach and Rosenstiel say that verification and synthesis are the “backbone of the 
new gatekeeper role of the journalists.” 28 Even though there are no standardized codes 
on this, every reporter operates “by relying on some often highly personal method of 
testing and providing information – in his own individual discipline of verification.” 
The discipline of verification consists in practices such as seeking multiple 
witnesses to an event, disclosing as much as possible about sources, and asking many 
sides for comment, they say. Kovach and Rosenstiel call it “the essence of journalism”, 
because it is that discipline what separates journalism from entertainment, propaganda, 
fiction or art. “Journalism alone is focused on getting what happened down right.”29 
Objectivity is linked to the discipline of verification. According to Kovach and 
Rosenstiel, “objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing 
                                                
25 La Nación, Manual de Estilo y Ética Periodística, p. 45 
26 Gans, Deciding what’s news, p. 39 
27 Ibid, p.116 
28 Kovach and Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism, p. 44-45 
29 Ibid, p. 71 
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information –a transparent approach to evidence- precisely so that personal and cultural 
biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.”30 
Although journalists usually give different interpretations to the meaning of being 
objective, the essence of the concept is the same, regardless of the misinterpretations and 
controversies the use of this word has aroused through journalism history. 
Kovach and Rosenstiel quote Lippmann when he said that reporters should 
acquire “the scientific spirit,” in the sense that they should aspire to “a common 
intellectual method and a common area of valid fact.” He meant that the method to gather 
the information should be objective, not the reporter.31 
Both authors emphasized that being objective in the method has implications, and 
one of them is the impartial voice used by news organizations to present the information 
to the audience. The neutral style of writing in journalism is “a device news organizations 
use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective 
methods.”32 
Gans says reporters try to be free from their own values and ideologies when they 
gather information, and even when objectivity is a value in itself, journalists try to 
exclude their preferences on the issues they cover.33 The author concludes that objectivity 
in journalism derives “from the use of similar fact-gathering methods; like scientific 
method, journalistic method is validated by consensus.” The methods are considered to 
be objective, since reporters – trying not to have any attachment with the story- do not 
                                                
30 Ibid, p. 72 
31 Ibid, p. 73-74 
32 Ibid, p. 74 
33 Gans, Deciding what’s news, p. 182 
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care how the story comes out, he adds.34 If they can or cannot be truly objective, it is a 
different discussion. But they do try to live up to their definition of objectivity, Gans 
says.  
The idea of being objective in gathering and presenting information is also 
reinforced by the necessity to protect journalistic credibility. “If journalists were not 
viewed as being objective, every story could be criticized as resulting from one or 
another journalistic bias, and the news would be distrusted by even larger numbers of 
viewers and readers than is now the case,” Gans writes. Reporters see themselves as the 
ones who provide information that will enable the public to come to its own 
conclusions.35 In other words, they need people to believe in the information they 
provide.  
Likewise, Goodwin says that depending on the history book, objective reporting 
started either with the growth of cooperative newsgathering through AP or it developed in 
the 20th century “as journalists imitated the scientific methods of natural science. In any 
event, the idea that news should be unbiased, balanced, fair became and remains widely 
accepted in the field, even though the word ‘objectivity’ has fallen into dispute.”36 
Goodwin also says that many journalists believe that objective reporting is 
defined by being spectators and not participants in what they cover. “Reporters are not 
supposed to get involved in their stories; they are not supposed to become part of the 
story; they are supposed to be neutral observers,” although it is not always easy for them, 
he says.37   
                                                
34 Ibid, p. 183  
35 Ibid, p. 186 
36 Goodwin, Groping for Ethics in Journalism, p. 11 
37 Ibid, p. 302 
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Others authors seem to be more radical in denying the purity of objectivity as the 
essence of journalism. In El Blanco Móvil (The Moving Target), reporter Miguel Ángel 
Bastenier says that objectivity does not exist, and there is no need for it to exist because 
every newspaper would give the same account of facts. But, he claims, what exists in 
journalism is honesty in the starting point or the will to act with the strict neutrality that 
gives journalism its condition of being a professional activity.38 
Looking through all these definitions, it seems clear that journalists try to provide 
information that it is truthful, so that the public can trust it. Reporters accomplish this 
service by using methods and techniques – both of them with objectivity, accuracy or 
fairness as their main values and goals -- that would help them to ensure that the 
information they are giving is truthful.  
Thus, the next question is where journalists should get information, and how they 
ensure that what they are publishing is truthful. 
 
Sources.  Reporters gather information basically by being in the place where 
things happen. As witnesses, they can later recall the events for their public, which may 
not have had access to those events or may not have had the time or interest to be there. 
Since reporters need to explain why those facts are important for the audience, they may 
seek comments from other people who were there or can give context to the event. 
Documents are another source of information. They can be official reports, 
academic research or special studies on issues of public interest, and they can be 
elaborated by organizations that are not part of the government, to mention a few 
examples. 
                                                
38 Bastenier, Miguel Ángel, El Blanco Móvil, p. 25-29 
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Human sources are a vital element of reporting. They can be officials, civil 
servants, witnesses of a certain event, citizens who are organized or not, or any person 
who has information. However, the relationship with sources of any kind is one of the 
most complex, changing and challenging for journalists, and yet it is one relationship 
they cannot avoid, since they need sources to have access to information that may be of 
public interest. 
Citizens rely on other sources of information for most of what they know, says 
Kovach and Rosenstiel. “Journalists monitoring the world on our behalf also most often 
depend on others for the details of their reporting,” they explain.39 
As Bogart puts it, reporters frequent places where news are supposed to be found, 
for examples, police stations, courts, governments offices, to mention a few.40 
As another example, Argentinean newspaper Clarín defines sources in the 
following way: testimonies of witnesses, officials or public people; official documents or 
from organizations; and radio or TV shows, photos, videos, Internet material.41 
Information is transmitted from sources to audiences, Gans says, with journalists 
“summarizing, refining, and altering what becomes available to them from sources in 
order to make the information suitable for their audiences.”42 The author defines sources 
as “the actors whom journalists observe and interview, including interviewees who 
appear on the air or who are quoted in magazine articles, and those who only supply 
background information or story suggestions.” Gans says that the most salient 
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characteristic of sources is that they provide information as members or representatives of 
organized or unorganized interest groups. 
“Journalists see people mainly as potential sources, but sources see themselves as 
people with a chance to provide information that promotes their interests, to publicize 
their ideas, or in some cases, just to get their names and faces into the news,” Gans 
writes. 43 Reporters and sources must have access to each other “before information can 
become news,” Gans says. However, the access is differentially distributed: those who 
are economically and politically powerful can get access to reporters and are sought out 
by them. But those who do not have power are harder to reach by journalists, or are not 
sought out until their actions “produce social or moral disorder news.”44  
Linn says that journalists are, in essence, “news diggers” as they have to “remove 
the ground” to see what is totally or partially hidden, especially by those who have 
power. Sometimes the reporter witnesses the event and sometimes he or she has to go to 
the main characters in order to obtain information. For those reasons, journalists are 
usually required to have a professional training that makes them capable of getting 
information, Linn adds.45 
Who are the sources? According to Gans, news is weighted toward sources that 
want to provide information. And sources become eager to release information, either 
because “they benefit from the widespread and legitimated publicity the news media 
supply or because they need the news media to carry out their duties,” he says.46  
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Thereby, what Gans calls “eager sources” become regular ones, and they often 
appear in the news. “Most sources that appear intermittently are agreeable; they do not 
need the news to survive but enjoy the benefits, such as added prestige, that come from 
appearing in the national news media”, Gans says. 
The author calls “permanently recalcitrant sources” to a smaller group of sources. 
“Many politicians and public officials who are normally eager sources will quickly 
become recalcitrant when the news hurts them or their cause,” Gans explains. “One 
permanently recalcitrant source is the organized or unorganized underworld; as a result, 
its leaders usually make the news only when they are murdered or imprisoned,” he says.47 
Within this description, Gans highlights the way powerful sources usually get into 
stories: They use their power to create suitable news. However, reporters and their editors 
“retain the right to choose suitable sources, and even the president is sometimes not 
deemed sufficiently newsworthy,” he says.48  
When sources are not powerful, they can overcome that difficulty because 
reporters need story ideas and stories, Gans says. But even then, their ability to be 
newsworthy “requires resources and skills, many of which go hand in hand with 
economic power, at least, and are possessed by only a few.”49 There is another group of 
sources that Gans calls “peer sources” and those are family members, relatives, friends, 
neighbors, and people reporters meet at social gatherings. Even children and their friends 
can play that role. All of them are credible sources because they usually do not talk out of 
their interest or group interest, and they can give story ideas.50 
                                                
47 Ibid, p. 118 
48 Ibid, p. 119 
49 Ibid, p. 121 
50 Ibid, p. 127 
 22 
According to Héctor Borrat in El Periódico, Actor Político (The Newspaper, 
Political Actor), newspapers try to conquer and keep the access to sources in order to 
satisfy their informative needs. At the same time, they are sought by sources that want 
their messages in the media. There are exclusive sources or shared ones, and both types 
are part of a network of sources a newspaper can have, he adds. Every source produces 
one version of what really happened, among other possible versions.51 Borrat adds that 
the number, quality and diversity of newspaper’ sources measure its informative power.52 
Having considered definitions of sources by different authors, it remains to be 
analyzed how the relationship between reporters and sources works. 
 
Relationships. Journalists relay on many and diverse sources to get information. 
A network of well-founded and trustworthy sources is indispensable capital for every 
reporter, Linn says. But to keep such a valuable network, journalists have to establish a 
personal relationship of trust, which most of the time ends up being conflictive.  
Linn says that usually there are contradictions between the value given by sources 
to what they leak and the value and use given by reporters who receive that information.53 
Freely doing journalism for an audience implies a conflictive relationship between 
reporters who look for news, and those who generate news, Linn says.54 Sources will try 
to push on their favor, and though it is legitimate, it will most likely affect reporters’ 
work somehow. 
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To have access to sources means that reporters need to gain their trust without 
deceiving their audience. This permanent “dribbling” between being loyal to a source and 
being loyal to a reader is, maybe, one of the most difficult to sustain, Linn writes in De 
Buena Fuente (From a good source). A deceived reader means the loss of credibility in 
reporters’ work; a deceived source leads to the lack of access to valuable information.55 
Gans says that the relationship resembles “a dance, for sources seek access to 
journalists, and journalists seek access to sources. Although it takes two to tango, either 
sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not sources do the leading,” he says.56  
“The source-journalist relationship is therefore a tug of war,” he says, “while 
sources attempt to ‘manage’ the news, putting the best light on themselves, journalists 
concurrently ‘manage’ the sources in order to extract the information they want.” 57 
From the sources’ perspective, he continues, a successful access to reporters 
depends on four interrelated factors: initiative, power, the ability to supply journalists 
with suitable information, and their geographic and social proximity to them. 
Within this relationship and its potential conflicts, there are several elements to 
consider. For example, journalists determine sources’ suitability with a main goal: 
efficiency. Since they have time constraints, they try to obtain the most suitable news 
from the fewest number of sources as quickly and easily as possible, Gans says. If 
sources have provided information for suitable stories in the past, they can be chosen 
again, as they are judged by their ability to supply a lot of information effortlessly and 
quickly. Another important issue in selecting sources is their reliability. Journalists will 
go after sources whose information requires the least amount of checking, although when 
                                                
55 Linn, Tomás, De Buena Fuente, p. 24 
56 Gans, Deciding what’s news, p. 116 
57 Ibid, p. 117 
 24 
it is a controversial story, they need to check the information with at least two separate 
and independent sources.58 
Reporters also look to talk to sources with authority and responsibility on issues, 
as official authorities. “They are assumed to be more trustworthy if only because they 
cannot afford to lie openly; they are also more persuasive because their facts and opinions 
are official,” Gans says.59 
Sources’ reasons to give information to a reporter are also relevant for the 
relationship with reporters. Many authors agree that sources give information for their 
best interest, while journalists seek them to obtain that information so they can provide it 
to their audience. Those mixed interests often create tension in this relationship. “When 
the source leaks information, it is not in the best interest of the public, but in its personal 
or group interest,” says Linn. Consequently, journalists have to be careful that sources’ 
motives are not affecting information received, and they need to check it with 
independent sources. They can be leaking distorted information to measure its effect on 
the public.60 
Although it may seem like a fluid relationship, sources can feel betrayed by the 
release of the information –even when they authorized the leak, especially if it has a 
boomerang effect, Linn says. The source may be the first to deny it, to publicly clarify 
that the disclosure was not his fault, and this can compromise reporters’ credibility. Even 
when journalists might be free from their confidentiality agreement, it is not always wise 
to release the identity, since it may lead to a controversial situation with other sources. 61 
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In the long term, Linn says, if the information were truthful, those who denied it in the 
first place would be the ones losing their credibility.62  
There are sources that disclose information because of their good will, said 
Hedrick Smith, in The Power Game. Others leak it in retaliation to their adversaries. 
Some sources leak information to measure the public reaction to potential policies. There 
are those who are angry at what they consider wrong doings, and they leak data.63 These 
are just examples of the many motives sources may have to release information. 
Journalists have to balance the value of the information leaked with the potential sources’ 
motives to disclose it.64 
Kovach and Rosenstiel recommend journalists be honest and truthful with their 
audiences about what they know and what they do not know, since they are supposed to 
be truth seekers. The best way to practice honesty “is to reveal as much as possible about 
sources and methods.”65 They consider it the most important element in creating a 
“discipline of verification.”  These explanations will allow the audience “to judge the 
validity of the information, the process by which it was secured and the motives and the 
biases of the journalist providing it.”  
 “If the best information a journalist has comes from a potentially biased sources, 
naming the source will reveal the audience the possible bias of the information – and may 
inhibit the source from deceiving as well,” they add.66   
In such a complex relationship between reporters and sources, with both parts 
having different motivations, conflicts are around the corner. One problem can be 
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determined by the closeness of the relationship. As Goodwin puts it: “Reporters who 
develop a friendship with their news sources, seeing them socially as well as 
professionally, can easily fall into the trap of favoritism.”67 Because of this closeness, 
reporters may feel that they have to avoid publishing information that can hurt their 
sources’ interest and, therefore, their friendship. If the source is really good, journalists 
may think that they will lose him or her by releasing that information.68  
 Goodwin explains that sources can also take care of reporters, “feeding them 
news or tips exclusively or at least ahead of their competitors, or filling them in on the 
sort of background information that makes their stories sound more authentic. A kind of 
mutual back-scratching pact can easily develop.”69 However, many reporters “try hard to 
avoid deep friendships with their sources for fear of relationships that would or might 
interfere with the reporter’s perspective and ability to treat news subjects fairly.”  
It is a hard call for reporters not to get involved with their sources if they share so 
much time together or if they develop a close relationship through social gatherings. It 
seems to be the perfect scenario for reporters to get breaking news or even to understand 
the context surrounding certain information. But the risk of not being able to accomplish 
the ultimate purpose of journalism, of providing all the information the audience needs to 
make its decisions, is too high for the reporter. Yet, the risk is also high for sources that 
may expect loyalty from reporters who are believed to be friends.  
Many newspapers try to avoid this proximity between journalists and potential 
sources by establishing rules in their codes of conduct. In practice, editors may decide to 
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rotate reporters from their beats or campaigns “to minimize the ‘cozy’ relationships that 
sometimes develop when reporters have to depend on the same sources again and again.” 
Nevertheless, journalists spend most of their professional lives covering the same 
beat, where they develop close relationship with their sources. According to Goodwin, 
editors acknowledge this problem “when they assigned reporters from outside a particular 
beat to move in on a special or negative story that the regular reporter could not do 
without losing some of his or her prized sources.”70 
As Kovach and Rosenstiel say: “Journalists must maintain an independence from 
those they cover.” However, they refer to something else –and Goodwin says the same -- 
which is a conflict of interest that has a lot to do with what was mentioned before. 
Journalists cannot be participants in the events, because that would cloud all the other 
tasks a journalist must perform, authors say. “It becomes difficult to see things from other 
perspectives. It becomes more difficult to win the trust of sources and combatants on 
different sides.” 71 
Seeing all sources as adversaries is another conflict that should be avoided, 
Goodwin says. “An adversarial relationship between reporters and sources is necessary 
for the press to be a true watchdog of government and other important institutions of 
American life, this argument holds,” Goodwin explains.72 “But treating all sources as 
adversaries can be just as unfair to them and to the public as treating them all as buddies”. 
Reporters who act as if most public officials or sources are thieves or incapable at their 
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functions, are wrong and they are apt to let their prejudices dictate both their questions 
and their news stories.73 
Many newspapers’ codes or internal rules mention how to deal with some of these 
conflicts between reporters and sources. The Washington Post Standards and Ethics 
refers to possible “conflict of interest” with sources and tells reporters how they are 
expected to behave. “This newspaper is pledged to avoid conflict of interest or the 
appearance of conflict of interest, wherever and whenever possible.” So journalists 
should pay their own way. “We accept no gifts from news sources. We accept no free 
trips,” it pledges. “We make every reasonable effort to be free of obligation to news 
sources and to special interests. We must be wary of entanglement with those whose 
positions render them likely to be subjects of journalistic interest and examination.”74 
Los Angeles Times rules that reporters should pay for their meals whenever it is 
possible, and should also pay for travel expenses. “Exceptions may arise when access to a 
news event or source can be gained in no other way. A journalist covering a military or 
scientific expedition, for instance, may have no reasonable method to pay for travel. 
Those arrangements should, however, be the exception.”75 Journalists cannot accept or 
give gifts to news sources, potential news sources or those who may seek to influence 
coverage.  
Foreign newspapers codes and stylebooks also give advice on how to deal with 
sources to avoid conflicts. El País de Madrid, a Spanish newspaper, says that a source 
has to be mentioned if the journalist did not witness the event. Whenever there is a doubt 
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on delicate issues, it should be contrasted between at least two independent sources.76 
Argentinean newspaper Clarín stylebook indicates that all the sources must be verified or 
confronted, whenever necessary.77  
 
Attribution. Once reporters get the information from sources, they deal with rules 
on how to attribute it. Before that, they have to negotiate with sources on how it will be 
published, an agreement that has an impact on the information released. 
One of the earliest reporters’ techniques to assure the reliability of the information 
was giving the source, Kovach and Rosenstiel say. “Such dependence on others for 
information has always required a skeptical turn of mind for journalists,” they write. If 
sources are fully described, people can decide for themselves if information is credible.78 
Linn talks about three ways to manage information from sources. The ideal one is 
when the source agrees to be quoted by his or her name and position. It is not the most 
frequent, he says, especially when the information is considered by the source to be quite 
“strong” for the audience.79 Another way is when the source requests not to be directly 
quoted and reporters will have to choose to pay the price of that limitation to publish the 
information. Yet, journalists may give a hint of where the information was obtained, by 
trying to specify where the source works.80 But a source can give the information, with 
the express request of not publishing it, which is known as an “off the record” request. 
These pacts with sources must be fulfilled. The only way to disclose the information is 
when a different source leaks it without that condition, says Linn. If sources do not have 
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these guarantees, they will never reveal information. If reporters do not commit to 
transitory confidentiality, in the long term the public may be misinformed, Linn adds.81  
Journalists come with a variety of contracts with which to negotiate their 
agreements with sources, Goodwin says, named “off the record,” “without attribution,” 
on “background” and on “deep background.” Sources speak “off the record” when they 
do not want to be identified with the information, and many use it sometimes even when 
they are speakers in a public meetings.82 “On background” describes the agreement when 
sources call in a group of reporters to brief them on a certain subject, but do not want to 
be directly identified with the information. “On deep background” is used, for example, 
for confirming a story.83 
According to Goodwin, the word “leak,” which is applied to information given to 
journalists that is not available to them through ordinary channels, is an offshoot of the 
background briefing. “That sort of thing happens when some person who is privy to 
private information decides, for one reason or another, to share that information with the 
world by feeding it to a single journalist or to a small group of them,” he says.84 
However, journalists are bothered by the possibility of being used when they 
come to these arrangements that restrict their ability to tell a story –not just what was 
said, but who said it and why. But even then, reporters have entered into these 
agreements. Some of them have gone to jail for not reviling their sources’ identities.85 
Thus, agreements of confidentiality are very important in the relationship between 
journalists and sources, but they are also another element in its complexity. Such is the 
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importance of these agreements that the ASNE wrote a principle about it as it follows: 
“Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore 
should not be given lightly. Unless there is clear and pressing need to maintain 
confidences, sources of information should be identified.”86 Goodwin says that those who 
support “the principle of confidentiality” for journalists argue that they are no better than 
their sources. “If you cannot promise protection, many people will not talk. And if you 
give in when a judge orders you to reveal a secret source, other sources will clam up 
when you or other reporters go to them for information.”87 If a reporter cannot carry out 
an agreement with the source, then he or she will have a short professional life, Linn 
says, because sources will know the journalist is not trustworthy and will not give him the 
information. Fulfilling such agreements is good professional practice, he adds.88  
Nevertheless, as a rule it has exceptions. As Kovach and Rosenstiel point out: “A 
growing number of journalists believe that if a source who has been granted anonymity is 
found to have misled the reporter, the source’s identity should be revealed. Part of the 
bargain of anonymity is truthfulness.”89 
The complexity of the negotiation and the reporter commitment show one of the 
biggest dilemmas in the journalist-source relationship: The use of anonymous sources can 
affect media credibility. “It is far better to go with genuine quotations from named 
sources who are in a position to complain if they have been misrepresented,” John 
Hulteng writes in his book Playing it Straight. If that happens, readers have some 
guarantee that they are getting honest reporting. “The appearance of impropriety can be 
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as damaging to the paper’s integrity in the case of faceless sources as it is in instances of 
conflict of interest,” he adds.90  
Hulteng says that “both old and new journalists indulge in a practice that falls in a 
gray zone between interpretation and flat-out lying: excessive reliance on anonymous 
sources.” However, he admits that sometimes is “necessary and helpful to make use of 
information supplied on condition that there is no direct attribution.” Yet, he adds that it 
is also “very easy to succumb to the temptation to cheat with such material. Anonymous 
quotes can be doctored to make them more biting or dramatic, or they can be made up 
from first to last to fit a given news situation and support the premise of a story.”91  
On the other hand, some sources do not want to reveal their identities and they 
have good reasons to make such request. “They might lose their jobs, be physically 
harmed or even killed, or lose the trust of those from whom they are getting the 
information they are passing on the journalists,” explains Goodwin.92 But editors have to 
be concerned over the use of anonymous sources in the following issues: the possibility 
of the media being used by sources who insists on secrecy or by reporters who can make 
up things and get them into stories by attributing them to supposed sources; and the loss 
of credibility when the public does not have enough information about sources.93 The lost 
credibility for using unnamed sources is the most bothersome aspect of confidentiality, 
says Goodwin. “Attribution –telling the public where the information came from- is a 
cardinal principle of American journalism and one that obviously has to be bent when 
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news comes from secret sources,” he explains.94 Although reporters seem to agree that 
there are times when granting secrecy to certain sources is the only way to obtain vital 
information, they do not agree on which level of threat to an individual or to society is 
required before anonymous sources can be justified, “or whether there has to be any 
threat at all,” Goodwin says.95 
Like Hulteng, Goodwin thinks “there is a widespread belief in the news business 
that confidentiality is being given too readily, and that the public suspects information 
that is not pinned to specific sources.” Journalists need to work harder on getting sources 
on the record “for credibility’s sake,” he adds.96 
The overuse of secret sources in news articles, Goodwin says, has hurt journalism. 
“When important sources of information and opinion are not specifically identified, the 
public is apt to distrust or dismiss what is written,” he adds. “Except in life- or society-
threatening situations where source protection is the only way reporters can obtain 
essential information, journalists ought to close ranks against leakers and news 
manipulators who insist on anonymity.”97   
In recent years, as dependence on anonymous sources for public information has 
grown, “journalists learned the importance of developing rules to assure themselves and 
their audience they were maintaining independence from the anonymous sources of their 
news,” Kovach and Rosenstiel say.98  
Many newspapers’ stylebooks deal with this issue. The Associated Press 
Statement of News Values says that journalists should seek more than one source, and 
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stories should not be released until additional sources confirm it. One source will be 
enough only “when material comes from an authoritative figure who provides 
information so detailed that there is no question of its accuracy.”99 Sources should be 
given full name and as much information as needed to identify them, and it has to be 
explained why he or she is credible. “The goal is to provide a reader with enough 
information to have full confidence in the story's veracity,” it says. 
The AP statement emphasizes that journalists should proceed with interviews on 
the assumption they are on the record. “If the source wants to set conditions, these should 
be negotiated at the start of the interview. At the end of the interview, the reporter should 
try once again to move some or all of the information back on the record,” it says. 
Journalists should try “to identify all the sources of our information, shielding them with 
anonymity only when they insist upon it and when they provide vital information – not 
opinion or speculation.” It adds that reporters can only agree to give this treatment “when 
there is no other way to obtain that information” and when they know that the source is 
reliable. Journalists must get approval from their news managers, who must know the 
identity of the source, “and is obligated, like the reporter, to keep the source's identity 
confidential.” They have to explain in their stories why the source requested anonymity 
and if it is relevant, the sources’ motives behind the discloser of the information.  
The AP statement also recommends reporters discuss with their sources the 
ground rules of attribution before the interview. If they agree to go on the record, the 
information can be used with no caveats and the source can be quoted by name. “Off the 
record” means that information cannot be used for publication, and “background” that it 
can only be published under conditions negotiated with the sources. However, in this 
                                                
99 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=6120  
 35 
regard, AP makes an exception and requests reporters to “object vigorously when a 
source wants to brief a group of reporters on background and try to persuade the source to 
put the briefing on the record.” There is another rule of attribution, “deep background”, 
which means that the information can be used, but without attribution, since the source 
does not want to be identified in any way, even on condition of anonymity. Information 
obtained under this way, allows the reporter to look for other sources to go on the 
record.100 
In its Standards and Ethics statement, the Washington Post says that it is “pledged 
to disclose the source of all information when at all possible. When we agree to protect a 
source’s identity, that identity will not be made known to anyone outside The Post.”101 It 
advises reporters to make every reasonable effort to get the information on the record, 
before accepting it without full attribution. “If that is not possible, reporters should 
consider seeking the information elsewhere. If that in turn is not possible, reporters 
should request an on-the-record reason for concealing the source’s identity and should 
include the reason in the story,” it says. The Post also recommends the use of some kind 
of source identification– by department or by position, for example. “The Washington 
Post will not knowingly disclose the identities of U.S. intelligence agents, except under 
highly unusual circumstances which must be weighed by the senior editors,” it adds. 
Los Angeles Times Code of Ethics starts talking about sources in the following 
way: “We report in environments – Hollywood and Washington, to name two – where 
anonymity is routinely sought and casually granted. We stand against that practice and 
seek to minimize it. We are committed to informing readers as completely as possible; 
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the use of anonymous sources compromises this important value.”102 Although it does not 
try to discourage journalists from dealing with sources who do not want to go public, the 
information sources are giving should be verified with sources willing to be named, with 
documents, or with both. Los Angeles Times establishes guidelines to treat unnamed 
sources, as well: it should be to convey important information to readers, not what is 
trivial, obvious or self-serving or speculation. “An unnamed source should have a 
compelling reason for insisting on anonymity, such as fear of retaliation, and stories 
should state those reasons when they are relevant,” it says. However, even when sources 
are anonymous, they should be identified as closely as possible, in order to give the 
reader an orientation to their potential biases. Reporters should ask editors before 
agreeing to protect source’s anonymity, and editors could insist on knowing the source’s 
identity to evaluate the reliability of the information provided. “In rare instances, sources 
may insist that the paper and the reporter resist subpoenas and judicial orders, if 
necessary, to protect their anonymity. Reporters should consult a masthead editor before 
entering into any such agreement,” the code says. It is possible that a prosecutor, grand 
jury or judge will demand to know a source’s identity, forcing the reporter to choose 
between unmasking the source and going to jail for contempt of court. The code says that 
those are rare situations, and should not stop reporters from investigating sensitive or 
contentious matters. “Promises to a source must be kept except under the most 
extraordinary circumstances. If a source, acting in bad faith, were to succeed in using the 
newspaper to spread misinformation, we would consider our promise of anonymity no 
longer binding. That said, we do not ‘burn’ sources.” 
In 2004, The New York Times released a source policy:  
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“Readers of The New York Times demand to know as much as possible about 
where we obtain our information and why it merits their trust. For that reason, we 
have long observed the principle of identifying our sources by name and title or, 
when that is not possible, explaining why we consider them authoritative, why 
they are speaking to us and why they have demanded confidentiality.” 103 
 
The use of unidentified sources is reserved for situations when there is no other 
way to release information considered reliable and newsworthy. “When we use such 
sources, we accept an obligation not only to convince a reader of their reliability but also 
to convey what we can learn of their motivation”, it adds. Reporters cannot assume 
anonymity in a regular interview, and should not offer it to a source. “Exceptions will 
occur in the reporting of highly sensitive stories, when it is we who have sought out a 
source who may face legal jeopardy or loss of livelihood for speaking with us. 
Anonymous sourcing will not be used when sources that can name are readily available. 
Confidentiality for sources cannot be used for speculation or for covering personal or 
partisan attacks, and should not be used for trivial comments. “We do not promise 
sources that we will refrain from additional reporting or efforts to verify the information 
being reported,” the New York Times says. “We do not promise sources that we will 
refrain from seeking comment from others on the subject of the story.”  The newspaper 
also says that when anonymity is granted, “the commitment is undertaken by the 
newspaper, not alone by an individual journalist.” Editors will have to keep 
confidentiality on the source’s identity as well as the reporter. Upon request, on regular 
stories, the executive editor and the managing editors are entitled to know the identity of 
the source. However, in the case of a moderately sensitive story, the reporter may wish to 
share the identity with the executive editor or managing editor only. “In the case of 
exceptionally sensitive reporting, on crucial issues of law or national security in which 
                                                
103 ASNE web site, available here: http://www.asne.org/images/nytpolicyonconfidentialnewssources.pdf  
 38 
sources face dire consequences if exposed, the reporter may appeal to the executive editor 
for total confidentiality,” the New York Time code says.  
Many newspapers worldwide also have rules on how to deal with sources. Clarín 
says that the best source is the one who can be identified with the full name, and when it 
cannot be that way, reporters should try to find a way to do the attribution as close as 
possible to the origin of the source, and they should never try to mislead the reader about 
the origin of the information.104 El País de Madrid makes the same recommendations to 
its reporters.105 
 
Effect.  According to the authors cited previously, the purpose of journalism is to 
provide people with the information they need to make their decisions on their lives and 
societies. It also contributes to controlling what the government is doing. Journalism 
helps to build societies by providing information that helps people to understand and 
share a common knowledge. “Journalism is our modern cartography. It creates a map for 
citizens to navigate society. That is its utility and its economic reason of being,” Kovach 
and Rosenstiel say.106 
But in order to provide this service, journalists must offer people information they 
can trust. That is why many authors talk about reporters looking for getting the truth. If 
the information journalists release were not truthful, people would not believe in it and 
would not be able to use it. “Thus journalists must be committed to the truth as a first 
principle and must be loyal to citizens above all so they are free to pursue it. And in order 
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to engage citizens in that search, journalists must apply transparent and systematic 
methods of verification,” Kovach and Rosenstiel explain. 107 
Goodwin explains it as follows: “What is needed is a set of principles based on a 
journalism that serves the public by aggressively seeking and reporting the closest 
possible truth about events and conditions of concern to people, a journalism that collects 
and deals with information honestly and fairly and treats the people involved with 
compassion, a journalism conscientiously interprets and explains the news so that it 
makes sense to people.”108  
Small also makes a point of this concept: “As Walter Lippmann put it, ‘The 
theory of a free press is that the truth will emerge from free reporting and free discussion, 
not that it will be presented perfectly in any one account.’”109  
In order to give the truth -- or an accurate report based on the information 
accessible at the moment -- journalists need sources, and they have to apply certain 
methods to obtain information from them and to ensure they are giving people truthful 
information. Sources are one of the most important elements in the described network to 
accomplish the purpose of journalism. However, authors agree that the relationship 
between sources and reporters is not always easy, since most of the time there are 
colliding interests between both. It is also enclosed by negotiations to disclose 
information, and agreements that have to be fulfilled by both parts to release the 
information and to keep the relationship working. 
Authors have implied that if the relationship between reporters and sources is 
altered in any way, the flow of information to the public will be affected. If journalists 
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cannot gain access to the information sources have, the public will not learn about what is 
happening and will not be able to be free and self-governing. In other words, journalism 
will not be able to fulfill its purpose.  
The importance of keeping an open and fluent relationship between reporters and 
sources is summarized by Small in the following way: “As history reminds us, free 
speech surrendered is rarely recovered.”110  
                                                





For the purpose of the study, this chapter describes what an official source is, 
where the source operates within the government, and the role of the press as watchdog. 
In order to give a context to the object of the study, the chapter also explains how the 
Washington, D.C., correspondents work with official sources, according to different 
authors. 
 
Official sources. Although official sources perform their roles as other sources, 
they are the gatekeepers of public interest information. Gans says that, “the recurring 
subjects of the news are nation and society – their persistence, cohesion, and the conflicts 
and divisions threatening their cohesion.”111 As people need to make decisions in their 
daily life, most of them are referred to their society, and therefore, their nation. Borrat 
agrees that news about politics is usually in the front page of newspapers, which have 
standard sections like national news, and they give columnists and editorials their main 
material to comment.112 
Nation is defined “as the federal government, and is often signified by the 
President and the presidency; but it also includes both nationwide and local institutions 
which are, in effect, ‘nationalized’ by the news,” Gans adds. Reporters usually cover 
news about the nation, as wars or international conflicts between governments. Other 
conflicts and disagreements usually covered through official sources, are those between 
public officials who personify different sections of the government. “Because the news 
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pays so much attention to the president, much of this type of news reports his 
disagreements and conflicts with Congress,” Gans says 113  
There is other news the press has to cover. Public officials such as the president or 
other executive-branch officials announce most of the government decisions and 
proposals. New government policies or congressional approval of new legislation or 
Supreme Court decisions also fall into this category. New appointments, resignations and 
dismissals of high public officials, mostly Cabinet secretaries and federal agency heads, 
are also news material, as well as high state and local officials in similar situations.114  
Considering that these activities are the main subjects of news, the most frequent 
actors, Gans says, “are inevitably individuals who play a role in national activities.”115 
Small defines those actors as follows: “The official source is one of a small breed, a 
member of either the establishment-in-power or the establishment-in-temporary exile, the 
political ins and outs, the official source major and the official source minor.”116  
These sources could be well-known or unknown people. According to Gans, 
“Knowns” can be political, economic, social, or cultural figures, and they can also be 
holders of official positions “or powers behind thrones who play no official roles.”117 
They are a combination of people: “Some are assumed by journalists to be familiar names 
among the audience; others have appeared frequently in the news and are therefore well 
known by the journalists. Some are not necessarily known by name but occupy well-
known positions, like governor of a large state or mayor of a troubled city.”118 The 
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“Knowns” frequently appear in the United States news and worldwide, and usually they 
hold governmental positions. 
Potential official sources are, for example, the President, who appears in the news 
most often, year after year. The White House centralizes a great deal of information from 
other federal agencies. “The president’s position involves him in a sufficient number of 
conflicts and world-shaking issues so as to generate a steady supply of suitable and, 
occasionally, dramatic news,” Gans says.119 Therefore, the president is one of the most 
productive, as well as authoritative and reliable, sources of news. 
White House staff members are the other official sources to obtain national news. 
As Don Campbell and Wendell Cochran say in Inside the Beltway, developing sources in 
there is difficult and most of the time frustrating. “Most administrations have no more 
than a dozen or so top White House aides –and often fewer – who are wired into all major 
planning and decision-making”, they explain. There is a second layer of several dozen 
aides who know some things about some issues, yet they do not have an overview of 
what is happening. “Establishing a working relationship with some of the few in the 
know is a first and lasting challenge for any White House reporter,” they say. Journalists 
should “work long hours, be persistent but fair, and demonstrate a high degree of 
knowledge and interest” in order to gain high level sources.120 
Presidential candidates are also potential sources. Since the presidency is so 
central to national news, “every presidential hopeful –provided he is affiliated with one of 
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the two major parties –enters the news when he begins to act like a candidate and stays 
there as long as he appears to have a chance at the nomination.”121  
Federal officials are also possible sources, since they work in the government and 
deal with all sorts of information within the government. Altogether federal officials 
appear in the news more often than the President, Gans says, but on a per capita basis, 
they do not get much coverage.122 They can be congressional leaders, from the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, or heads of major committees; they can be Cabinet 
members as, for example, the secretaries of State or Treasury; or they can be leading 
members of the White House staff or agency heads. Among official sources, there is also 
local official information that governors and mayors can provide, as well as civil servants 
from local governments.123 
Within national news, the defense beat seems to be rather difficult to cover. 
Campbell and Cochran say it is one of the most demanding and rewarding. It centers on 
the Pentagon, “although many sources and resources related to the beat are scattered 
across Washington, the nation and the globe.” The Pentagon can be a frustrating and 
difficult place to cover, since it is a “hostile environment” for reporters. It takes around 
three years to know the place, authors say, and reporters have to learn about everything: 
economic, science, political and budget beats. It is a place to work through public 
information officers, since military mobility makes it difficult to create a relationship 
with a source.124 
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These beats imply that reporters should deal with bureaucracy, which usually 
demands hard work to get stories out. “As elsewhere in government, the bureaucracy has 
its turf battles and political feuds. But unlike, say, on Capitol Hill, there is usually no 
ready source of leaks, counterleaks and political potshots in a federal agency,” Campbell 
and Cochran say. The flow of official information to reporters is often tightly controlled, 
to the point that sometimes the White House has to give clearance to talk.125 
 Thus, press offices are valuable links to cover agencies. However, journalists are 
always trying to get beyond them and into the bowels of the bureaucracy, even when they 
are not welcomed by those official sources. “Most bureaucrats are nervous about talking 
to the press unless they’ve developed a special relationship over time.”126 Campbell and 
Cochran say reporters should cultivate the relationship with the press officers at a 
relevant federal agency, because they will be “more conversant with the top dog’s 
thinking.” In addition, reporters should identify officials below the assistant secretary 
level involved in programs related to the beat they are covering.127  
However, there is a key place to get national news. “As in almost every 
Washington assignment, the Capitol Hill connection … is absolutely essential,” Campbell 
and Cochran say.128 “Since administrations must come to the congressmen for their 
money and must justify their programs while doing so, a great deal of information is 
disclosed,” Small explains. Congressmen would share information with journalists, but 
they are not necessarily altruistic or idealistic in sharing it: Sometimes they look for 
reporters’ attention to ensure good coverage when they are seeking their re-election, or 
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because their goal differs from the government. It benefits reporters who are looking for 
information.129 
A newspaper that does not have professional politicians among its sources 
“reveals in this shortage its few chances to influence,” Borrat says.130 For the politicians, 
the press is “irresistible,” as Small says, because it reflects what they are doing, and the 
image they are projecting. “It is the link to his constituency, a line to his public, the 
avenue to the electorate.”131 Politicians have a problem: The press is in journalists’ hands, 
not theirs. Public officials have an additional one. While corporate officials or others who 
operate without public funds can bar reporters, public officials “are legally required to be 
able for public inspection even if they try to circumvent the relevant laws,” Gans says.132  
All these elements explain why reporters go back to public officials to get 
information: the public interest in the matters they deal with, the obligation they have to 
release information, and the interest these public officials also have in letting people 
know what they are doing or which decisions they have taken. “The reliance on public 
officials, and on another, equally authoritative and efficient sources, is almost sufficient 
by itself to explain why the news draws the portrait of nation and society,” Gans says.133 
 
Watchdog.  Which is the role of the press when it comes to public matters, 
mostly held by public officials? The ASNE principles say: “The American press was 
made free not just to inform or just to serve as a forum for debate, but also to bring an 
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independent scrutiny to bear on the forces of power in society, including the conduct of 
official power at all levels of government.”134  
Hulteng says that through the years American press has acquired an indispensable 
role in the functioning of the democratic system. Former Wall Street Journal editor 
Vermont Royster said that the very phrase, “Fourth Estate,” implies that the press is part 
of self-governing process of our society. The media provide the information that people 
need to make their decisions when they elect their authorities and to keep tabs afterward 
on the stewardship of officeholders. “Inherent in this function are vast power and 
concomitant responsibility. Neither should be abused,” Hulteng says.135 
According to Goodwin, many journalists believe that their image of watchdogs 
protecting people from government abuses is rooted in the First Amendment. “They 
argue that a free press is an essential of democratic government. Without journalists 
observing and reporting on government actions and inactions, the voters would be 
ignorant and unable to make intelligent decisions in elections.”136 This role attributed to 
the press comes from the beginning of the American democracy. Before journals 
appeared, the internal workings of the government were primarily the knowledge of the 
privileged –those with business before the state or those directly involved in the 
administration. People used to be informed through gossip or official messages, until 
newspapers started to publish what the government was doing, instead of what the 
government wanted to inform.137  
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 “In the years to come, as conflict between a protected press and government 
institutions increased, it was this watchdog role that the Supreme Court fell back on time 
and again to reaffirm the press’s central role in American society,” Kovach and 
Rosenstiel say. The case of Near v. Minnesota forbade the government from restraining 
publication of any journal except when the story threatened “grave and immediate danger 
to the security of the United States.” From then on, the Court had methodically built a 
secure place within the law where journalists were protected “so that they may 
aggressively serve the public’s need for important information concerning matters of 
public welfare.”138 Both authors remember how Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black 
continued to focus on the press’s watchdog responsibilities when he wrote: “The press 
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only 
a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.”  
The centralization of power in the government created executives with powers 
unmatched earlier in American history and an irreverent and not-so-easy-to-intimidate 
press ended up being vital to balance this power. According to Small, press should be a 
“fourth branch of government when it performs its function, filling a void left as 
legislative and judicial shrink.” The press, he says, keeps politicians honest, alert to the 
scrutiny of their constituents and human.139 
Therefore, journalists must serve as an independent monitor of power, Kovach 
and Rosenstiel say.140 However, the goal of the watchdog role extends beyond “simply 
making the management and execution of power transparent, to making known and 
understood the effects of that power. This logically implies that the press should 
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recognize where powerful institutions are working effectively, as well as where they are 
not.”141 In addition, the watchdog principle it is not only about monitoring government, 
but extends to all the powerful institutions in society.142  
The watchdog role is interpreted differently from reporter to reporter and 
newsroom to newsroom. “‘The public’s right to know’ became a flag for those many 
journalists who infer from the roots of press freedom a special responsibility to be 
watchdogs of government, to protect the people from the abuses of government,” 
Goodwin says.143  
The author also advises that there are other kinds of reporters, the ones he calls 
“lapdogs” who seem to be “too cozy, too intimidated, and too respectful of people in 
power,” as Les Payne from Newsdays puts it. Sometimes reporters are more insistent in 
their watchdog role; other times they are not that into it. “Journalistic watchdoggery also 
seems to wax and wane with the times, showing its more aggressive fangs during the 
Watergate era and wagging its tail during the Regan presidency, for example.”144  
When the watchdog role is not played so aggressively, responsibilities associated 
with it fail to be fulfilled, by omission rather than commission, Hulteng says. Journalists 
do a poor job bringing scrutiny to bear on activities of government by not reporting about 
them or not looking for them or just evading them.145 Kovach and Rosenstiel also 
consider the watchdog principle “is being threatened in contemporary journalism” 
because of an overuse “aimed more at pandering audiences than public service.”146  
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Nevertheless, journalists continue to see the watchdog role as central to their 
work. “Nearly nine out of ten journalists believe the press ‘keeps political leaders from 
doing things they shouldn’t do,’ and the watchdog role was second, after informing the 
public, among the answers journalists volunteered as to what distinguished their 
profession from other types of communication,” Kovach and Rosenstiel say on a study of 
their book.147 
The press has the role of monitoring government decisions and activities, as well 
as other institutions. Journalists get the information from official sources, not always 
willing to release it. This conflict of interest surrounds a difficult but needed relationship.  
 
Conflictive relationship. Tension, distrust and suspicion are main elements in 
this particular relationship between journalists and official sources. While reporters have 
to obtain information quickly, public officials have their rhythm and interest in releasing 
information of public interest. Journalists tend to believe that politicians try to cover up 
mistakes, withhold public information and only want to get positive coverage. Politicians 
usually think reporters only seek negative information, that they are biased and most of 
the time they are not interested in getting facts straight if good story can get spoiled. Too 
often both parts are right about the other.148  
However, this tension between press and public servants is fundamental for the 
people’s decision-making process. Government cannot be counted on to release 
information about mistakes, or corruption or fraud. “When conducting the people’s 
business it is easy to rationalize the errors of the bureaucracy, easy to cover them up with 
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the excuse that it serves no useful purpose to undermine public confidence,” Small says. 
But the press and political opposition see useful purpose in exposing government’s 
imperfection. In other words, “if the unpleasant aspects of government go unreported, the 
public is not simply uninformed, it is misinformed.”149  
So, how can journalists work with government officials and still do their jobs as 
critical observers and reporters of government activities, Goodwin asks. There is a degree 
of cooperation that serves both interests.150 But there are certain barriers for this 
cooperation to develop; one is the secrecy many public officials want to act with, and 
then there is the closeness many reporters may get while dealing with public officials. 
The root for the tension between journalists and politicians is based on the fact 
that they are driven by different interests. “Men in government, for good reasons as well 
as suspicious ones, are compelled to minimize or suppress information, to try to mold it 
by the amount they release and the timing of that release,” Small explains. “Men in the 
press, by practice and tradition, want to publish all they can learn as quickly as they can. 
The two groups must differ in this key element to their relationship and as a result are 
compelled to become adversaries,” he concludes.151  
The only “law” in press-government relations is that information is provided in 
reverse proportion to the amount of controversy involved, Small says. Official sources 
tend to be less cooperative when the subject is too sensitive. Politicians are not prompt to 
share material that either gives a negative image of their administration or that they judge 
must be kept from the public for its own good. “It is the arrogance of political power that 
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those who have it always knows best when the public should know least,” Small says.152 
Thus, governmental secrecy is one of the main sources of friction between journalists and 
public officials, because it is in the nature of governments to operate in the shadows and 
to resent the probing of the press.153  
Public officials tend to feel that people are best served when they know about 
actions and decisions at “the right moment,” while journalists want to put it out right 
away. Official servants also tend to believe that it is not always in the public interest for 
people to learn about certain matters. As Small puts it, they consider it not fooling people, 
but only protecting them. Public officials may believe that their knowledge of the public 
business allows them to know for sure when premature release or release at all of 
information can be more damaging than helpful.154 For example, government public 
information people may not always be truthful in their dealings with the press, although 
they can give journalists a lot of legitimate information. “The drive for secrecy leads 
government officials who are otherwise honest and open people to resort deceptions, 
half-truth, and even lies,” Goodwin says.155 
 “Authorities frequently feel the need to do business behind closed doors or to 
seek cooperation of individual journalists or their organizations in certain projects or 
operations,” Goodwin says. “Both of these compulsions of government –to be secret and 
to involve journalists as partners- threaten the watchdog concept. They also present 
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journalists with difficult ethical decisions about their responsibilities as citizens as well as 
their functions as reporters and evaluators of their own government,” he adds.156  
Closeness between government officials and journalists is another source of 
tension in the relationship. Official sources can be overwhelmingly attractive to reporters. 
They can be persuasive in arguing the need to delay the release of the information or to 
protect the public from some of the facts. “Newsmen are sometimes persuaded and 
become willing accessories,” Small says, “Whenever they do, they violate the trust that 
the Founding Fathers placed in the press. The First Amendment is a protection for the 
public, not the press alone.”157 The power of being persuasive comes from the proximity. 
“Cronyism, flattery, sharing of confidences all work in favor of the politician. Only the 
tradition of independence and of skepticism by news people works against him,” Small 
writes.158 Even Walter Lippmann warned more than once, “Cronyism is the curse of 
journalism.” When official sources tell reporters that they will be trusted with certain 
information because they are responsible, or when they flatter journalists by inviting 
them to dinners and lunches, reporters may fear losing the source by offending them if 
they do not agree to go.159  
There is another kind of cooperation that can lead to trouble. Sometimes public 
officials turn to journalists for advice. Reporters can feel flattered and find it difficult to 
turn down. “Then if friendship develops between the advice seeker and giver, serious 
conflicts of interest can result for the journalist,” Goodwin says.160  
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The same problem can show up when reporters assigned to a particular beat over a 
period of time become tired of being watchdogs.161 Furthermore, journalists want to 
treasure good sources, but sometimes they can feel tempted to call them all the time, even 
when it is not their subject and just because they are quotable and easy to reach. That is 
another focus of potential conflict.162  
 Having said all these, official sources have an indisputable advantage compared 
to reporters no matter how hard-digging they may be. Because of their positions in the 
government, they are the beginning of news with their statements, explanations or news 
releases and generate an attention that cannot be overlooked. “Even when the reporter, 
the honorable exception, refuses to accept gospel, the burden counterpoint to official 
sources becomes his; he must disprove the political contention,” Small writes. To break 
through this situation, reporters have to find sources outside existing establishments to 
see if either official sources or their critics are to be trusted.163 
Reporters are usually under pressure to censor and self-censor from public 
officials more than from other business. And government officials tend to be more 
sensitive to news about themselves and what they do, and they have many ways to 
communicate displeasure on what has been published or released. Public servants can 
complain to a news editor or a corporate executive. They can also threaten to hurt the 
media company economically if journalists do not report the news more of the liking of 
these officials. Moreover, administrations can launch investigations of the media 
company to persuade journalists not to release certain information. As well as regular 
sources, angry public servants can also sue reporters to restrain them from gathering and 
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reporting news which can be harmful to their interests. A last type of pressure is when 
they appeal to the public in an attempt to show press failures. The intended outcome of 
this action is to generate negative reactions from the public toward reporters to freeze 
them out.164 
“Considering the tools that men of power have to weaken and wither the press, it 
is a tribute to journalists that they have survived the intrusions of politicians and 
governments so well for so long,” Small says.165 And indeed it is. Reporters have 
uncovered many kinds of abuses from governments through history and that has become 
another tool to get into official secrecy at all levels. Secret government takes damaging 
steps to “protect” the public, and “only free and public discussion can be disinfectant.”166 
“It is hoped that lack of applause will not stop journalists from aggressively pursuing 
what they see as their watchdog function,” Goodwin adds.167  
After analyzing the potential conflicts within the relationship between reporters 
and official sources, the question is how this relationship works in the U.S., who are the 
official sources and where do reporters collect the information. 
 
Washington Correspondents. As the capital of the United States of America, 
Washington, D.C., concentrates most of the government offices and agencies, as well as 
the White House and the Congress. It is in Washington, D.C, where journalists from all 
over the world converge to cover not only American news and their connection 
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worldwide, but also foreign news, since most international organizations are based there. 
It is the city where most official sources work. So, how do correspondents work there? 
“Satisfaction and frustration are constant companions in Washington,” Campbell 
and Cochran say. “The glamour of walking the corridors of power is tempered daily by 
the demands of discovering behind which doors that powers resides, and in what amount, 
and for how long. Many people are ready to help reporters open those doors; some are 
not.”168  
While thousands of potential sources are in Washington, their value as sources 
sometimes is inversely proportional to their willingness to talk.169 Journalists’ success in 
Washington can be measured in the quantity of knowledgeable sources they have. 
Keeping those sources requires mutual trust. “One side craves publicity to promote 
careers and policies. The other side depends on making contact with the right people to 
gain reliable information. Candor and credibility depend heavily on the confidence that 
officials have in the reporters and their news outlets,” Donald A. Ritchie says in 
Reporting from Washington-The history of the Washington press corps.170  
To gain confidence among their sources, Washington journalists have crafted 
formal and informal rules to relate with them. One of the most important is the attribution 
rules. Both reporters and officials know the difference between what is on and off the 
record, not for attribution, or on deep background. “The press corps has a proud history 
of refusing to divulge confidential sources. Twice during the nineteenth century, 
Washington correspondents were imprisoned in the Capitol in unsuccessful attempts to 
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force them to reveal the source of leaked government secrets. Countless other leak 
investigations ended just as ineffectively,” Ritchie writes.171  
Since people in Washington are busy, developing sources is a constant challenge, 
no matter how long the reporter has been around. Even journalists who have been 
covering the capital for many years find it difficult to get high sources to return their 
phone calls. And that is even harder for journalists who are not read in Washington – 
foreign correspondents or regional ones -- because officials tend to pay less attention to 
their needs. Another challenge, besides getting through to the right person, is being able 
to separate facts from fiction and rhetoric from reality. Washington is a place where 
hidden agendas and second intentions behind quotes or data are more frequent than in any 
other place, since it is where officials can measure right away the effect of their decisions 
and policies.172 
Nevertheless, although getting high and powerful sources is one of the biggest 
challenges for reporters in Washington, it is also the biggest potential danger for them. 
Trying to get closer to sources in order to gain their trust, can lead reporters to get too 
cozy with sources. For this reason, Campbell and Cochran recommend: “Don’t become 
an insider. Washington can be an incestuous place. The lines between work and play are 
subtle and easily blurred. But you can be friendly and sociable in dealing with sources 
and still keep them at arm’s length.”173  
Indeed, if Washington reporters have showed any persistent partiality, it has been 
toward those who hold power and the information they are trying to get. “As vexed and 
abused by reporters as so many politicians felt, the Washington press corps has always 
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paid the greatest attention to those in authority,” Ritchie says.174 Official authorities have 
also paid attention to journalists, because it is useful for them to become their favorites. 
“There are always favorites in the press, there is always social courting of newsmen. 
More than one Washington bureau chief has urged his reporters to be neither in nor out, 
far enough from sources to retain objectivity but close enough to be effective. Distance is 
an excellent prophylactic for reporters dealing with politicians. Familiarity breeds 
contempt and inhibited reporting,” Small says.175  
In addition, when a journalist gets too close, too intimate with a source, he can fall 
prey to a publicity-seeking politician. If sources know how, they can use newsmen “by 
offering stories too delicious to reject, too outrageous to ignore, and too difficult to 
question if the reporter is to remain his customarily objective self,” Small adds. 
As Washington is the capital of national news, media outlets send their 
correspondents to cover big stories. But there are few places where they can get them, 
and many journalists end up covering and writing the same story. The lack of diversity 
may come from the way public officials organize the coverage, through a press 
conference with a sole source or through a background session with an unnamed official 
source. Reporters wait for the information together, whether they like it or not, so they 
are forced to base their stories on the same information. That is called pack-journalism or 
herd-journalism.176  
Some reporters believe it is not bad. “It’s a useful device sometimes, such as a 
situation not uncommon when you are watching outside a Senate hearing room or the 
White House for some meeting to break up. Reporters pick up targets of opportunity and 
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then get back together and exchange quotes,” said David Broder, Washington Post 
columnist.177 However, many complain that in Washington within the pack-journalism 
there is a tendency to let the New York Times, the Washington Post and the AP set the 
agenda or decide what journalists should be attending to, Goodwin says.178 The pool 
reporting is a different way of pack-journalism in Washington. Reporters do not always 
like it, because it implies that only a handful of reporters are allowed to observe an 
important event and then they have to brief the others who were not allowed to be there. 
Washington correspondents have other problems getting information. Many times, 
government representatives invoke the need to keep information secret in the name of 
national security. “The revelation of some government secrets obviously would 
jeopardize the nation’s security, but recent history has taught us that our leaders also 
invoke national security improperly to cover up embarrassing mistakes, administrative 
incompetence, and plans they don’t want the public to know about for strategic reasons,” 
Goodwin writes.179 Although journalists have gone after those secrets, they have often 
restrained themselves when the possible harm has been obvious.  
Even so, journalists learn what administrations try to keep hidden through "leaks" 
from officials sources. “Howard Simons, former managing editor of the Washington Post, 
says it’s impossible for journalists in Washington to do their daily job “without bumping 
into a secret.” He notes that about 4 million bureaucrats have access to classified 
information and estimates that 20 million government documents are classified as secret 
each year,” Goodwin writes.180   
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Despite government fighting to prevent leaks, official sources also leak 
information themselves to further their own policies. According to Ritchie, leaks became 
a prime instrument of government. In the 1940s, Bruce Catton, Washington 
correspondent before writing history, defined leaks as information that officials were 
“either unwilling or unready” to reveal formally but would divulge to reporters they 
trusted not to reveal their sources. “Reporters, likewise, needed to have some confidence 
in their sources’ proximity to the actual events and their honesty in conveying them. 
These collaborations resulted in stories attributed to ‘a usually reliable source’, 
‘administration officials’, ‘sources close to the investigation’, and ‘high-level sources’,” 
Ritchie says.181 
If government sources can face several problems when they leak information, why 
do they leak it? Stephen Hess, who used to study government-press relations, identified 
certain reasons. One is related to the sense of self-importance that the leaker is looking 
for himself by leaking information. Another reason is to get favorable treatment from 
some reporters. Yet another reason is to promote or shot down a proposal. It can also be 
to test public opinion before deciding on some policy. And there is also the whistle 
blower, who leaks information to try to correct a perceived wrong doing in the 
administration.182 Official sources leak to float trial balloons they can later disavow, to 
sabotage programs they opposed, and to undermine their rivals. Yet, leaks also allowed 
the public to get a glimpse of policies still in the making, Ritchie says.183  
Within the three main forms of investigative reporting Kovach and Rosenstiel talk 
about, they point out reporting on investigations. This refers to reporting that develops 
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from the discovery or leak of information from an official investigation already under 
way or in preparation by government agencies. “It is the case of journalism in 
Washington, a city where government often talks to itself through the press,” they say. 
Government investigators cooperate with reporters in these cases for many reasons: to 
affect budget appropriations, to influence potential witness, or to shape public opinion.184 
Having reviewed how the Washington press corps usually work to get 
information, it has to be noted that past decades were “replete with attempts by those 
running the government to manipulate reporters by controlling and distorting the flow of 
information. But manipulation was not always necessary to make reporters receptive to 
the government’s agenda. The press corps generally shared a similar worldview with 
those in power, and embraced the prevailing national consensus,” Ritchie says.185 Some 
of these concepts are analyzed in the next chapter that refers to the history of the 
relationship between government officials and reporters. 
Yet, no matter how much politicians and authorities try to avoid them, 
Washington reporters provide most of the information the public receives about the 
government. 
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This chapter intends to review through history how different administrations dealt 
with the press -- in terms of access to information, laws, relationship with reporters -- and 
how journalists dealt with official sources. If it is established that the relationship 
between public officials and reporters changed after 9/11, the importance of those 
changes should be analyzed under the light of what happened before.  However, the 
chapter only highlights issues over history that may add perspective and context to the 
study. 
 
Early Days.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances,” the First Amendment says.  
Since the beginning of democracy in the United States, the press has operated 
under this amendment, which has been emulated in many other countries. It establishes a 
protecting frame for journalists to work, invoked any time it was threatened. The First 
Amendment was born in the 18th century, when newspapers were highly partisan and 
opinionated, and very popular. The Founding Fathers early understood that protecting the 
right of such publications to keep publishing their criticisms was vital to establish and 
maintain democracy.186 
However, the First Amendment was not always respected or interpreted in the 
way it was intended to be. There were convictions involving antiwar publication and 
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speeches that were sustained even by the Supreme Court.187 There were many 
components that drove to those reactions and still do. During times of crisis, federal 
governments have sought to enlist journalists “and other opinion shapers as allies in 
telling the administration’s version of events or, failing that, to suppress those who insist 
on leveling criticisms,” Ted Galen Carpenter explains in The Captive Press. Critical press 
was inconvenient for many past administrations, especially when investigative journalism 
tended to uncover stories they did not want to make public.188 
Governments usually knew and still know that people’s awareness or ignorance of 
these stories could greatly influence their support for an initiative.189 Nevertheless, 
administrations tended -- and still tend -- to recognize that the press could be effective to 
disseminate propaganda. As Carpenter says, journalists, especially those in Washington, 
exist to report on government. Less government intervention would provide them less 
work, and therefore, less presence in their media. Reporters were and are highly 
motivated to reveal information that administrations would prefer to keep hidden; and in 
order to do it they have to cultivate good relationships with those who provide the 
information.190 
Small summarizes part of the problem in the following statement: “Presidents 
don’t like the press.”191 Many presidents have said that they would be defenders of press 
freedoms and that they would offer an “open” government. “Almost every president 
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comes to develop a strong distaste for the press and an urge to malign, manipulate, and 
manage the press very soon after his early days,” Small says.192  
 George Washington wanted a State Department clerk fired because he edited an 
anti-Washington newspaper, while Teddy Roosevelt brought libel suits against 
newspapers during and after his presidency. Even Thomas Jefferson once suggested that 
a few good prosecutions would help restore the integrity of the press. Presidents hate 
news leaks too, and many of them have gone after “leakers.” Teddy Roosevelt and 
Herbert Hoover used the Secret Service to find the source of unwanted news reports. 
John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon tried to use the FBI similarly.193  
However, presidents could not ignore the press. “It is like walking past a full-
length mirror several times a day. One can’t resist looking into it and seeing what it has to 
reflect,” Small says. But journalists cannot succumb to the presidential seduction. When 
that happens, people develop their own skepticism and they do not believe in the press.194 
Since the beginning of democracy, press was supposed to perform the role of an 
independent ‘censor’ of government, as Jefferson put it. “The newsman was not meant to 
be ‘on the team’, he was meant to view that team from sidelines.”195 For those reasons, 
Small writes, “They will never be compatible, American presidents and the press. That is 
something that citizens should be grateful for.”  
Even so, journalists were restrained from freely performing their role of 
independent observers of governments. It usually has happened “in time of national 
strain, including time of war, when newspapers have been stopped of publication [sic], of 
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mail privileges, of distribution, and, even on occasion, put out of business, the editor 
jailed or expelled from the community,” Small recalls.196Administrations have an 
advantage over the press, which is the right to protect state secrets. Hiding the actions of 
government from the public has been a general and persistent behavior. “It is done in the 
name of efficient operation of the people’s business. But the power to operate in a closed 
room is the power to cover up error or worse,” Small says.197 
This last point has been reflected in the inherent tension between requirements of 
national security as perceived by government officials at the time, and the freedoms of 
speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The tension has historically been 
more pronounced during wars or foreign policy crises.198 
The strain in the relationship became evident very early in the history of the 
United States. During President Adams' administration, and in order to control anti-
federalist critics over foreign policy issues, four statutes were passed in 1798, collectively 
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. These were enacted in the middle of a foreign 
policy crisis, when the country seemed to be on the edge of a war against France. 
Nonetheless, they set the pattern for subsequent relations between the press and the 
government.199 
The Alien Act gave presidents an unrestricted power to expel any alien critic from 
the country. The Sedition Act was designed to silence all foreign policy criticism, even 
that coming from U.S. citizens. It prohibited any “false, scandalous and malicious 
writing” directed against any branch of the U.S. government, with the intent to “defame” 
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or bring it “into disrepute,” among other things. As the Gazette of the United States put it 
then, “It is patriotism to write in favor of our government –it is sedition to write against 
it.” Those who violated the act could be fined $2,000 and could spend two years in jail.200  
The acts represented such broad grants of power that they enabled government 
officials to silence foreign policy critics for any reason, while they considered critics as 
disloyal elements that ought to be suppressed. The Alien Acts were not enforced, and 
only 25 persons were arrested for violating the Sedition Act. These laws had a two-year 
expiration date. But Americans reacted angrily to them, which may have later been 
reflected in the election of 1800 and in the strengthening of the respect for freedom of 
expression.201 Many aspects of these laws would be coming back later in history, when 
the country was facing similar war scenarios, Carpenter says. 
During the Civil War, at first, Union authorities requested that newspapers follow 
voluntary censorship, but they did not provide guidelines. “As would be the case in future 
wars and foreign policy crises, when the government failed to get its way by urging the 
press to be cooperative and ‘patriotic,’ it resorted to coercion,” Carpenter says. 202 
President Lincoln’s administration then took measures to prevent the disclosure of 
information that could undermine military operations. But the guidelines were vague and 
it opened the door to censor other kinds of information, to the point that newspapers 
could be prosecuted for publishing “false reports” that may hurt the Union cause. In fact, 
military authorities temporarily shut down the Chicago Times for criticizing the 
administration.203 
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Meanwhile, censorship of news dispatches began in Washington when the 
government assumed control of all the telegraph wires in April 1861.204 The service 
allowed journalists to report about military movements as they were taking place. As 
many in the military considered reporters as  spies, transmission of news dispatches were 
delayed. In February 1892, the War Department took military control of the telegraph 
lines. The order said that all newspapers that published unauthorized military information 
would be excluded from receiving reports or from transmitting dispatches through 
telegraphs.205  
Presidents’ personal styles shaped relationships with journalists. “Presidential 
anger often involved leaks of information that he either does not want published, does not 
want published in that form, or does not want published at that time,” Small explains.206  
Teddy Roosevelt called the chiefs of the three press associations of the time, and 
let them know that as a president he would be accessible and would trust reporters who 
possessed his confidence. But if that confidence were betrayed, Roosevelt would punish 
them by withholding news. Roosevelt also made a habit of calling reporters’ editors to 
complain about stories and to suggest firing a journalist.207 He instituted modern press 
relations in the White House. Press releases were timed to get maximum effect; he even 
wrote many of them. Roosevelt introduced the news conferences, but did not hold them 
regularly. He allegedly invented the “trial balloon,” the act of sending an idea to the press 
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and, depending on people’s reaction, later deciding if it was worthy to take credit for it. 
He also played favorites with reporters to leak information.208 
William Howard Taft did not like the press that much, while Woodrow Wilson 
looked forward to meeting reporters. Wilson scheduled news conferences regularly and in 
advance, two per week. But he disliked reporters when they asked questions he assumed 
as critical of his administration. Wilson introduced the “off-the-record” remark, as he 
often started his statements requesting not to be quoted.209 But problems started with a 
war. 
 
World Wars. Several years after the Civil War, the United States engaged in a 
debate on a foreign conflict that resulted in tough controls for the press. Authors do not 
agree on how tough Wilson was on the press once the United States entered World War I 
in April 1917. A week after entering the war, Wilson created a Committee on Public 
Information headed by George Creel, former editor of the Rocky Mountain News in 
Denver. Creel tried to invoke within the press a voluntary will to censor information that 
could compromise the actions of the American military in the war, while he also tried to 
persuade the administration to avoid formal mechanisms of censorship. But in the 
following two months, legislation would allow censorship.210 
According to Small, although there was “some depressingly oppressive 
legislation, the actions against the press in World War I were far less extreme than those 
of the Civil War.” He says that Wilson, “while shrinking from the White House press 
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corps, stood firm in defense of press freedoms.”211 But Carpenter sees it differently: “The 
Wilson administration’s repressive actions during the World War I placed First 
Amendment freedoms in greater danger than they had been in at any time since the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of more than a century before, and significant precedents were set for 
controlling the press in the name of national security.”212 Administration officials co-
opted most elements of the press as part of a massive propaganda campaign to “sell” the 
war effort to the American public, Carpenter writes. Critics were either intimidated or 
suppressed. “For the first time in American history, the government claimed a legal and 
moral right to exercise monopoly power over information on international affairs,” 
Carpenter says. The Committee on Public Information directed an “ubiquitous 
government propaganda apparatus,” he says. There were tough rules to give war 
correspondents credentials. A prominent journalist was assigned to censor press 
dispatches.213 From 60 correspondents working at the front, five lost their credentials for 
having “offended” the censor.214 
However, Small and Carpenter agree on the impact that three acts had on the press 
during World War I.  The Espionage Act, approved in June 1917, opened the possibility 
of imprisonment for those who made “false reports” to help the enemy. “It soon became 
evident that federal prosecutors considered the mere circulation of anti-war literature a 
violation of the Espionage Act,” Carpenter says.215 The law provided fines up to $10,000 
and long jail terms for interfering with the draft or encouraging disloyalty or exposing 
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secrets to foreign powers. Over half a century later, this act was brought up in the case of 
the government against the New York Times in the Pentagon Paper controversy.216  
A few months later, the Trading with the Enemy Act authorized the president to 
censor all international communications and gave the postmaster general sweeping 
censorship authority over foreign-language press in the United States.217 The law 
formalized censorship and made it a punishable offense to convey any false report or 
statement that interfered with U.S. military success. In May 1918, the Sedition Act listed 
nine additional offenses including the use of disloyal or profane language about the 
United States, its constitution, its flag, and the uniform of its Army or Navy. The fine was 
set at $10,000 or 20 years in jail.218 The Sedition Act gave power to the federal 
government over verbal and printed opinion. Over 1,500 persons were arrested for 
disloyalty because of these laws.219  
“The tangible legacy of the wartime censorship statutes was evident in legislation 
as well. Although Congress repealed the Sedition Act in 1921, the Espionage Act and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act remained on the books. Furthermore, during both the 
conflict and the years following, more than two dozen state legislatures enacted criminal 
syndicalism laws patterned after the Sedition Act of 1918,” Carpenter explains. 
“Restraints originally designed for a wartime emergency thus became part of the nation’s 
legal framework even during the period of unquestioned international peace.”220 
Moreover, an interesting amount of information never got to the public during these days. 
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Carpenter says that there is no credible evidence that public disputes about war policies, 
which these acts intended to suffocate, could increase the number of casualties.221 
Warren Harding’s presidency brought to an end the wartime repression. Harding 
used to be an Ohio publisher, and kept a good relationship with the press corps. But once 
he faced an incident with his secretary of state, Harding announced that all reporters’ 
questions should be presented in writing, and none would be answered until the 
department affected was consulted. If there was no reply at all, he said, no reference to 
the fact could be made. During his term, the “White House spokesman” device appeared 
to avoid quoting the president directly.222 President Calvin Coolidge restored press 
conferences, but he did not say that much. Questions were given in advance, and he 
would select the ones to answer.223 
Instead of a war, Hebert Hoover faced a major economic crisis. His interaction 
with the press corps got worse during those days, as he suggested that reporters exercise 
self-censorship in writing about the depression. He later recommended that they submit 
their stories to the White House for clearance before publishing them.224 Hoover did not 
like stories about his personal life leaked out from the White House. When it happened, 
he assigned the Secret Service to find the source and placed a ban on all White House 
news, other than official and approved announcements. The Service Secret failed to 
accomplish his request, while the restraint on news also failed.225 According to Ritchie, 
Hoover “preferred to deal with a select group of friendly reporters, and divorced himself 
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from the rest of the Washington correspondents. The resentful press corps suspected that 
his initial cordiality had been simply a calculated maneuver for advancement.”226  
During those years, New York was the news center, not only because the 
economic crisis, but also because politics was not the focus of public attention. Reporters 
did not want to work in Washington, where most of the action was receiving press 
releases and briefings.227 The Great Depression forced several Washington news bureaus 
to close down, and more papers were depending on wire service reports.  
Around 300 news bureaus operated in Washington when Franklin D. Roosevelt 
entered the White House in 1933. In his first press conference, he announced that there 
would not be written questions. At the end, reporters gave him a round of applause.228 
Roosevelt instituted twice-weekly press conferences. He understood that both parties 
would have an adversarial relationship, but he also knew how to get his story across 
through a good handling of correspondents, the radio and the movie newsreels. His 
administration established four types of information for reporters: off the record (not for 
publication), occasional special items for direct quotation, background information, and 
the indirect quotation –information which could be attributed to him without the exact 
quote.229  
Instead of giving exclusive interviews, Roosevelt dealt with reporters as a group 
in his regular press conferences. According to Merriman Smith, from United Press, 
during these conferences Roosevelt “insulted them, lectured them, and made them 
laugh.” He called reporters liars, said Smith, but afterwards, with a first-name greeting, 
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he would win forgiveness.230 “These were times of the New Deal. He used the strategy of 
denying information whenever the public reaction didn’t suit his interests,” says Ritchie.  
However, Roosevelt had an uneasy relationship with Washington’s most 
influential news bureaus. “No matter how artfully he flattered and rewarded their 
correspondents, he could not control the news they reported,” Ritchie explains.231 As well 
as other presidents, Roosevelt did not like to be criticized. When he presented a bid of a 
third term in 1940, Arthur Krock from the New York Times, wrote a highly critic article 
on him. Roosevelt did not seem to pay attention, but he later asked the Secret Service “to 
bar from press conferences a half dozen of the most critical correspondents,” and Krock 
was among them. Press Secretary Steve Early promptly rescinded the order. 232  
During World War II, the relationship between Roosevelt and journalists changed. 
He kept doing press conferences, but he started traveling in secret and invited select 
groups of correspondents and columnists for off-the-record background briefings.233 The 
Roosevelt administration requested the media to refrain from publishing information 
about a variety of topics, including the construction of new ships and the strength of 
various naval units. This happened a year before the United States entered the war. After 
the Pearl Harbor attack, the response of the government was immediate censorship, 
Carpenter says.234  
The tension was in the air before the Pearl Harbor attack. The Chicago Tribune 
published an article about the strategy of the government to win a war against Germany 
and Japan. The newspaper was accused of being disloyal and unpatriotic, although 
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Roosevelt seemed to be pleased with the leak. Days after, the Pearl Harbor attack 
happened and the United States entered the war. In June 1942, the Chicago Tribune 
published a story on Japanese naval capacity, giving clues from which Japanese could 
have surmised that the United States had broken their codes. The U.S. Navy demanded to 
prosecute the newspaper under federal espionage laws, and a grand jury was impaneled. 
But the Navy realized that Japanese did not read the paper because the codes remained 
the same after the story was published. Although the case collapsed, the Washington 
bureau of the Chicago Tribune had to face FBI agents interviewing reporters and tapping 
their phones, Ritchie explains.235  
Once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the FBI temporarily assumed control 
over both news reports and telecommunications into and out of the country. Later, 
Roosevelt appointed Byron Price, editor for the Associated Press, as the head of the new 
Office of Censorship. Congress passed the First War Power Act, which authorized the 
censorship of all communication between the United States and any foreign country. The 
Office of Censorship issued a Code of Wartime Practices to which publishers and 
broadcasters were asked to adhere. Among other things, the code banned interviews in 
the street of random people, because they could be used to send coded messages to Nazi 
or Japanese agents.236 Nevertheless, press seemed to be quite receptive to these 
restrictions. “Virtually all reporters were enthusiastic supporters of the war and willingly 
responded to requests to sanitize or withhold unpleasant information. Stories of allied 
atrocities were notably absent –even though such incidents did occur – and accounts of 
dubious policies or even outright military blunders seldom appeared,” Carpenter 
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writes.237 Roosevelt’s connection with journalists was also reflected in the fact that he 
managed to hide his physical infirmities from the public, while he was the president. 
Reporters never wrote about his health and photographers never showed that kind of 
picture. This power over the press extended also to the coverage of war and government 
issues.238 
The administration “fostered an illusion of greater tolerance of dissenting views, 
but the mechanisms of control and intimidation were merely more insidious. The 
unhealthy legal precedents established during the first global conflict were reiterated and 
strengthened during the second,” says Carpenter.239 Both world wars helped to build the 
idea that the press should be either a tool for disseminating government’s propaganda or 
an adversary to be silence. This mindset, he adds, continued into the Cold War era and 
beyond.  
“One of the most prominent casualties of the two global conflagrations of the 20th 
century was the concept of independent, unfettered, and skeptical press coverage of 
foreign policy,” he says.240 Hard as Carpenter’s appreciations may sound, later in the 
same century other foreign conflicts had an impact in the same concept of press coverage. 
 
Cold War and McCarthy. Harry Truman used to give short press conferences, 
whenever he felt there was a need to give one. His administration was also trapped in a 
war conflict that impacted the press. When the World War II was over, the executive 
branch and the Congress tried to strength government’s control of information. Support 
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for secrecy first focused on the atomic bomb. With the McMahon Act from 1946, among 
other provisions, strict secrecy on atomic research was demanded, so those projects were 
“born classified.”241 It was a first step into a concept of “national security· that reflected 
the beginning of the Cold War, a period of high tension between the United States and 
the communist soviet regimen.” Patterns established during the two world wars to 
manage the press corps were used in more subtle ways.242 
Members of the Truman administration used the “selective leak”: officials would 
choose reporters who “cooperate” and give them valuable information for exclusive 
stories. Those considered uncooperative were frozen out.243 Many authors agree that the 
attitude of the press corps during the Cold War was not brave, yet tended to be eager to 
please. As Carpenter puts it, “An increasing number of journalists failed to heed the 
warning of Walter Lippmann that there ‘were certain rules of hygiene’ in the relationship 
between journalists and government officials ‘which one has to observe’. Members of the 
press, he admonished, ‘cannot become the cronies’ of officials if they are to do their jobs. 
At least ‘an air space’, if not a wall of separation, was essential.”244  
According to authors, journalists were also challenged by an increasing climate of 
fear and hysteria that made them frequent subjects of witch-hunts. In the late 1940s, the 
U.S. Army arbitrarily revoked the credentials of 11 reporters and denied them to 50 
others to ban them from covering military issues. In 1948, Secretary of Defense James 
Forrestal tried to impose a loyalty test, similar to the one taken by official employees, to 
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journalists seeking credentials. Reporters complained, so it was called off, but the 
military kept investigating the backgrounds of those in charge of covering the beat.245 
Efforts to restrict the media’s sources on defense and foreign policy issues –with 
the exception of data on atomic energy, as it was said before- were sporadic in the post-
World-War-II period until the Korean War. During that war, Carpenter says, main media 
did not oppose and, in fact, reporters actually ended up requesting to be formally 
censored to clarify the guidelines on what could be or not released. Many journalists 
thought that it was a way of being patriotic.246 “Much of the conformity was not the result 
of blatant governmental restrictions. Instead, it was a response to subtler signals –
expressions of official approval of ‘patriotic’ accounts and vaguely ominous indications 
of disapproval of critical stories,” Carpenter adds.247 Hence, many journalists in TV 
channels used the expressions “we” or “ours” whenever they referred to the U.S. forces.  
Even so, when the U.S. cause was doing well, censorship eased on journalism, but 
whenever there were setbacks, military censors became less tolerant, a pattern that had 
been seen during both world wars and would be seen again in future conflicts, Carpenter 
says.  
During those years, Sen. Joe McCarthy stepped into scene, causing American 
journalism one of its biggest controversies of all times. In the early 1950s, McCarthy 
used the concern and paranoia of the moment about the Communist threat to create news 
that would put him daily on the front page of every newspaper. He offered press 
conferences to announce he had a list of alleged members of the Communist Party in the 
United States government, but he was evasive in letting other Congress members know 
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what he was up to. He attacked government officials and other persons, or he was quoted 
making statements that, if true, press and government could not ignore. McCarthy knew 
about deadlines and how to produce the stories reporters needed to be on the front page.  
For four years, he managed to feed the atmosphere of fear against Communism or against 
being called a Communist.  
Although the Senate disciplined McCarthy when most of his accusations could 
not be proved, the damage of his action over the press’ credibility was huge.248 
McCarthy’s accusations and statements were not enough challenged or investigated by 
journalists, who seemed keener to get a good story fast. On the one hand, the senator was 
quick to suggest connections between newspapers and communism, especially if he was 
criticized in their pages. On the other hand, budget cuts in Washington bureaus left 
reporters with little time or resources to check McCarthy’s lists. “The senator had 
provoked agonized discussions in many Washington news bureaus over how to cover 
someone they thought was lying, and whether employing news analysis to challenge his 
assertions would somehow undermine their objectivity,” Ritchie explains.249 
But McCarthy’s legacy included other lasting effects. In 1951, Truman, one of the 
senator’s favorite targets, issued an executive order authorizing federal agencies to 
classify and withhold all matters related to national security. It also empowered agency 
heads to pass the classification authority on to their subordinates.250 Journalists 
complained that this executive order was too vague and would lead to massive over-
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classification. Republicans also complained against the government’s intents to feed the 
secrecy culture.251  
Two years later, President Dwight Eisenhower issued a new executive order, 
which tried to restore “a proper balance” between public information and state secrets. It 
took classification privileges away from 28 federal agencies, limited them in 17 others 
and left only 15 with full classification authority.252 It reduced the number of categories 
to top secret, secret and confidential, and eliminated the reserved category. The executive 
order also let reporters appeal to a higher authority when a lower-level official denied 
specific information.253  
In 1954, Eisenhower extended the executive order to “executive privilege” to keep 
his administration officials from having to face congressional cross-examination. 
Although it was intended to prevent administration officials from falling into McCarthy’s 
hearings, it was ultimately used to protect officials from being held accountable to the 
Congress. “Since executive orders cut off the Congress as well as reporters, the press is 
twice damaged since as much news about a presidential administration leaks out of the 
Congress as from the White House itself. Senate chairmen complained about the penalty 
of such presidential power during all the years since Truman first issued his executive 
order,” Small explains.254 
That being so, one consequence of the Cold War was the exponential increase in 
the number of classified documents. Before the Cold War, only information related to 
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military operations was secret, but it changed as the national security concept 
increased.255 
 “The absence of media skepticism about U.S. foreign policy continued with few 
exceptions throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. What is so striking in 
retrospect is the lack of inclination to challenge the official version of events even when 
government explanations were manifestly dubious,” Carpenter says.256  
During Eisenhower days it was not easy to obtain information. He had every 
intention to run a “leak-free” administration. In late 1955, Marvin Watson, who was in 
charge of spotting staff members making contact with the press, installed a system of 
phone checks at the switchboard operators, to record every outside call received by 
staffers. Reporters realized what was happening when operators begun to ask their names. 
They started giving names of movie stars and international playboys.257 Press Secretary 
James Hagerty was the only bridge to get an interview with someone from the 
administration, as the White House staff “clamped down tightly.”258 Hagerty allowed 
television to film the president press conferences, but he reserved the right of the White 
House to edit the film. When journalists complained, he said the White House wanted to 
have control of the spoken word of the president. Yet, he never edited any film.259 
Even so, in 1960 the Eisenhower administration was caught giving misleading 
information, when the U-2 spy plane was shot down by the Soviets. At first, the 
government assumed the plane had vanished with the pilot, so officials said it was a 
weather flight. But the Soviets had the pilot who confessed it was a spy flight. Hence, 
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Eisenhower had to admit in public that it was an espionage activity.260According to 
Carpenter, the official lie was possible because the press did not report the incident in the 
proper way. “The apparent wish of the mainstream media to be deceived was more than a 
little distressing, for they accepted without scrutiny or reservation the government’s 
contention that all of its actions were vital to the nation’s security,” he says.261 Many 
times the State Department requested media to “soften or suppress” a story. For example, 
public officials asked to downplay Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959. 
After Eisenhower’s cold relationship with the press, it was the turn of President 
John Kennedy’s charm with the Washington correspondents. Kennedy liked and was 
liked by reporters. His press conferences were called when he had “news to make.”262 
Kennedy had a direct approach to journalists, and gained their trust. But even then, there 
were moments of high tension between official sources and journalists. 
Since Cuba represented one of the biggest issues in Kennedy’s short 
administration, it quickly became a topic of confrontation with the press. In April 1961, 
Gilbert Harrison, from the New Republic sent presidential aid Arthur Schlesinger Jr. the 
draft of an article on CIA activities among Cuban refugees in preparation for the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, that was about to be published. The New Republic agreed not to run the 
article, as Kennedy requested.263 The New York Times was working on a similar story in 
Florida, about recruiting men to engage in an “imminent” invasion of Cuba. After 
internal discussions, editors decided to leave out the time of the landing and every 
mention of the CIA involvement. Many editors protested, since the newspaper had never 
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changed a story for political reasons. Publisher Orvil Dryfoos said national security and 
safety of men going ashore were involved.264 
The invasion of April 17, 1961, was a failure. Newspapers reacted angrily toward 
Kennedy’s administration for hiding the information. Three days later, at the American 
Association of Newspapers Editors, Kennedy spoke about Cuba, yet not directly about 
the Bay of Pigs incident. In his speech, “he stressed the need for the media’s commitment 
to self-censorship on defense and foreign policy issues, and the impact of the precedents 
and attitudes established during the two world wars was alarmingly apparent in his 
thinking,” Carpenter says.265 Kennedy asked the publishers to recognize their own 
responsibility and to re-examine standards. Even the First Amendment “must yield to the 
public’s need for national security,” the president said. A group of editors later met with 
him to discuss what he had in mind. Kennedy said he did not want to restrict anything, 
but insisted on the need to be aware of the critical period the country was leaving.  But he 
assured them he had no intention of declaring a national emergency with a censorship 
system over the press.266 
Kennedy faced another serious crisis late in 1962, when it was discovered that 
Soviets were placing missiles on Cuba. He took personal action in dealing with the press 
to avoid earlier disclosures of information. The president requested newspapers –among 
them, the New York Times- to withhold the information, and they did.267 In an attempt to 
justify the lies that were released during that crisis, Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary 
of state for public affairs, argued that news generated by government’s actions were part 
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of the president’s arsenal of weaponry to deal with crises.268 Kennedy “expected the 
media to operate on a wartime footing for what might well be decades. The troublesome 
point the president failed to address was whether healthy, independent news media could 
survive such a prolonged period of constraints,” Carpenter explains.269  
Many reporters complained against what they called a “news management” policy 
in the Kennedy’s administration. They argued that Bay of Pigs preparation was hidden, 
and the results of the investigation did not become public. The State Department released 
a report before the invasion that misled reporters, and during the invasion the Defense 
Department gave false information to mislead the enemy, which also misled the public. 
Journalists criticized the use of “planted” questions in news conferences. Press Secretary 
Pierre Salinger would call his favorite reporters and say that if a certain question were 
asked, they would receive a “most interesting answer.” Salinger defended the practice, 
arguing that the president may come prepared to answer important questions and 
reporters would not ask them because they were not well prepared.270 
The administration considered using lie detectors to find leaks at the Pentagon. 
Sylvester created a directive that forbade Pentagon staffers from talking with reporters 
unless the substance of the conversation was reported later to the Public Information 
Office.  They could invite a member of the office to witness the interview. The State 
Department tried to apply the same policy, but journalists complained so much that it 
could not be used.271 White House aides were required to clear any contact with the press 
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through Salinger beforehand. After any interview, White House staffers were expected to 
give a written report about it, Helen Thomas recalls in “Watchdogs of Democracy?”272 
Kennedy believed that it was really important for the administration to speak with 
one voice. All speeches were supposed to be cleared by him, and in sensitive matters, 
questions should be referred first to the White House.273 In addition, at least three 
reporters were woken up or called by FBI agents who requested information on their 
stories about Edmund Martin, president of Bethlehem Steel, who was being investigated 
by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Others said that the FBI was also used to shadow 
reporters in the Pentagon and to ask journalists about their stories.274 Kennedy replaced 
Eisenhower’s executive order, aiming to downgrade or declassify material. But he used 
the executive privilege to prevent military and State Department censors from testifying 
about deletions made in high military officers’ speeches.275 
According to Thomas, the trend of “news management” only got worse from one 
administration to the other, and President Lyndon Johnson’s years proved it. Johnson 
entered the White House after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, and tried hard to seek the 
favor of the press. He had reporters and publishers for lunch or formal dinners at the 
White House. It did not prevent the media from publishing stories that Johnson 
considered embarrassing or against him.276 So the president or his assistants would call 
publishers to grumble about stories he disliked. Johnson was also known for granting 
favors to reporters writing “good stories” about his administration. 
                                                
272 Thomas, Helen, Watchdogs of Democracy?, p. 69 
273 Ibid, p. 64 
274 Ibid, p. 164 
275 Ibid, p. 161-162 
276 Ibid, p. 109 
 85 
Many times, the administration tried to find leakers. After an unwanted story 
broke, the Secret Service would canvass the staff to see who had seen the reporter 
involved.277 Also throughout the Johnson administration, the planted question in the press 
conferences continued. Press secretary Bill Moyers said, “It is the prerogative of the 
president to decide how he’s going to make himself available to the press and how and 
when he makes certain information known to the press. It’s to serve the convenience of 
the president, not the convenience of the press that the presidential press conferences are 
held.”278  
Johnson always believed that the press was plotting against him, Thomas says. An 
example was the abolition of the press pool that use to travel with the president in the Air 
Force One. The purpose was to ensure that there would be qualified press coverage in 
case of emergency, but Johnson saw reporters as “spies” and did not like to travel with 
them. Yet, journalists were back in the plane shortly after.279  
That being so, if Kennedy’s government was known for its “news management,” 
the Johnson administration was known for the “credibility gap.” This meant, “The White 
House was not to be believed,” says Small. Reporters resented the fact that all important 
announcements had to be funneled through Johnson’s office, as much as they resented the 
twist and turns of administration statements, the publicity barrages to distract people from 
other issues, and Johnson’s passion for secrecy.280 
The Vietnam War caused the credibility gap to widen, as well as the Dominican 
Republic revolt in 1965, when the government tried to hide the participation of American 
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troops, saying they were trying to save U.S. citizens. In both events, president and 
administration officials were caught in half-truths, contradictions and even lies.  
During Kennedy’s administration and also during Johnson’s, public servants tried 
to discredit journalists who were writing reports from the war. Between 1961 and 1964, 
officials on the scene intensified their pressure on news personnel to promote the official 
version of what was happening. They helped the Saigon government to censor “negative” 
stories and to prevent them from leaving the country.281 Allegations of “disloyalty” 
became frequent. Many reporters who had written articles that the Pentagon considered 
critical of the U.S. action in Vietnam, were accused of being disloyal. The tension with 
the press got worse after the Tet offensive in January 1968.282 However, none of the three 
administrations that dealt with Vietnam war imposed a rigorous censorship system, 
Carpenter says. In 1965, Gen. William Westmoreland recommended instituting formal 
censorship to protect military security, and restricted access to certain installations. For 
three days, officials from the State and Defense departments discussed the proposal 
before concluding that the system would be unworkable. They argued that without a 
congressional declaration of war, the military would not have the authority to perform 
such activity.283 
However, it was during Johnson’s years that the Freedom of Information Act 
became law. “Although most presidents have sought to perpetuate or even strengthen the 
secrecy system in the name of national security, Congress has made periodic efforts to 
the opposite end,” Carpenter explains.284 The FOIA allowed journalists, among others, to 
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have a statutory right to press the government for the review of classified material and to 
have the material declassified if it did not pose a threat to national security. “As it turned 
out, however, the change was more theoretical than substantive,” Carpenter adds. The 
law exempted nine categories of information, including records specifically required by 
Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 
After that, journalists had to face bureaucratic obstacles to get the information requested. 
They had to ask the right question or to identify the material with incredible precision, to 
receive it. In addition, FOIA procedures were too expensive or too time consuming for 
the media.285 In following administrations, the act changed to ensure access to 
information, with different results. 
 
Nixon administration. President Richard Nixon was convinced that the press 
corps disliked him and his party. “In the long history of unhappiness with the press, no 
administration ever attacked the media as boldly as that of Richard Nixon,” Small says.286 
“During Nixon’s White House years, news management was made into a new 
science, using any number of nefarious techniques,” Thomas says. The president had the 
phones of “offending” reporters wiretapped; the vice president talked about “disloyal” 
journalists; the Department of Justice attempted to subpoena reporters’ notes; and a 
White House aide called television channels to advise them to let more conservatives in 
the networks or they would be facing antitrust lawsuits, Thomas recalls.287 
When Nixon took office in January 1969, he found a friendly press, although it 
did not last long. At the end of the year, Vice President Spiro Agnew “was to unleash the 
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most bitter, perhaps the strongest attacks on the news media ever made by such a high 
profile official,” Small says.288 Agnew looked to affect media’s credibility, but mostly he 
tried to discredit the information about Vietnam War. His first speech against the press 
was in November 13, 1969. Several networks received complaints on their coverage of 
the Vietnam War, and they, as well as newspapers, were called unpatriotic.289 
Strange things started to happen to journalists that were perceived as critical to the 
administration. Daniel Schorr did a piece for CBS about the government, and shortly 
after, the FBI was investigating him. According to the government, Schorr was being 
considered for a public position. Jules Witcover wrote a critical book about Nixon’s 1968 
campaign. Once it was published, his sources were intimidated and Internal Revenue 
Services started to investigate him.290 
Meanwhile, Nixon’s staff called the media to request copies of editorial comments 
on the government. Many thought it was a subtle way to intimidate the press, since the 
Federal Communications Commission, which licenses television stations, was asking 
networks for transcripts of their comments on Nixon’s speeches. “In 1972, the Justice 
Department filed antitrust suits against the three networks, and television stations owned 
by newspapers regarded as ‘hostile’ to the administration had their license renewals 
challenged. White House aides admonished network executives to be more prudent,” 
David Broder remembers in Behind the Front Page.291 
The White House press corps was facing other challenges. Press Secretary Ron 
Ziegler and staffers applied certain techniques to weaken reporters’ work, says Timothy 
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Crouse in The Boys on the Bus. They tried to divide journalists from the same medium by 
giving the story to one on the condition of not letting others work with it, or freezing out 
certain reporters from covering presidential activities, or auditing certain journalists’ 
taxes after they wrote something critical, as they did with Witcover292 “Meanwhile, the 
White House kept building up a powerful public relations machine whose function was to 
compete with the press, to go over the heads of the press and straight to the people. The 
White House sent off tons of mailings to newspapers and individuals. The White House 
frequently demanded and received free network television time so that the President 
could present his arguments to the public and even so the Vice President could attack the 
press,” says Crouse.293 
Nixon did not give many news conferences during his two terms. He held only 
eight in his first year in the office and during 1970 only four, says Small.294 After the case 
of the Pentagon Papers and the Watergate investigation, Nixon did not give any other 
press conference. He became increasingly inaccessible to the press, holding only nine 
news conferences in his last 20 months in the White House, adds Broder.295  
The lack of press conferences affected the quality of journalists’ jobs. “Since few 
of the White House correspondents had opportunities to ferret out information, since they 
were largely sequestered from staffers and outside sources, they needed decent briefings 
and press conferences if they were going to do a creditable job,” says Crouse.296 It was 
not only the administration’s fault, but also reporters’, since they “refused to assert 
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themselves, except to write a few snipping, ineffective articles about the lack of press 
conferences.”297 
During Nixon’s administration executive orders were extensively used, notably in 
the case of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He was “only allowed to speak on 
background at press conferences and was never allowed to appear on television until the 
end of Nixon’s first term,” Thomas says.298 These executive orders kept Senate 
committees away from examining Pentagon material including the Pentagon Papers. 
When the Justice Department tried to prevent the New York Times from publishing the 
Pentagon Papers, it used executive orders promulgated and amended by Eisenhower and 
Kennedy.299 Nixon tried to deny the special prosecutor access to the Watergate tapes 
under a claim of executive privilege. The Supreme Court later turned down this executive 
privilege.300 
Likewise, the FBI investigated government employees who were thought to be 
possible sources. In September 1971, it was revealed that FBI agents quizzed officials in 
the State Department, and it was suggested that these public servants had to take lie 
detector tests after leaks related to a U.S. offer in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
and a second story about U.S. arms being shipped to Pakistan.301 The administration used 
other tools to detect leakers. “In Saigon in early 1970, four agents of the U.S. 
Government had masqueraded as newsmen in an apparent attempt to find out how 
newsmen got information from military sources. When legitimate newsmen unmasked 
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the impostors, the army said it was an isolated incident, ‘Somebody goofed’ and that it 
was not the policy of the military to pose as newsmen,” Small recalls302  
The Office of International Security Affairs in the Pentagon reinstituted the 
practice of monitoring conversations with journalists. Public officials could never hand 
reporters a copy of the rules for those monitoring sessions, says Small. The Pentagon 
“kept a close eye on reporters. A number of newsmen reported that telephones were 
tapped including their own phones in the press room. Defense denied this. Security 
agents have conducted investigations of news reports to find the source of leaks. 
Reporters have been called for questioning by FBI agents or Pentagon investigators.” 
Nonetheless, Small says, such interrogation was rare for journalists, and never high 
profile or unfriendly. But with Pentagon staff, investigators could be tougher and could 
threaten to use, or use, lie-detectors.303  
The relationship between reporters and the Pentagon got worse during the 
invasion of Laos in 1971. To prevent the enemy from learning U.S. military positions, 
commanders placed embargoes on news. With the Laos invasion, the embargoes reached 
new landmarks: they were applied to all news and lasted six days. Reporters could not tell 
they were banned from writing what was happening.304 Nixon considered the press was 
unfair with the Laos invasion coverage. “President Nixon’s criticism, while more muted 
than the strident attacks of his vice-president, served some of the same functions. One, it 
raises doubts as to how much the public should trust the journalist, and two, it serves to 
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warn journalists that the product of their efforts is being carefully watched,” Small 
explains.305   
Subpoenas became a frequent tool to learn what journalists knew about dissident, 
militant, radical protest groups and their leaders, especially during the post-1968 period 
following the riotous Democratic National Convention, Small explains. The author adds 
that in mid-1971 CBS and NBC disclosed that something like 123 subpoenas had been 
issued in an 18-month period, 52 of them by the government, to both broadcast networks 
and affiliates.306 During that year, Attorney General John Mitchell issued guidelines on 
the issuance of subpoenas to journalists, which led to a sharp decline.307 “The abuse of 
subpoena privilege by the government resulted in what the courts have called the 
constriction of the necessary ‘breathing space’ that a free press needs, what the courts 
called a ‘chilling effect’ on First Amendment rights,” Small says.308 
Nevertheless, two incidents during Nixon administration made obvious the kind 
of connection the government wanted to have with the press. The first one was known as 
the Pentagon Papers, a 7,000-page top-secret document from the Defense Department 
with the history of the United States involvement in the war in Vietnam from 1945 to 
1967. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had requested this study in 1967. Daniel 
Ellsberg, a military analyst who had access to those papers, leaked them to the New York 
Times.309 
On June 13, 1971, the New York Times published a first article on The Pentagon 
Papers that did not result in much attention, Small says. But a second article was 
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published the following day, and the press reacted. The government reacted too, as the 
Justice Department sent a telegram to the New York Times asking it to stop releasing the 
document and to return all classified material to the administration. The newspaper 
refused to do so, and published a third article. The government asked a federal court to 
ban the newspaper from releasing the material.310 On June 18, the Washington Post 
started to publish the document too, and it was also asked to cease publication. That case 
also ended in a federal court. “The rejection of government’s heavy hand on the 
eighteenth century press had its echo in the twentieth century when government moved 
against the New York Times, ultimately three other newspapers in court, and still others 
by threat of court, to prevent publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers,” Small says.311  
During those days, the government raised issues such as how it could not protect 
itself from damaging publication, or how newsmen were not able to act with patriotism, 
Small recalls.312 The administration argued in court that the Times and later the Post were 
violating the Espionage Act since they were not authorized to have the document.313 All 
the cases went to the Supreme Court, which on June 30, 1971, in a 6-3 decision ruled that 
the injunctions against publication were unconstitutional prior restraint and that the 
government had not proved any damage to national security.314 “The press was to serve 
the governed, not the governors,” wrote Justice Hugo Black for the majority.315 
The Watergate scandal was the second big problem Nixon had with the press, 
which became the end of his second term. The scandal began with the arrest of five men 
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for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters located at the 
Watergate building on June 17, 1972. Nixon was running for re-election, which he won. 
At first, the incident did not get that much coverage. But Washington Post reporters Carl 
Bernstein and Bob Woodward, who did not cover national politics, discovered that the 
robbery was related to a scope of crimes and abuses from the government, including 
campaign fraud, political espionage, and illegal wiretapping, to mention a few.316 Other 
newspapers later revealed details of the case, but the Washington Post was the one that 
kept doing so consistently. An unnamed source, later known as “Deep Throat,” helped 
Bernstein and Woodward check the story. The White House denied every story published 
about the Watergate, and tried to isolate the Washington Post.  But the story grew in 
power and interest, and Congress started its own investigation of the case. It led to 
Nixon’s resignation in August 1974.317 
“The White House’s accountability reached the lowest point,” Thomas says. “It 
was not even managed news. It was a total blackout.” She remembers how Nixon dealt 
with the press on his last day at the White House: “He actually had the press locked 
inside the pressroom with Secret Service agents posted as guards. This was the only way 
he felt he could take one last walk around the White House without having to contend 
with the press.”318   
 
Post-Watergate. After Watergate, journalists came under hard criticism and 
many newspapers reviewed the way they covered government. “The White House press 
corps came in for the harshest criticism, accused of having become ‘prisoners’ of the 
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presidency,” Ritchie says. “They spent more time looking for authorities to quote than in 
drawing their own conclusions, and they had grown too dependent on the very people 
they needed to scrutinize.”319 Reporters knew they had missed many clues, says Thomas, 
and they were not going to let that happen again. “The White House pressroom became a 
lion’s den. Nothing was accepted at face value,” she adds. The following two 
administrations – Ford and Carter -- got “the brunt of a hostile, newly awakened press for 
a time.”320  
President Gerald Ford's relationship with journalists was quite good at the 
beginning, but his decision to give an unconditional pardon to Nixon made it shaky for a 
while, Broder says, mainly because the White House had previously announced the 
opposite. But Ford kept a sort of open policy compared with previous presidents; he gave 
press conferences and answered questions directly from reporters.321 
President Jimmy Carter developed a good yet distant relationship with journalists. 
Carter “saw himself as an outsider, who had been snubbed and underestimated by the big 
shots of the press corps,” Broder says.322 According to Thomas, that perception “led to 
some antipathy toward the established press corps, which in turn, often led to poor 
relations with the White House press.” She adds that the Carter administration ran an 
“open” White House, “with little effort to spin the news.”323 Carter held televised news 
conferences for Washington reporters twice a month. He also invited groups of 
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journalists from around the country to meet him. When the Iranian hostage situation 
started, Carter interrupted his regular schedule of press conferences.324  
In March 1979, the Justice Department obtained an injunction against Progressive 
magazine to prohibit it from publishing a story on the design and manufacture of 
hydrogen bombs. The Carter administration ultimately abandoned its effort to ban the 
article from being published, but only when confronted with irrefutable evidence that the 
story was based entirely on unclassified sources, says Carpenter. However, the 
government succeeded in delaying its publication for seven months.325  
President Ronald Reagan had a cordial relationship with the press during his two 
terms at the White House. “Ronald Reagan’s relationship with the press evolved through 
almost six years of stunningly successful news management, followed by one of the most 
embarrassing and politically costly blowups in the modern presidency,” Broder says.326  
According to authors, Reagan’s staff kept him away from having direct contact 
with journalists. The president appeared only when it was scheduled that he would talk in 
public. Many reporters believed then that Reagan was “scripted” during his press 
conferences.327 It was a deliberate press policy, which was based on three principles, says 
Broder: “limit the direct access to the President, make news management a major priority 
for trusted White House aides and Cabinet secretaries, and shut down the flow of 
information from lower levels of the administration and the bureaucracy.”328 During his 
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second term, Reagan was less accessible, and the flow of information decreased, Broder 
adds.329  
The president allowed his top aides to answer to the press.330 According to 
Thomas, there were two factions within the White House, which resulted in “great leaks 
to reporters.” Chief of Staff, James Baker was on one side and counselor Edwin Meese 
was on the other side, with both trying to dominate the news and to show closeness to the 
president.331 But leaks were not always freely allowed in the administration. The 
Washington Post reported that Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger had urged 
newspapers and two television networks to withhold stories about a secret military cargo 
on a space shuttle that was about to be launched. Although the Post said that all the 
information came from public records, “the Pentagon ordered a search for the leakers.” In 
November 1985, Reagan signed an order authorizing “polygraph testing to thousands of 
government employees dealing with ‘sensitive compartmented information,’ a broad 
classification of ‘secret’ documents,” Broder says.332 “Few of the threatened actions were 
taken, but the impulse to crack down on press leaks has been a powerful one throughout 
the Reagan years,” he adds.333  
The Reagan administration developed strategies to keep secrecy and to control the 
flow of information, aiming to protect policies and reputations from criticism, Carpenter 
writes. In March 1983, National Security Decision Directive 84 required more than 
100,000 government employees to take a lifetime censorship oath. Officials with access 
to what was considered “sensitive information” had to submit their materials for 
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publication or speeches that might be related to such information to the government for 
prior review. In other words, Carpenter says, the directive gave government considerable 
power to prevent former employees from revealing information that could embarrass the 
administration. “Government hostility toward and obstruction of FOIA and the entire 
concept of information disclosure received a considerable boost from the Reagan 
administration.”334  
The FOIA was a target in this policy. Reagan and his attorney general, William 
French Smith, unsuccessfully tried to limit the scope of FOIA, by exempting the CIA and 
the FBI from its coverage. In April 1982, an Executive Order lowered the minimum 
standard for each level of classification, and using this order, the administration 
reclassified documents that were already declassified and public.335  
“During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, attempts to intimidate the press or 
deny coverage of controversial foreign policy actions increased. Indicative of the 
administration’s aggressiveness was its treatment of the news media during the October 
1983 invasion of Grenada,” Carpenter says.336 Reporters were excluded from covering 
U.S. troops entering Grenada during the first 48 hours of the operation. Afterwards, 
military escorts were required to move around the island.  The White House provided its 
own videotapes to the television networks. None of the tapes showed any pictures of 
actual combat, Thomas says.337 Even those journalists who tried to be there were turned 
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away by U.S. Navy patrols. A group of reporters succeeded in arriving in Grenada, but 
they were taken into custody and ordered to return to Barbados.338  
The government said these actions were aimed to ensure “the secrecy of the 
operation and to ‘protect’ journalists”. But “a more credible reason for the exclusion was 
the administration’s fear that there would be critical, even hostile, press accounts of the 
invasion,” Carpenter adds.339 Grenada showed how dangerous it could be when the 
government restricts the flow of information on a military action. “Not surprisingly, there 
were significant episodes of misinformation during the period that the government 
excluded the press from Grenada.”340 After the Grenada assault, the Pentagon proposed 
the creation of media pools, to guarantee media coverage of military operations.341  
In 1986, Reagan’s credibility “was severely damaged by press exposure of secret 
United States arms shipments to Iran, followed by the even more stunning 
announcement” that the money obtained in that operation was used to support the Contras 
in Nicaragua.342 The story was first published in the Lebanese newspaper Ash-Shiraa, 
Thomas remembers. Reagan denied it and “denounced persistent reporters as sharks 
circling blood in the water.”343 According to Broder, “once the story was out, the 
American press was on it like a horde of hungry locusts, and this time all the 
administration’s press management and damage-control operations, designed to keep the 
President at a safe distance from any controversy, failed to stem the tide of disclosures- or 
the consternation of the public.”344 
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“If reliance in confidentiality sometimes blinded investigative reporters to their 
sources’ motives, conventional wisdom too often obscured the view of the rest of the 
press corps,” Ritchie says. “The same attitudes that had caused the New York Times to 
discount presidential involvement in the Watergate slowed its response to the Iran-Contra 
scandal a decade later.”345 The New York Times had strong and good tips on the story of 
the Iran-Contras situation, but editors thought that the president could not be doing that. 
People could not know what the administration was doing because the rhetoric 
was absolutely the opposite, as it had been consistently hostile toward Iran. “The question 
then arises: how can the populace in a democratic system of government pass judgment 
on the wisdom or the morality of a policy that they have no idea even exists- and that in 
fact runs directly counter to everything they have been led to believe?” Carpenter asks.346 
“During the Reagan and Bush years the government attempted to repeal the legacy of the 
1970s with regard to the press and public scrutiny of national security issues. In a variety 
of ways, both administrations sought to exclude and intimidate the press, thereby 
reducing the prospect of embarrassing disclosures of dubious foreign policy 
initiatives.”347  
George Herbert Walker Bush was a Washington insider and knew well the 
Washington press corps. A former vice president who became president, Bush was 
generally friendly and informal with reporters. He preferred to give informal press 
conferences rather than prime-time press conferences, Thomas recalls.348 But in 
December 1989, with the Panama invasion, journalists had a taste of what they could 
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expect. According to Carpenter, although the pool was ready to leave, it did not departure 
until two hours before the invasion. Once in the place, reporters had troubles sending 
their stories, and by the time they could work independently, combat was over.349 
The Persian Gulf War was Bush’s main turning point in the relationship with 
reporters. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and a coalition of 34 nations led by the United 
States, forced Sadam Hussein’s troops to withdraw from Kuwait. In terms of media 
access, Carpenter says that all the elements came together in this conflict, from successful 
appeals to the patriotism of news personnel to the exclusion of reporters from covering 
military operations independently. Government could supply its own videos of what was 
happening, while the press acted as the administration’s “echo chamber.”350 
In fact, reporters who covered the Gulf War were immediately restricted by the 
Department of Defense, Thomas says. The press pool had to be escorted by Defense 
Department officers, and coverage was tightly controlled.351 Pentagon officials used press 
pools, requesting reporters to be with military escorts on all interviews, and mandatory 
reviews of stories. At the same time, the Pentagon provided “information” through its 
briefings, recalls Carpenter.352 Journalists needed approval as to where to go and who to 
interview. In many cases, print media had to get Pentagon clearance before printing a 
story.353 Before being allowed to Saudi Arabia, reporters had to sign the Pentagon’s 
“ground rules,” among which it was established that journalists should be with military 
escorts for safety reasons. Media later complained to the Defense Secretary Richard 
Cheney that military escorts frequently interrupted the interviews. Carpenter says that 
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those reporters who tried to reach American troops on their own were arrested and 
threatened with losing their press credentials.354 Carpenter adds that the government also 
tried to discredit journalists and refers to the case of Peter Arnett, from CNN, who was 
accused of being a “propaganda stooge” for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.355  
But Carpenter is also very critical of the media reaction during that war. “Such an 
inadequate treatment of the military issues was symptomatic of a larger failure. Instead of 
carefully examining and dissecting the various rationales for intervention, the media for 
the most part tamely accepted the administration’s interpretation of events and gave the 
public a steady diet of simplistic images and analyses of developments in the gulf.”356  
However, Bush’s relationship with the press deteriorated and his advisers blamed 
the media for Bush’s defeat by Bill Clinton in 1992 elections. Yet, after the Persian Gulf 
War experience, in May 1992, the Defense Department and an alliance of key press 
associations agreed on nine principles on how to do news coverage during war times. 
Although the principles seemed to reflect quite the interest of the media, according to 
Carpenter it did not represent a successful negotiation of the press since “the Pentagon 
refused to budge one of the most crucial issues: mandatory review of all news stories 
from military theaters of operations.”357 
During Clinton’s presidency, those principles were proven in situations such as 
the intervention in Somalia in 1993, or the military action in Haiti in 1994. Regarding 
Somalia, the press found an open operation to be covered without any fuzz from the 
military side, Carpenter says. However, when it turned out to be bloody, things changed 
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and reporters found it difficult to cover. Carpenter explains that there was no pool of 
journalists organized at any point, because it was a United Nations missions and not only 
American.358 In the Haiti intervention, “the relationship between government and the 
press was not tested in a combat setting.” But before this military action, says Carpenter, 
in a meeting between representatives from TV networks and White House and Pentagon 
members, officials demanded an eight-hour broadcast blackout, and requested reporters 
“to stay in their hotels until military commanders gave them permission to cover the 
fighting.”359 The military intervention did not get to the point where these measures were 
implemented.  
As president, Clinton kept a generally friendly attitude towards the media, yet he 
did not have close friends among journalists, Thomas recalls.360 “Clinton held numerous 
meetings with members of the local press and geared his dispatches to specifically 
targeted markets. At the same time, he realized the value of speaking directly to the 
American people and used the talk show circuit as a forum,” arranging first certain rules 
with hosts.”361  
In access to information, Clinton also expressed his support for reducing 
government secrecy early in his administration. “Presidential Review Directive 29, issued 
on April 26, 1993, ordered a sweeping review of Cold-War-era classification rules by an 
interagency task force with the goals of speeding the declassification process and 
preventing the overclassification of new documents,” says Carpenter. But it was not a 
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completely successful measure, since there was not more declassification of documents 
than before. The author believes Clinton acted like his predecessors.362 
Nevertheless, Clinton’s affair with an intern, Monica Lewinsky, while he was the 
president, plus his later denial of the affair, put the president under investigation and later 
led him to an impeachment. The Internet had broken into the media scenario for the first 
time: alternative sources of information and opinions were thrown into the stage. “The 
polarized atmosphere of the Clinton era renewed editors’ tolerance for anonymous 
sources, while the multiplicity of media outlets, from cable to television to the Internet, 
allowed leakers to shop their stories around town until someone agreed to publish them. 
If one media outlet broke a story, the rest gained license to repeat it, with or without 
substantiation,” Ritchie says.363 The media seemed to be more excited about the scandals 
of the administration than the public. “The yawning gap between the public’s 
indifference to Clinton’s impeachment trial and the media frenzy over it symbolized the 
press corps’ isolation,” Ritchie adds.364  
 
To sum up, relationships between reporters and administrations have always been 
a source of tension, many times on high levels, such as when there was a war; other times 
not so high. But in different stages of the American history, it can be seen that there have 
been acts aiming to silence the press or the critics of the government, as well as there 
have been executive orders that restricted the access to information, or administrative 
rules that intend to detect who was leaking information from inside the government, or 
subpoenas to learn the name of sources, or attitudes toward reporters aimed to shut them 
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off from giving information. Controls have been most tough during times of war. In other 
words, from the beginning of democracy in the United States, the relationship between 
reporters and public officials has been shaped by each presidency with its own interests, 
and therefore, it has changed over time under the influence of those interests. Whether 





After reviewing the purpose of journalism and the role of sources in achieving it, 
after analyzing who are the official sources and the Washington press corps, and after 
looking through history to see how previous administrations have dealt with journalists, it 
is time to focus the analysis in the time frame purposed. This chapter intends to gather all 
the elements needed to understand how the Bush administration and the press was 
operating before and after 9/11, in order to answer the main questions of this study. 
 
Starting point. George W. Bush had spent only eight months in the White House 
when the United States was the subject of an attack like no other before. On September 
11, 2001, the Twin Towers in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were hit 
by passenger airplanes, while a fourth airplane was hijacked and crashed before getting to 
other targets. More than half an hour after the airplanes crashed into them, the Twin 
Towers collapsed. The attack killed more than 3,000 people. The terrorist organization al-
Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the attack.  
For the press, September 11, 2001, was a day of pure journalistic work. Beyond 
the fear, the chaos and the communication problems aroused that day, journalists from 
every medium were outside trying to get the best possible account of the facts. And 
people consumed information with eagerness. News was not a commodity; it was a need. 
Before getting into the aftermath of September 11, 2001, it is necessary to review 
how the administration and the press corps arrived at that day. 
Less than a year earlier, Bush had narrowly won the 2000 election over Al Gore, 
former vice president to Clinton. The new president had been governor of Texas and had 
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a long tradition of political experience, since his father, George H.W. Bush had been 
president, too. But his relationship with the press corps remained to be seen. James E. 
Mueller in his book Towel Snapping the Press – Bush’s Journey from Locker-Room 
Antics to Message Control, has an answer to that question: “Bush is a chameleon with the 
press… With the Texas press, he was friendly and accessible. But when he got to 
Washington, he knew that there was no advantage in trying to schmooze the White House 
Press corps. He knew the intense competition and the elite bias of the Eastern press 
toward a conservative from Texas could not be overcome by joking.”365   
Authors agree that the new president’s strategy to approach the press was simple 
and effective and could be summarize in one concept: control the message. “Such 
tenacity in controlling the message has been a hallmark of Bush’s press relations since he 
learned about focusing on a simple, consistent theme during his failed race for Congress 
in West Texas in 1978,” Mueller recalls. “After the race, Bush told Kent Hance, the only 
person ever to defeat Bush in an elections, ‘Hance, you had a message and you stayed 
with it.’ Hance was an experienced politician and won for reasons other than just his 
focus on message, but Bush took the lesson to heart and perfected the technique of 
‘message discipline’ to an extent that amazes political scientists and frustrates 
journalists.”366  
Indeed, journalists like Julie Mason, from the Houston Chronicle, used to say that 
it was “like throwing questions at a wall.”367 Bush’s closest circle of advisors shared that 
concept, such as Karl Rove. “Message was everything with Rove,” said Lou DuBose, Jan 
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Reid and Carl Cannon, who noted in their Rove biography that he had Bush so focused 
on message that in the 1994 campaign Ann Richards called Bush a “windup doll.”368  
Ari Fleischer, Bush’s first White House press secretary, recalled in his memoir 
that Bush remained on message even when taking questions from reporters. “He would 
often repeat the same statement to the press, no matter how many different ways they 
asked their questions,” Fleischer wrote. “He seldom made mistakes or inadvertently 
created a controversy through what he said, and for many reporters, who are always 
looking for the next big story, the White House’s message discipline came to be 
frustrating.”369  
However, the strategy of controlling the message had a deeper purpose: sealing 
the White House from any possible leak.  “Bush no doubt developed his hatred of the 
practice through observing how leaks had affected not only his father but also his vice 
president, Dick Cheney,” when they worked at the Ford administration, says Mueller.370 
Bush control of the access of the press to his aides started before his entrance to the 
White House. During his 2000 presidential campaign, “reporters were allowed access to 
only to designated-spokesmen, and some employers had to sign agreements that they 
would not talk to the press.” David Beckwith, the press secretary of the moment, was 
fired for being “too glib with the media.”371 
The controlling-the-message strategy and sealing leaks showed a fondness for 
keeping information that the administration would prefer not to release to the public. In 
that regard, one of the first decisions made by the president “was to issue an executive 
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order tightening controls on the release of presidential and vice presidential records. To 
begin his presidency with secrecy as his priority was no accident,” Murray Marder wrote 
in April 2008 in the Nieman Watchdog.372  
“The presidential press relationship, it turns out, is surprisingly simple. The 
president has most of the power in the relationship because he controls access to himself 
and his staff,” Mueller emphasizes. The author says that Bush entered the White House 
knowing how reporters worked, and unlike many of his predecessors, he was not 
concerned over press criticism of his actions. “The best example of Bush’s attitude is 
press conferences. … Bush schedules them, to paraphrase the language he directed at 
terrorists following 9/11, at a time and a place of his choosing.”373 (p.173) 
He held only 17 solo question-and-answer sessions with reporters in his first term, 
without counting brief joint appearances with visiting heads of state. According to the 
Project for Excellence in Journalism, that was the lowest total of any president in the 
television age. “In the four months following the attacks of September 11, 2001, for 
instance, Bush held only one press conference. In all of 2003, the year the U.S. invaded 
Iraq, Bush held only four sessions,” said a study from Project for Excellence in 
Journalism released in October 2006.374 However, in Bush’s second term this seemed to 
change. In 2005 alone, he held nine press conferences with questions from reporters. 
“Partial explanations may be found in the president’s flagging poll numbers and difficult 
news from Iraq. Yet even then, the president did no press conferences between January 
and June of 2006, despite tough political fortunes.”  
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Like other presidents before, Bush also tried to recreate a world of public relations 
officials in the government. “A large part of the business done by these offices is the 
communications efforts that are designed to get information directly to the public by 
going over the heads, around the backs, and between the legs of MSM [mainstream 
media],” Frank Greve wrote in the Nieman Reports, Summer 2005.375 Those spokesman 
brief “supportive” reporters or have teleconferences with journalists with a one-question 
rule, “and when the daily beat reporters grow hostile, leaks to outside of Washington.” 
That being so, a study from the Project for Excellence in Journalism, called The 
First 100 Days: How Bush Versus Clinton fared in the Press, revealed that despite having 
a very good first month of press coverage, Bush’s coverage overall was less positive than 
Clinton’s at the beginning. “As a whole, the press has depicted Bush as a skillful 
manager, more comfortable as an insider than a man of the people, who is stubbornly 
pursuing a sincere, conservative ideological agenda even if it is controversial,” the study 
said.376 However, the study also pointed out that Bush had more success controlling his 
message than Clinton.377 “Much of what the press has covered about Bush is the message 
he wanted to have them cover, the study found. Of the top five continuing Bush stories, 
three were his own creation: his educational plan, his faith-based initiative, and his 
budget address to Congress,” the study said. “This carefully managed coverage also led 
to positive stories.”378 
What was happening with the press, or more precisely with the Washington press 
corps, before 9/11? According to different authors, the end of the '90s found that many 
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newspapers started to reorganize themselves and to adapt to new technologies. 
“Newspapers could not hold accountable agencies and departments they did not cover, 
and they covered fewer of them than in the recent past,” Leonard Downie Jr. and Robert 
G. Kaiser say in The News About The News. According to a study by the Project on the 
State of the American Newspaper, in 1999 only about a dozen newspapers still had beat 
reporters covering the Defense Department, the Justice Department and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and just a handful regularly covered other federal agencies or departments.379  
Ritchie has a similar reading of the reality of the newspapers and their coverage of 
national news. “Washington news bureaus dismantled the conventional beats at 
government agencies. Instead of ‘building coverage’ – for example, being posted 
regularly at the Capitol or the Pentagon -- reporters were assigned to follow broad issues 
of education, health and consumer safety that cut across agency lines. For the routine 
news from the federal agencies, news bureaus simply relied on the wire services,” he 
says. “Young reporters believed that they could gather news via e-mail, fax, and web 
sites rather than spending their time at press conferences or lingering in the halls of the 
bureaucracy. Veteran reporters complained that such a remote approach to the job missed 
the personal observations, inside tips and general expertise that they had developed in the 
past. But editors responded that the changes in coverage reflected the general loss of 
public interest in the type of needs the Washington had generated for so long.”380 
And then the attacks of September 11 changed the perception of journalists and 
their work, especially those who were based in Washington, D.C, and saw the decline of 
interest in national news. “Keeping the nation informed that day reminded them once 
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again why they went into journalism, and why reporting the news from Washington still 
mattered,” Ritchie says.381 “This is why we do what we do,” Marc Fisher wrote in 
American Journalism Review in October 2001.382 
Although television networks dominated the news of the day, since they were 
broadcasting live were the attacks had occurred, newspapers claimed the following day as 
theirs. “American hungered for information when their interests were at stake, and 
newspapers offered greater depth of coverage than did television,”383 Ritchie writes. 
Downie and Kaiser agree: “People that did not usually buy newspapers, devoured them. 
Papers were filled with information that had not been mentioned or developed in 
television.”384  
Fisher described the function of the newspapers in the following way: “It was left 
to the nation’s newspapers, to the small-town dailies that called in all hands to pump out 
extras on Day One, and especially to the couple of dozen big papers that have not 
succumbed entirely to the cost-cutting frenzy of the past two decades, to show why this 
business deserves its constitutional protection, and why so many people accept sub-par 
wages, long hours and public disdain to practice this craft.”385 
But the change was deeper than the following day, according to Ritchie: 
“September 11 reanimated national news reporting. Washington news bureaus that had 
abolished beat reporting suddenly felt the need to station correspondents at the State 
Department, the Pentagon, the White House, and the Capitol.” Official sources and 
official information both were now vital elements to develop the main story of the 
                                                
381 Ibid, p. 301. 
382 Fisher, Marc, Meeting the Challenge, American Journalism Review, October 2001. 
383 Ritchie, Reporting from Washington., p. 300 
384 Downie Jr. and Kaiser, The news about the news, p. 63. 
385 Fisher, Meeting the Challenge, American Journalism Review, October 2001. 
 113 
moment. “Some of the reporters they sent were so unfamiliar with the territory that they 
had trouble finding the right doors to enter these buildings. The scramble for hard news 
expanded bureau staffs and refocused attention on government activities, written off so 
recently as yesterday’s news.”386 
 
Aftermath. The attacks of September 11, 2001, left fear and a desire for unity, 
which reflected itself in the political behavior of the days after the attacks. The 
government’s reaction found little criticism as a fearful public looked upon it for answers 
and protection. The press was not confrontational during those first months; instead, 
journalists focused on facts and on looking for explanations and information. 
First came the review of what had not been seen before: “In January 2001, the 
U.S. Commission on National Security issued a report that predicted terrorist attacks on 
American soil. The Bush administration, Congress, and the news media all gave the 
report minimal attention,” Ritchie recalls.387 Until the attacks, the report and its findings 
seemed to be destined to live among other papers in the federal agencies' shelves, Susan 
Paterno wrote in American Journalism Review in November 2001.388 But once the attack 
happened, the commission was flooded with media calls asking for the report. What 
happened “raised serious questions about the media’s ability to monitor the departments 
of government that the public depends upon for its protection,” added Paterno. 
Besides these considerations about the past, there was an urgent need to know 
what was happening. Media was in front of a new challenge that needed quick reactions. 
Many newsrooms did not have reporters who were specialized in covering terrorism. A 
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new beat emerged fast enough to put reporters on the search of new sources that could 
help them to inform their public. The center of the action was Washington, D.C., where 
bureau chiefs had to figure out a way of reorganizing their resources to better cover the 
war against terrorism the government was announcing. They “redeployed their forces to 
long-abandoned and newly created beats in the wake of terrorist attacks,” Stephen 
Seplow wrote in AJR on December 2001.389 Many journalists had to redefine their beats 
and redirect them to cover terrorism, like those who were covering State Department or 
congressional issues, or even federal agencies that were in charge of transportation or 
nuclear energy. Newspapers from all over the country sent more journalists as 
reinforcements to their Washington bureaus, in order to extend their coverage of the war 
on terrorism. Small newspapers that did not have resources to do that, rearranged their 
reporters’ beats instead to avoid missing big stories. The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security added another landmark to cover. 
“In meeting the surging demand for news, publishers pleaded with government for 
more openness in the flow of information. Investigative reporters, rebounding from a 
decade of sordidness, began delving into issues of intelligence failures, international 
terrorism, government infringement of civil liberties, nuclear proliferation and the hunt 
for weapons of mass destruction,” Ritchie explains.390  
But the reaction of the government did not seem to go in the direction the press 
hoped. “In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, however, secrecy has become the default 
status for most proceedings even remotely connected with the war on terrorism. The 
changed climate has made it difficult for the American public and the news media to 
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monitor the fairness and effectiveness of the Bush administration’s antiterrorism,” said 
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press on a special report named “Homefront 
Confidential. How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public’s 
Right to Know.”  
According to this study, a proof of that secrecy path began with the 
administration’s suggestion, right at the beginning of the aftermath of the attacks, that 
videotapes from bin Laden should not be broadcast by the networks, arguing that he 
could be sending coded messages. 391 The Bush administration tried the same argument 
with the print media, to prevent newspapers from publishing the complete transcripts of 
bin Laden’s speeches, David Dadge recalls in his book Casualty of War. On October 11, 
the executive editor of the New York Times, Howell Raines, received a phone call from 
Ari Fleischer asking the newspaper to avoid publishing bin Laden’s statement. Raines 
declined the request.392 This is only an example of the policy of secrecy that started to 
show in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, according to authors and interviews held for 
this study. More examples will be described in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
Afghanistan war. On October 7, 2001, U.S. forces started the attack on 
Afghanistan in order to capture bin Laden. According to the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press (RCFP), it was not until November 20 that journalists could join the 
troops in combat.393 Many journalists were able to go to Afghanistan later. “The Bush 
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administration’s strict controls have made it very difficult for journalists to provide a full 
picture of the war in Afghanistan,” wrote Nina J. Easton in AJR, March 2002.394  
According to her description, journalists were facing two options: either travel on 
their own to one of the most dangerous areas -- eight reporters were killed in only 17 
days in November -- or “play by the rules of a Pentagon determined to delay and limit 
access to the conflict.” As an example, Easton said that during the fall campaign, 
“Americans received most of their war news via the hall of the Pentagon, where 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, citing the covert nature of the war, imposed 
tight restrictions on the flow of information.” The absence of journalists during the first 
period of the war had an obvious consequence, as Easton pointed out: “The critical 
October-November period remains a black hole, with little public knowledge or 
understanding of U.S. military actions in Afghanistan”.  
In Nieman Reports in Winter 2001, Bob Giles warned journalists about the risks 
of reporting in a war scenario like Afghanistan. “When the United States is on a war 
footing, there is a tendency to set aside many of our traditional checks and balances by a 
well-intentioned instinct for national unity,” he wrote.395 “With Congress on the sidelines, 
there is no forum for a national debate on our military and foreign policy. The press 
remains the single institution free to independently probe for facts the government wants 
to shield from American citizens.” He added that the administration’s impulse to control 
information “is complicated by the nature of combat in Afghanistan,” as cities come 
under control of anti-Taliban forces, journalists can move independently and give their 
own accounts of what is happening there. However, the coverage of this particular 
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scenario of the war, has other challenges, said Maud S. Beelman in the same issue of 
Nieman Reports. “For reporters covering this war, the challenge is not just getting 
unfettered and uncensored access to the U.S. troops and the battlefield –a long and mostly 
losing struggle in the past- but in discerning between information and disinformation.”396 
Indeed, “the media feared that the war in Afghanistan and the constant threat of 
terrorism might lead to disinformation being planted in the media,” says Dadge. And the 
evidence came with a New York Time story released on February 19, 2002, which 
revealed the creation of the Office of Strategic Influence, where the Pentagon was 
prepared to develop news items containing disinformation for foreign media 
organizations,” explains Dadge.397 The idea did not prosper, and the government insisted 
once and again that its intention was to tell the truth to journalists. 
An early study made by Project for Excellence in Journalism showed that after the 
attacks of September 11, the media reacted with great care and not getting ahead of acts, 
“but over time the press (was) inching back toward pre September 11th norms of 
behavior.”398 Immediately after the attacks, solid sourcing and factualness dominated the 
coverage, as 75 percent of what the press reported were straightforward accounts of 
events. But when the story moved to war in Afghanistan, analysis and opinion started to 
take over the coverage. “The study found that during the periods examined the press 
heavily favored pro Administration and official U.S. viewpoints-as high as 71 percent 
early on.” 
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The study involved the examination of 2,496 stories on television, in magazines 
and newspapers in three key periods: mid-September, mid-November and mid-
December. Then it examined the sourcing, verification and range of viewpoints in the 
coverage. Among its findings, the study showed that, “the number of sources cited as 
evidence in stories also declined over time, though it is still relatively high. The level of 
on-the-record sources has remained consistently high –three quarters of all sources.” 
The report suggested that the decline in sourcing and factualness may respond to 
“the restrictions the government [was] imposing on journalists’ access to information. … 
The evidence strongly suggests that coverage is more factual when journalists have more 
information and becomes more interpretative, perhaps ironically, when they have less.” 
The report also explained that, “As the war moved abroad, the Pentagon made access to 
soldiers and the battlefield more difficult than it has ever been. Web sites with previously 
public information were suddenly removed. Sources quit talking. Reporters say they have 
never seen the Pentagon as intimidated about talking to the press as they do now.”  
 
Access to information. On October 12, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a 
polemic memorandum that reversed the policy of the Clinton’s administration regarding 
the release of information through FOIA requests. Previous Attorney General Janet Reno 
openly endorsed disclosures of government information and her memorandum instructed 
agencies not to use discretionary exemptions to the federal act unless they could point to 
a “foreseeable harm” that could result from disclosure.399 
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A month and a day after 9/11, Ashcroft revoked Reno’s policy and instructed 
“federal agencies that if there were any ‘sound legal basis’ for withholding information 
from FOI requesters, the Justice Department would support the withholding,” explained 
RCFP.400 “He had urged agencies to carefully consider national security, privacy, and law 
enforcement's worries before releasing information,” Mueller adds.401 Some congressmen 
were angry at the new turn of events. Ashcroft's memorandum “encourages agencies to 
disclose information protected under the act ‘only after full and deliberate consideration 
of the institutional, commercial and personal privacy interests that could be implicated,’ 
(Democrat Sen. Patrick) Leahy wrote.”402 
“Pre-Ashcroft memo, the government had to provide compelling reason why it 
would not release information to the public. Post-memo, the government didn’t have such 
a responsibility: it would only release information if the public could show why they 
shouldn’t be kept secret,” further explained Lori Robertson in AJR, February/March 
2005. According to Robertson, many public officials denied reporters information that 
used to be available in the past.403 
Complaints started to show up. “Ever since September 11, ‘national security’ has 
been the catchphrase to justify unprecedented secrecy in the federal executive branch, 
whether or not it has anything to do with conducting successful military operations or 
thwarting terrorists attacks,” wrote Jane Kirtley in the February 2002 issue of AJR.404 
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Other memos followed Ashcroft’s, all of them with the same spirit. In late March 
2002, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card Jr. released another memorandum telling 
all agencies to review their safety procedures for sensitive information. “Card’s 
memorandum also encompassed records, informing agencies that they should keep 
classified those types of information that were already excluded under the rules and that 
could ‘reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass 
destruction,’” explains Dadge.405 The memo instructed officials to follow this guideline 
even when the information was more than 10 years old. It also directed agencies to use 
loopholes in the classification order to protect such weapons information that is more 
than 25 years old, RCFP observed in its report. “It directs agencies to classify such 
information if it has never been classified, no matter how old it is, so long as it has not 
been disclosed to the public under proper authority. And it directs reclassification of 
sensitive information concerning nuclear or radiological weapons if, although it had been 
declassified, it had never been disclosed under proper authority,” RCFP’s report added.406  
 “With FOIA rules restricted and with fears of further attacks still occupying the 
minds of the Bush administration, it came as no surprise that a number of government 
agencies withdrew or altered their Web sites. These agencies included the Department of 
Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the NASA Glenn Research Unit, and the 
International Nuclear Safety Center,” Dadge says.407 After 9/11, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission retired its entire website following a request from the Department of 
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Defense. Early in 2002, the agency restored the website, yet not all the content that could 
be allegedly used by terrorists.408  
In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act brought new elements to the table, 
as it had “serious implications for access by the press and the public,” Bob Giles wrote in 
an article for the Nieman Reports, Winter 2002.409 “It would create an exemption from 
FOIA for any information voluntarily submitted to the government,” he adds. The new 
law criminalized agency disclosures of critical infrastructure information without consent 
of the businesses that gave it to the department.410  
There were more moves in the same direction: a Bush order halted 
declassification of Reagan administration records just before they were about to become 
public; thousands of documents remained sealed411; the Office of Management and 
Budget was instructed to create a new classification, “sensitive but unclassified.” 
According to Giles, “The idea is to keep information away from the public and the press 
without formally classifying it as secret.”412 
The policy extended beyond the aftermath of 9/11. In March 2003, a classification 
order issued by Clinton was amended and it received significant changes to extend 
classification. According to the RCFP report, it called for automatic classification of 
foreign government information where disclosure was not authorized, under the 
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presumption that release would damage national security. By 2004, the government had a 
record 15.5 million classification actions.413 
On December 17, 2003, Bush issued another order. “This directive, addressed to 
all federal agencies, targeted their handling of ‘voluntarily submitted information.’ With 
no mention of the FOI Act, the presidential directive told all agencies that they must 
abide by the Homeland Security Act’s prohibition against disclosures of ‘voluntary 
submitted information and information that would facilitate terrorists' targeting of critical 
infrastructure and key resources.’ The act stipulates that the CII [Critical Infrastructure 
Information] protections are for information delivered to the Department of Homeland 
Security,” said the RCFP report.414  
In the context of the measures adopted by the government to avoid releasing 
information to the public, many started raising their voices to the press. “A public 
stunned by attacks and nervous about what future threats we might face, became pliant, 
accepting the administration’s version of events, its secrecy impulses, and the 
constriction of some of our liberties,” Giles said. “In this environment of growing 
uncertainty and pronounced patriotism, it is left to the press to be the vigilant watchdog 
of those in power, to make sure that the ‘right’ to know does not become just the ‘need’ 
to know.”415 
 
Fear and Patriotism. The September 11 attacks left a nation in fear, looking for 
unity and strong command of the country. There was no room for doubts; it was a time of 
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coming together to fight a common and unknown enemy. American flags everywhere and 
a sense of shared moment was all over. Many journalists – especially in broadcast -- were 
wearing flag pins, as members of a shaken society. People were afraid that another attack 
could happen any moment. The alerts developed by the government –orange, yellow, red- 
did not help to calm the nerves. Journalists were everywhere, trying to grasp each story. 
Yet, as human beings, many of them were trapped in the fear net that involved everyone.  
Less than a month after the 9/11 attacks, “anthrax-filled letters addressed to 
government officials and to the news media added to the capital’s anxiety,” Ritchie 
says.416 It seemed that Americans would not have a rest from any threat. For the press, 
this time the threat was at the newsroom and it was frightening. The anthrax attack 
seemed to become an obsession, fed from the government side too. “As bioterrorism 
frenzy took hold, factual information was the first casualty. A myriad of contradictions 
and misinformation emanated from the White House and other official channels. Mixed 
messages clouded news conferences and government briefings,” wrote Sherry Ricchiardi 
in December 2001.417 
The scenario was set to keep the unity going, and feelings of fear and patriotism 
came together. “Neutrality was not an option,” says Ritchie. “Reuter’s new service came 
under harsh criticism for declining to use the word terrorist, on the ground that ‘one 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ The slightest hint of unfavorable 
reporting about the president brought angry protests,” he added. USA Today reporter 
Susan Page quoted a historian who had criticized Bush for not returning to Washington 
after the attacks, and received hundreds of irate letters. “Reporters felt grateful that the 
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firm response of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks had made Washington 
once again ‘the place to be in terms of news,’ even as they struggled with a tightly 
controlled White House and intense security at government buildings. The reporters’ 
deference to those in authority surprised themselves.”418  
Helen Thomas asked herself several times “why the media in Washington has 
become so complaint, complicit, and gullible. It all comes down to the 9/11 attacks in 
Washington and New York that led to fear among reporters of being considered ‘un-
American’ or ‘un-patriotic’.”419  
Few voices rose to criticize the actions of the government in the months following 
the attacks, and those who expressed a different opinion were pointed out as 
“unpatriotic.” Nina Easton wrote an article on the difficulties that liberal-left press was 
facing after the attacks. “Those opposing U.S. military action find themselves more 
isolated on a matter of national security than at any time since the months leading up to 
World War II. The American public’s support for the war ranges in the 85 to 90 percent 
range, and only one lawmaker voted against President Bush’s request to launch a military 
action.”420 
A year after 9/11, a survey conducted by AJR and the First Amendment Center 
showed public support for governmental restrictions on the press during the war on terror, 
and almost half of those surveyed said the First Amendment goes too far in guaranteeing 
rights. “In 2003, two years after 9/11, the percentage of population who believed that the 
First Amendment ‘goes too far’ was down to 34 percent,” Mueller wrote.421 . 
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The study from the Project for Excellence in Journalism showed that at first, 
people were deeply satisfied with media work, as they perceived it as accurate, 
professional, moral, caring about people and patriotic. But people’s approval went down 
because they disliked anonymous sourcing. “They want information more than 
interpretation. They resent journalists offering what they think rather than what they 
know. They dislike hype and the sense that the media is manufacturing and 
sensationalizing stories,” said the study. In September more than 75 percent was pure 
facts. By November, the number went down to 63 percent and in December those levels 
were the same. In addition, the study showed that television was perceived as more pro-
administration, while the print press was considered more circumspect.422  
The government seemed to take advantage of the feeling of patriotism, and its 
members made statements that did not ease the situation for those who were critics to the 
administration. On September 26, 2001, presidential press secretary Ari Fleischer said 
that everybody should be careful with their comments. Referring to a comedian's remarks 
on the war in Afghanistan, Fleischer said they were “reminders to all Americans that they 
need to watch what they say, watch what they do. This is not a time for remarks like 
that.”423 Ashcroft also said that criticism of the administration “only aids terrorists” and 
“gives ammunitions to America’s enemies.”424 Both comments set the tone for the way 
the media would be treated, and, according to Dadge, “were exhortations for journalists 
to censor themselves.”425 
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The author adds that, “As a consequence, the media were pushed further and 
further away from their traditional role as the watchdog for American society. Criticized 
by the government and the public alike, the media found themselves confined to the role 
of furnishing information on the attackers and the victims. Greater scrutiny was 
discouraged. The media, particularly the print media, performed this newly imposed role 
admirably. But, in acceding the public’s implicit demands, the watchdogs were 
acknowledging that their claws had been clipped.”426 
With the described climate, it was difficult to express concern or a different 
opinion. After the attacks, reporters were reluctant to be critics to the president or his 
policies, said Marvin Kalb at the Nieman Report from Winter 2003. “Patriotism stifled 
the urge to ask penetrating questions of senior officials or, on the omnipresent talk shows, 
to voice skepticism about the buildup of the war.”427 
 
Leaks. As did other presidents before him, Bush disliked leaks and did everything 
in his power to prevent them in his administration. But the 9/11 attacks gave the 
administration a powerful reason to persuade public officials to endorse a non-leak 
policy. For those who were not convinced, the argument of breaking the law was 
persuasive enough. Rumsfeld had publicly warned Pentagon staffers “against discussing 
military operations with the media, saying those who did so would be breaking federal 
criminal law ‘and should be in jail.’ His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, issued a memo urging 
staffers to ‘exercise great caution in discussing information related to DOD (Department 
of Defense) work, regardless of their duties’, making no distinction between classified 
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and unclassified information,” recalled Beelman in Nieman Reports, Winter 2001.428 
According to a longtime press adviser, “Bush considered leaks especially inexcusable in 
wartime. Referring to a newspaper reporting that the military would attack 13 camps in 
Afghanistan, the president told the adviser, “There’s an act of treason in the newspaper 
this morning. Whoever did this is a traitor; they’re putting lives at risk.”429  
Controlling the message and concentrating the information in a few hands was the 
main strategy to prevent leaks. A former Nixon aide, John Dean, wrote that Chief of Staff 
Andrew Card organized the White House in a way that various groups only shared 
information on a need-to-know basis. For example, speechwriters were isolated from 
scheduling and decision-making meetings. “Bush administration has ‘cobbled together 
the equivalent of a new unofficial secrets act more awesome than anything Congress 
might give them,’ citing as an example the administration’s 20-count indictment of 
former intelligence analyst Jonathan C. Randel for leaking unclassified information to a 
British journalist. ‘Clearly this was a warning aimed to potential whistleblowers in the 
federal bureaucracy, advising them to keep quiet or risk jail’,” Mueller says.430 
Many believed that it was a very “buttoned-down administration,” where those 
who revealed information to the press could lose their jobs, said Mueller.431 “Experts 
predicted such a policy would serve only to alienate the White House press corps, which 
would find other sources for news sources unfavorable to the administration,” he wrote. 
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“The policy undoubtedly alienated some reporters, but they have been largely powerless 
to do anything about it.”432  
According to speechwriter David Frum, Bush generated loyalty by revealing a 
little of himself to his staff and also by showing that he cared about them. For example, 
he would make a brutally frank comment on current issues with his staffers. “These 
comments, Frum argued, were a gift of confidentiality that bound the staffer to him like a 
direct marketer obligates a survey respondent by giving him a dollar.”433  
However, almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the government “started to 
turn off some of the taps through which information flowed. Moreover, with the 
administration’s emphasis on secrecy in the war against terrorism, and with officials 
displaying an increasing reticence to disclose information, institutions such as the media 
found it difficult to investigate the government’s activities,” Dadge explains.434 
The policy of preventing the government from leaking got to the Congress. On 
October 5, 2001, Bush informed the heads of six agencies that only they or a designated 
officer could brief members of Congress on “classified information” or “sensitive law 
enforcement information.” The memorandum specified who was entitled to receive 
information – Senate majority and minority leaders, and the chairs and ranking members 
of the intelligences committees in the House and Senate. “All other members of Congress 
were to be excluded from the information loop,” Dadge adds. Fleischer argued that this 
policy was a reflection of “the reality that disclosure of information in a time of war is 
different from an inadvertent disclosure at a time of peace. It could literally mean the loss 
of lives of people who are embarking on missions.” Congress did not like the measure 
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and reacted by threatening to suspend all legislative hearings. At the end, the measure 
was relaxed to mend the relations between both branches of the government.  
The Pentagon became leak-proof quickly enough. On July 22, 2002, Rumsfeld 
urged Pentagon employees to reveal the name of an official who leaked an alleged U.S. 
plan to invade Iraq to the New York Times. He said those kind of leaks were 
“inexcusable” and those sources “ought to be in jail.” During July, in a memo with 
unclassified assessment of war-related leaks prepared by the CIA, Rumsfeld wrote: “I 
have spoken publicly and privately, countless times, about the danger of leaking 
classified information.” He added, “It is wrong. It is against the law. It costs the lives of 
Americans. It diminishes our country’s chances of success.” The CIA’s report said that 
al-Qaida planners have learned a lot from public press information. According to RCFP, 
“By late July 2002, parking lot guards were stopping every 30th car leaving the Pentagon 
to ask if anyone was smuggling out classified documents, and the CIA has suspended two 
contractors for talking to the press, according to U.S. News & World Report.” Reporters 
faced new tighter requirements for access to the building, and only those who worked 
full-time within the Pentagon or who visited twice a week could have a press pass and be 
allowed unescorted access. Others reporters had to have an escort.435All defense 
contractors were also contacted on behalf of the Pentagon, and they were advised to use 
“discretion” in their public statements. Pentagon staff members responsible for 
acquisition were forbidden from speaking with the media.436 
At a certain point, many reporters feared that the government would try to go for a 
law to prevent the press from using leaks. In a report to Congress dated October 2002, 
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Ashcroft said that “there was sufficient ammunition in his arsenal to go after government 
leakers without having to bother with fresh legislation,” Jane Kirtley wrote for AJR in 
December 2002.437 “He speculates that ‘carefully drafted legislation specifically tailored’ 
to address leaks rather than classic espionage ‘could enhance our investigative efforts.’” 
Kirtley called attention to the fact that Ashcroft seemed to believe that “all the leaks are 
created equal. Nothing in his report limits the initiatives he proposes only to leaks that 
endanger national security. … Gratuitously exposing military secrets is one thing; 
providing the public with information it needs but the government wants to keep under 
wraps to avoid embarrassment or controversy is another. Ashcroft utterly fails to 
acknowledge this distinction in his report,” Kirtley said. 
As another example of this policy, in 2004 “the Department of Homeland Security 
began requiring employees to sign a nondisclosure agreement that stipulates they will not 
reveal ‘sensitive but unclassified’ information, which includes anything that if lost or 
misused could ‘adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal programs’ 
or the privacy of individuals,” wrote Lori Robertson in AJR, February/March 2005.438  
In the years after 9/11, the Bush administration expressed continual fears “that 
information leaked to the enemies would have disastrous results,” says Dadge.439 For the 
potential leakers the threat of ending up in jail was real. “Two federal government 
employees were fired for their comments about government actions in the face of new 
security needs after Sept. 11 and others have been disciplined or gagged,” said the 
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RCFP.440 U.S. Park Police Chief Teresa Chambers was fired in 2004 after seven months 
of being on administrative leave, during which she was prohibited from talking about her 
work at the Department of the Interior. She had told the Washington Post that her office 
had less money to operate because of the extra security around national monuments after 
9/11. In June 2002, two congressmen requested Ashcroft to investigate the leak of 
classified information from a close-door meeting with the National Security Agency. 
Officials had told the congressional panel that messages related to what happened on 9/11 
were intercepted the day before, but were not translated until following day. CNN and 
other media reported that. By early August, the FBI had questioned nearly 37 members of 
the Senate and House intelligence committees, 100 congressional staffers and dozens of 
officials at CIA, NSA and Defense Department. In August 2004, the New York Times 
reported that the source of the leak seemed to be a Republican senator.441  
In May 2005, former Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin and others were 
charged in a leak investigation with knowingly disclosing information. Federal agents 
speaking on condition of anonymity told the New York Times that four reporters had been 
questioned in the investigation of leaks of classified information on terrorism, American 
forces in Iraq, and Middle East strategy to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
and the news media.442  
Around this policy to avoid leaks from the administration, the Patriot Act, enacted 
on October 26, 2001, became another issue that could chill potential leakers. According 
to the RCFP, “Journalists should be concerned about certain provisions of the law, which 
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grant broad new powers to government agents to investigate terrorism and make previous 
statutory protections for newsrooms almost irrelevant when it comes to terrorism 
investigations.”443 The Patriot Act expanded the FBI’s ability to obtain records through 
secret court orders, which meant that government investigators could also give them 
greater authority to track e-mail and telephone calls and to eavesdrop on those 
conversations, said RCFP. “Although aimed at trapping terrorists, those provisions of the 
law could ensnare journalists and compromise their ability to report on the war on 
terrorism.” Even when it might not have been used with reporters, the threat was there for 
them and for those who contacted them, which at the end implied that the Patriot Act 
could have chilling effect on potential sources. 
 
Beyond the attacks. The elements described in the above section of this chapter 
showed the policies adopted by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks that had an 
impact in its relationship with the press corps, particularly those working in Washington, 
D.C. But the war on terrorism developed through the following years to other places, 
with other discussions and other kind of policies that also affected the media work.  
Following the war in Afghanistan, the government started switching its attention 
to the Iraq front. Helped by the patriotic feeling, during 2002, the Bush administration 
tried to build the case for the Iraq invasion, mainly on the grounds that Saddam Hussein’s 
government was holding weapons of mass destruction in the country that were a threat 
for the United States and the world, plus the fact that the country may have had ties to al-
Qaida. It took several months to build the case, and Bush did not get that many other 
allied countries along the way, as he seemed to be hoping. On October 11, 2002, the 
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Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed 
Forces Against Iraq, which gave Bush administration the legal basis for going to Iraq. 
With the evidence collected by the government on the existence of WMD in Iraq, the 
administration looked to engage other countries in its goal. The United Kingdom and 
Spain became allies, but the United Nation as a whole remained reluctant to be part of the 
proposed war, since its inspectors found no evidence of weapons. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell tried to make the case on February 5, 2003, but still, the United Nations did 
not have enough evidence to engage in such an action. The invasion of Iraq started on 
March 20, 2003. Later, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its WMD 
programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that it 
intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted. 
 
WMD reporting. The war in Iraq had several fronts for journalists. One of them 
was the building of the case and the alleged “use” of journalists by the government in 
order to gain popular approval. The other front was the harsh criticism reporters received 
for not going their jobs after WMD were not found in Iraq. And another front was the 
coverage of the war itself. 
Giles warned about the reporting on Iraq early in 2002 in Nieman Reports, Winter 
2002: “What we know about this situation is, in large measure, what the Bush 
administration want us to know. We have read stories telling of leaked battle scenarios.” 
He pleaded reporters should be holding government accountable through information. 
“Asking the questions will force the administration to respond. It will inform our citizens 
about the risks and uncertainties of acting as the administration appears to want to act,” 
 134 
he added. “The burden of proof must always be on the government to show beyond doubt 
where national security interests justify any exemptions to official accountability and 
transparency in the use of power.”444 One of the “most formidable challenges for nearly 
every journalist covering the war abroad and stateside has been covering the U.S. and 
British governments’ efforts to demonstrate that the Saddam Hussein regime actually 
pursued weapons of mass destruction,” said the RCFP. “But the press accounts of the 
lack of success in uncovering such weapons have subjected reporters to scorn and 
charges of unpatriotic reporting.”445  
There was a catch with that story -- many journalists believed then. The story that 
led the government to raise the case appeared on the front page of the New York Times, 
and was written by Judy Miller and Michael Gordon, and it was attributed to unnamed 
sources. A few hours later, Cheney, Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice were on different TV shows confirming the information. The media 
reacted immediately and amplified the information. Many journalists said that the story 
could have been leaked from the White House to the New York Times with the purpose of 
making the data a fact, Charles Layton wrote at AJR from August/September 2003.446 
Miller kept saying that she confirmed the information.   
The problem with the WMD reporting seemed to be that since the government 
brought the issue into public discussion, “many members of the press have 
stenographically reported the White House’s homeland security arguments without 
independently attempting to verify the ostensible evidence behind those arguments,” 
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Susan Moeller wrote for the Nieman Reports, Summer 2004.447 She pointed out that in 
October 2002, when Bush and Rumsfeld kept linking the war on terror with Iraq and 
WMD, the press accepted that claim without further investigation. “Press reporting on the 
President amplified the administration’s voice … When alternative perspectives were 
presented as part of their coverage, that evidence and analysis tended to be buried,” 
Moeller added. Only a few journalists were exceptions – many with a lot of years of 
covering national security beats or government agencies, Moeller said, would challenge 
with other sources what the government was saying. Before the war started, many veteran 
journalists were asking why younger reporters at the White House and Pentagon were not 
asking basic questions about how the war be won and at what cost, Paul McMasters 
reported on Nieman Reports, Summer 2003.448 
It was not until May 2003, when Bush made his “Mission Accomplished” speech, 
that more journalists were seeking “independent confirmation of the White House and 
Pentagon’s pronouncements.”449 And yet, having elements to believe that the evidence 
given by the government to go to Iraq had not been proved, it took a while until the press 
started reacting to that fact, wrote Gilbert Cranberg for Nieman Reports, Fall 2003. “The 
likelihood that the President had used bogus information to sell the war he was eager to 
launch seemed to be judged by press and politicians as not all consequential despite 
ample early warning that the administration had a truth-in-advertising problem.”450  
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Embedded. But the press was facing another flank regarding the Iraq war. During 
the months before combat, journalists were worried that the history with Afghanistan 
would repeat itself in Iraq, and they would not be in the battlefield until late in the action. 
The proposed system was called embedding, and consisted of incorporating troop units 
that were going to combat. 
From the beginning of discussions, defense officials considered that this kind of 
immersion of reporters was historical. The Pentagon helped and trained journalists that 
were going to combat. According to RCFP, the rules for the embedding system had “a 
sense of vagueness” since they had been written with a language “that could offer 
anything from a slight to a likely possibility that curtains could fall down over 
transparency.” However, the organization recognized that, “The Pentagon … refrained 
from taking too much advantage of vague language in the rules and allowed the news 
media to file thousands of reports with few restrictions during the war.” 451 The ground 
rules defined media-embed as “media representative remaining with a unit on an 
extended basis.” The Pentagon agreed to provide billeting, rations, medical attention and 
some assistance with communications if necessary “to facilitate maximum in-depth 
coverage of the U.S. forces in combat and related operations.” Journalists could not carry 
or use firearms or have their own vehicles. Commanders could not exclude reporters for 
safety reasons or for gender. “The rules required journalists to seek approval for 
transmissions in hostile situations or in combat. With the rules, the Pentagon stated that 
media reports would not be subject to security reviews” and that the standard for 
releasing information should be “why not” release instead of “why” release. All 
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interviews with officials, service members and unit commanders were considered to be 
“on the record,” but rules sought for “security at the source” and placed restrictions upon 
the release of 19 different categories of information.452  
On March 7, 2003, the first wave of journalists to be embedded with U.S troops 
shipped out. On July 14, 2003, according to Editor and Publisher magazine, only 23 
journalists remained attached to a military outfit. “Most journalists had struck out in their 
own by that time, willing to brave the hostilities of a post-war Iraq without military 
support,” reported RCFP.453  
Among the shortcomings of the system, many considered the fact that the reporter 
could only see what one unit was seeing. Journalists could also develop strong 
attachments to the soldiers with whom they were embedded.454 Others believed that the 
articles sent by the embedded reporters could not escape a certain patriotic tone, at least 
at the very beginning. The embedded program was interpreted as an “impressive form of 
news management,” as McMasters put it. “The official imprint on press coverage of the 
war was achieved through a smart combination of incentives and threats. The price for 
more intimate and productive access to the frontlines for the press was steep: agreement 
to a long list of ground rules, submission to unit commanders’ authority over their 
reports, and practical neutralization of independent reporting.”455 According to the 
journalist, the “genius” of news management was “that it compromises the press while 
securing its enthusiastic participation.” 
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The attitude toward the press covering the war quickly changed, once things did 
not go as expected. Sig Christenson, who was first embedded, wrote that once he went 
back, the climate towards journalists was totally different. “Blame the media. Accuse us 
of overlooking the good news stories of Iraq,” he said in Nieman Reports, Summer 
2005.456 Journalists in Iraq were kept on a “short leash” in their hotel rooms and were not 
able to do one-on-one interviews, for security reasons. Many claimed that although press 
was not doing a good job in the field, it wasn’t their fault as security worsened.457 
According to the RCFP, the primary government support of openness and free 
press activities in conflict overseas was replaced “with hesitation and haphazard, 
unpredictable practices,” among them the “abuse and sometimes detainment of 
journalists covering the aftermath of the war.”458 It seemed that the press could not have a 
win-win situation in Iraq. 
 
Subpoenas. Early after the 9/11 attacks, potential official sources could fear that, 
even coming out anonymously, nothing would guarantee that their names would not be 
disclosed, except the word of the reporter to whom they entrusted the information. In 
many terrorism-related leaks, journalists have been subpoenaed in order to learn the 
identity of their sources. Obviously, this also became a factor of chilling-effect among 
sources. “The battle between secrecy and disclosure has generated periodic clashes over 
leaks and confidential sources. For the news media, freedom of press implies freedom to 
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use information from confidential sources,” said Daniel Schorr at Nieman Reports, 
Summer 2005.459 
“With the increase in national security concerns since the September 11, 2001, 
terrorists’ attacks, U.S. journalists face an increased likelihood of being seen as 
government informants with no constitutional right to keep sources confidential or to 
withhold unpublished materials from prosecutors. Crackdowns on government leaks also 
threaten the availability of confidential sources,” warned the RCFP. “But journalists 
should be aware that since the terrorist attacks and the war with Iraq, courts may be more 
likely to decide that the balance falls in favor of disclosure (of sources), especially where 
national security issues are at stake. Leaks of sensitive information to the news media 
have angered government officials and sometimes the public, prompting a number of 
investigations” 460 In fact, RCFP added, at least nine U.S. courts had faced the issue by 
August 2005 and seven of them had shown willingness to force journalists reveal their 
sources. 
The Valerie Plame case became the most well-known case in this field. On July 6, 
2003, Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former U.S. ambassador, wrote a column in the New York 
Times questioning Bush’s statement that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa. Wilson 
said that the CIA sent him to Niger in February 2002 to investigate the matter, and his 
conclusions were that the transaction was “highly doubtful.” A week later, syndicated 
journalist Robert Novak published a column where he identified Valerie Plame, Wilson’s 
wife, as a CIA operative and attributed the information to unidentified senior 
administration officials. On July 16, Matthew Cooper wrote a column that said some 
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government officials had told Time magazine the same thing about Plame. To reveal the 
identity of a CIA operative is a felony. On September 29, the Justice Department 
informed the White House that it had opened an investigation into the leak of Palme’s 
identity as a CIA officer.  
During the following months, special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, investigating 
the leak, subpoenaed reporters from the New York Times, the Washington Post and NBC 
News, to mention a few.  In the meantime, more subpoenas were sent to the White House, 
requesting the records of all the communications held two weeks before Novak published 
his column. “In an effort to release reporters from confidentiality agreements with 
possible White House sources, FBI investigators asked administration officials in January 
2004 to sign waivers of their rights to have private conversations with reporters,” 
explained RCFP. One subpoena sought records of White House contact with more than 
20 journalists.461 
Reporters’ phone records were requested for the investigation, to see who called 
them during the days of the leaked information. Such was the case with Judy Miller from 
the New York Times, although the newspaper filed a suit to block the request. During the 
following two years, many reporters who had covered government information in 
Washington, D.C, had to deal with subpoenas and confidentiality of their sources.  
Walter Pincus, veteran journalist from the Washington Post, was also subpoenaed. 
He did not testify as to the name of the source. “The traditional government concern 
about the leaks has taken a new turn,” he wrote in the Nieman Report, Summer 2005. 
“Journalists, including me, have been put in the middle of a highly publicized criminal 
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investigations and civil cases based on leaks.”462 He added: “Protecting confidential 
sources, who provide me with material for many of the intelligence stories I write, is a 
key factor that enables me to write the stories I do about national security.” But, he said, 
the use of anonymity should be taken carefully, because the use of it can harm the 
profession and it “diminishes the value of those who are whistleblowers- people who risk 
their jobs and jail for what they may believe is a higher cause.” 
When Tim Russert, from NBC, was subpoenaed, the network looked to quash it 
because, said NBC News President Neal Shapiro in a statement, “sources will simply stop 
speaking to the press if they fear those conversations will become public.”463 In July 
2005, Miller went to jail, as she refused to reveal the identity of her source.  
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the vice president's chief of staff, was one of the sources. 
He released reporters from their commitments in some cases, and encouraged them to 
talk before the jury. Karl Rove, a senior Bush adviser, turned out to be another of the 
official sources who leaked the story. 
Another leak investigation that involved subpoenas to reporters was on the 
information that the FBI planned a raid to the Global Relief Foundation, an Islamic 
charity suspected of funding terrorism. Fitzgerald was denied permission in 2003 by the 
Department of Justice to subpoena reporters’ telephone records, but received it in 
September 2004 and subpoenaed the telephone records of two reporters, Judith Miller 
and Phillip Shenon from the New York Times.464 The case of Steven Hatfill, who sued 
Ashcroft for government leaks that Hatfill was a subject of investigation in the 2001 
                                                
462 Pincus, Walter, Anonymous Sources: Their Use in a Time of Prosecutorial Interest, Nieman Reports, 
Summer 2005, p.27-28. 
463Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Homefront Confidential. How the War on Terrorism 
Affects Access to Information and the Public’s Right to Know. Sixth Edition, September 2005, p. 52  
464 Ibid, p. 53. 
 142 
anthrax attacks, also involved subpoenas of reporters. Hatfill was not charged, but after 
the information was leaked, he lost his job as a contractor and was not able to get another 
job. The subpoenas to reporters were withdrawn after the government made federal 
employees witnesses in the case.465 
 
Relationship with sources. Having gone through the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks until 2005, what remains to be analyzed is if all that was described above, 
somehow affected the relationship between Washington, D.C., reporters and their official 
sources. For that reason, a group of persons who could offer different points of view on 
the subject was interviewed for this study. The interviews were done during May 2007. 
Articles and literature showed that the immediate aftermath of September 11 
attacks was signalized by a climate of fear and increased patriotism. Under the guise of 
the War on Terrorism, two wars developed in less than five years, one in Afghanistan and 
another one in Iraq. Authors and reporters agreed that the Bush administration enforced 
restrictions in the flow of information, through limitations in the data released through 
FOIA requests, among other examples. A tough policy to control the message from the 
administration, as well as to prevent leaks from the government, plus the constant threat 
to go after those who released information and the subtle pressure of subpoenaing 
journalists to learn the identity of their sources, completed a complex picture for 
journalists to gather information. 
Many of the interviewees agreed that there is something that would never be 
known, and that is if Bush presidency was or was not leaning towards this kind of 
relationship with the press before the 9/11 attacks. A group among those persons 
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interviewed for this research works with journalists and their problems, and have seen the 
evolution of these issues through time. 
For Lucy Dalglish, executive director of RCFP, an organization that provides 
legal defense to reporters, “there is no question that things have changed” after 9/11, 
“particularly on the federal level. A lot of information was put off limits by federal 
government.” According to Dalglish, “Had 9/11 not happened, things would still be 
considerably different because George Bush and his administration placed a very high 
premium on message control and secrecy. When 9/11 happened it just gave them much 
more, it made it easier for them to shut down things they were inclined to shut down 
anyway … [9/11] accelerated what Bush was able to do.” 
From her point of view, the Ashcroft Memo, plus other measures that restricted 
the access to information were indicators that “things were going to be bad” after the 
attacks. “Officials were just clamming up,” she said. “They were all told message control 
was very important. It took two to three years for us to figure out what all this secrecy 
meant for confidential sources because people within the government then started to get 
really concerned that the public didn’t know what was happening.” Dalglish said that 
there might have been more  “confidential, high stakes confidential sources than ever 
before.” According to the attorney, that also caused certain problems since there was no 
federal shield law that could prevent journalists from being asked to reveal their source's 
identity. Because of the administration policy, Dalglish said, journalists were having 
“more detailed conversations with their sources about precisely what the agreement is” in 
terms of revealing or not the identity of the sources and under which conditions. Among 
the recommendations that the RCFP gave to journalists back then was to “stay off the 
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phone that can be traced to you,” as well as “don’t put stuff like that in your e-mail.” The 
risk, she said, is that the phone company could be subpoenaed to give a log of the 
reporter’s calls to determine the source. “So if you are not using your home or office 
phone to talk to sources, they can’t get the information. [We are] telling people to have 
face-to-face meetings in park benches in scheduled locations.” Dalglish knew reporters 
who would not write an article just because they could not agree with the source to a 
waiver under any circumstance. 
On the other hand, Dalglish said that reporters were hard to convince that there 
was a problem of access to official sources or information in general “We can write 
newsletters, we can write magazines, we can send out press releases, I can be on 
television, I can give speeches at conferences. If they don’t face the problem, they don’t 
believe it exists because they think they’re going to be the one who gets it,” she 
explained. She recognized that by then (2007) journalists were starting to see the effects, 
“but for the first couple of years after 9/11 it was virtually impossible to get their 
attention.”  
Former editor of the New York Times, Bill Kovach is now the acting director of 
Project for Excellence in Journalism. He agreed that the relationship between reporters 
and sources have changed significantly, “in the sense that the amount of information that 
the government is willing to share with journalists has decreased enormously. The 
government has systematically taken more and more information about government 
affairs, about government decisions, about government programs, that used to be freely 
available to journalists, and through journalists, to the public. They’ve taken more and 
more of that information off of their Web sites, out of their releases, and in conversations 
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with journalists refuse to share information … Access to government officials by 
journalists has declined significantly as well. They refuse to give interviews consistently 
and more often just simply refuse to talk to the press.”  
Although Kovach thinks this has been changing over the past administrations, he 
emphasized that during the Bush administration, there was an open talking about “their 
dismissal of the press as an institution. They would much rather have information 
controlled directly from the government to the public and avoid the one true, organized 
press.” He added that the attacks of September 11, and the subsequent war on terrorism, 
“under that theory of governance they feel that the executive branch [was] entitled to 
withhold considerably more information from the public than they normally would.” 
According to Kovach, those changes in the relationship with official sources could be 
grouped as follows: “Fewer people in the government know what [was] going on”; more 
information was classified, even information that previously was public; there was an 
intent “to manipulate the press in order to propagandize the public.” An example of that 
was when the government was making its case for the war by making available "people 
... at a certain level of government, to describe the situation in the way that the 
government wanted the public to believe it. And some journalists took that information 
and didn’t document it sufficiently and helped mislead the public. So it’s set up a process 
to, in effect, control the public’s knowledge about events.” 
Kovach said that “government officials who disagree with the policy set by the 
administration are much more reluctant to speak to the press even on a background basis 
for fear that they’ll lose their jobs.” 
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The former editor summarized the situation in the following way: “The two 
fundamental elements that make journalism a service to democracy are: one, 
independence of control by the government or any other source, and two, a process of 
verifying information before you release it. Those two principles of journalism, 
independence and verification, suffered considerable diminution during the first two or 
three years after the attacks on 9/11. A number of journalists did not sufficiently do their 
job in that sense.” 
Howard Kurtz, media reporter from the Washington Post, who covered reporters’ 
attitudes after 9/11, picked the issue from the point of view of the media attitude during 
those years, which also could have had an impact on the relationship with official 
sources. Kurtz believes that the attacks “had a significant impact on the usually 
contentious relationship between journalists and government officials. The country had 
been attacked in a way that had never happened before, and particularly as America 
geared up for war first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, there was a certain restraint 
shown by most journalists.” Although he did not think that reporters were intimidated, he 
did see “a kind of jingoistic environment in the country, particularly during the run up to 
both wars. And there was perhaps a self-imposed restraint on the part of many journalists 
and news organizations who did not want to appear unpatriotic in a time of national 
crisis. Many reporters still did their jobs and it wasn’t like skeptical questions were never 
asked, but clearly the Bush administration enjoyed a period of a somewhat less 
aggressive press corps.” Kurtz said that many of those stories that contested what the 
Bush administration was publicly saying ran in some newspapers, yet not with the 
prominence they deserved. 
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But Kurtz did not see a big change in, for example, quoting anonymous sources: 
“The difference was that the reliance on unnamed sources in the run up to the war in Iraq 
was to some degree giving a pass to senior officials to make the case that Saddam 
[Hussein] had these weapons without having their names attached. And so it was just a 
more serious example of what reporters in the capital do far too often, which is let people 
make assertions and make charges without having to go on the record.” 
However, he acknowledged, the Bush administration “pushed the boundaries 
when it comes to secrecy,” since it only authorized few people in each department to 
speak to the press, “cutting off access to career officials and experts that we ordinarily 
rely on.” 
Having prosecutors trying to find out how journalists got their information “has 
had a chilling effect, not just on reporters who have to think twice and three times about 
whether a story based on confidential information or unnamed sources might make them 
the target of future prosecution, but on the sources themselves, who may not want to risk 
being dragged into some legal proceeding and maybe were more reluctant to talk to 
reporters at all.” After the Valerie Plame case, said Kurtz, even when it did not have the 
chilling effect it could have had, “certain news organizations have declined to publish 
explosive material out of concern over such a prosecution and certainly some sources 
have refused to come forward, but by and large the kind of confidential transactions that 
have long taken place between reporters and their sources are still going on. Everyone’s 
being a lot more cautious. Reporters are not necessarily keeping their notes. They’re 
being more careful about calling people from an office phone because they’ve seen the 
ways in which they can have the tables turned and come under investigation themselves.” 
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National security was the beat that seemed to be more affected by all the 
restrictions and provisions to avoid leaks from public officials. Therefore, it should be 
one of the most difficult beats to have access to official sources. Walter Pincus, who has 
been working for almost 30 years covering this information and, most recently for the 
Washington Post, was not so sure about a change in the relationship with official sources 
during this administration. For him, the problem is rooted somewhere else and combined 
with other elements.  
“Print’s role now is to tell you why something happened or what happened in 
depth or what’s going to happen next, analyze what’s happening. To do that you need 
people who understand the subject matter,” he explained. “But this is going on at the 
same time that people spend less and less time becoming expert in the subject and more 
and more time switching around.” Since Pincus had spent so much time covering national 
security issues, “There are a number of people, who if you do it as long as I’ve done it, 
[you] know people from the time they came here to the time they get higher and higher in 
government. I know people who started on the Hill and ended up secretary of defense.” 
According to Pincus, that is why it is important for people to stay in their beats for a long 
time, “so they’re not totally dependent on the people that the administration puts out to 
talk to them. If you just begin to cover intelligence, there’s nobody you can call except 
for the public affairs people.” He also said that it is a mistake not to socialize with 
potential sources. “This whole idea that we’re different and you don’t socialize with 
people in government, I think that’s foolish.”  
Pincus thinks that each administration gets more sophisticated in covering the 
press. “The thing that’s different about this one is that they are actively using PR to 
 149 
promote issues starting with weapons of mass destruction and all the rest of it. There 
clearly was a public relations campaign to sell the country on that and on terrorism,” he 
said. And he had been a victim of those. “I’m dealing with public affairs people who are 
in Iraq. You have to send e-mails. Nobody wants to talk on the telephone. .... If you’re 
asking a question that hasn’t been asked they then have to play reporter and go to their 
own people in the military. You go back and forth and the answer may raise more 
questions. You then have to go through this very frustrating exchange because nobody 
who knows the answer will get on the phone.”  
But Pincus preferred to talk with the people he knew from ever and had been his 
sources since before the Bush administration. “I generally deal with people I’ve known 
for a long time. It’s not a matter of somebody just whispering something to you; it’s a 
matter of having a conversation, raising questions and getting honest answers,” he 
explained. And with those long-time sources, “there’s a general understanding that you 
don’t quote them.” Those conversations, he said, did not change after 9/11, and neither 
did the care he always took before printing a story where unnamed sources are quoted.  
“It doesn’t matter if it’s 9/11 or pre-9/11. The fact that people want confidentiality 
doesn’t make what they say true. Therefore you have to check it out. What people forget 
in general is that when we print a story that has this kind of information, you go to the 
administration for comments so they know what you’re doing. Somebody doesn’t just 
whisper something to you and you print it in the paper and that’s it. You generally go to 
official sources so they have an understanding what you’re doing. If it’s a real secret, and 
those few times it is, they’ll either tell you or go to an editor,” he said. 
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Josh Meyer covered national security and terrorism for Los Angeles Times, but 
started just a year before the 9/11 attacks. Yet, he moved to Washington, D.C, right after 
the attacks, but he already had sources around the capital. “It was a lot different then than 
it was after 9/11. People were much less guarded in their comments. Many people were 
still guarded, the FBI in particular. But I did find people in Washington in the national 
security apparatus who were more willing to talk. They almost seemed relieved that I was 
asking about terrorism,” he recalled.  
Once in Washington, Meyer had a hard time getting people to talk and trust in 
him, when they did not know him. “But 9/11 made it much worse, especially because 
both the FBI and CIA were accused of screwing up and having big mistakes and both 
each blamed the other. So in some ways you could get the FBI to talk about the CIA and 
you could get the CIA to talk about the FBI, but not much.” His main strategy was to “try 
to get them outside the building.” The reporter went to several retirement dinners, or 
congressional hearings or background briefings to get to know potential sources in 
person. The face-to-face contact seems to be unbeatable compared to other ways of 
contacting sources, like phone calls. “In the past couple of years because there’s been a 
lot of leak investigations … people that I know in the Justice Department and other 
government agencies believe that their phone calls are being monitored, that if they 
actually place a call out to a journalist that somehow somebody will find out about that.” 
According to Meyer, “it doesn’t matter if it’s true or not. If they’re afraid that it’s true, 
then they won’t call you. And in many cases they’re afraid that even if you call them, it 
will show up. So it’s had a very chilling effect. But I think that’s what the government 
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wanted. They don’t want these people to talk. And so by doing things like that, I think it 
has the desired effect.” 
Like Pincus, he had to deal with public relations officials. “What they want us to 
do is go through the media office instead of calling around them. And they get mad at 
you if they find you’re calling people directly that are outside the media office.” Meyer 
said that if you actually did it, they would not give an answer. “It’s called 
compartmentalization. The only people they let talk to the media either don’t know 
anything or won’t say. They’ll tell you it’s not their job to ask, that it’s none of your 
business.” 
An additional problem Meyer found was a direct effect of the subpoenas to 
journalists. “Washington has always been a place where covering intelligence and 
national security, you have to promise people anonymity, because they’ll get fired if you 
don’t or they’ll get retaliated against. But even the promise of anonymity no longer does 
the job. Because they’re afraid that these investigations will find out who they are even if 
you don’t quote them by name in the paper. It’s made it much, much harder.” One of his 
sources, he recalled, had been investigated at least four times in leak investigations, even 
when the person had nothing to do with the leak. 
However, Meyer said he had to be really careful to get independent confirmation 
in each case. “It’s very important to confirm or triangulate information from a variety of 
sources, especially sources in different government agencies or from the top and the 
bottom of a government agency.”  
Meyer said that when you cover a beat like his, “ there’s a concern that if you 
alienate your sources they won’t talk to you anymore and you won’t be able to cover your 
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beat… I think some other reporters bend over too far backward the other way and are too 
concerned with offending people. But for every reporter like that, there’s another very 
good, courageous reporter who does. There’s some of the best journalism work I’ve ever 
seen being done in Washington right now. It’s just hard to do.” 
John Harwood, then from the Wall Street Journal, had been covering politics in 
Washington for almost a decade. He believed that the Bush administration was running 
the White House pretty much like other administrations before. “This White House has 
been more disciplined than most. Probably the least disciplined of the White Houses that 
I have interacted with was the first Bush White House and I think the experience of that 
time influenced this president to try and control things more tightly.” By disciplined, he 
referred to “the ability of the White House staff to only put out information that is 
authorized by the White House communication officials… 
“When I say discipline I mean when the administration is making a personnel 
choice or unveiling a policy initiative they are disciplined about not letting that get out 
ahead of time unless they want it to. They are effective in keeping people from talking to 
press who they don’t want to talk to the press. In White Houses that are looser, you can 
call people, they will return your call and they might tell you something. Here it’s much 
more likely that the press office will intercept the call and they’ll return the call and they 
won’t tell you anything interesting.” 
Like others interviewees for this study, Harwood believed that controls in the 
release of information may have been happening since, and that the attacks probably just 
accelerated the process. “There are fewer people in this White House with access to good 
information and there are fewer people willing to share it.” 
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Regarding the criticism of the press coverage of the administration after 9/11, he 
said that journalists usually are “at the mercy of the information that they have. If 
reporters had access to information that would have shown conclusively that Saddam 
Hussein didn’t have weapons of mass destruction we would have reported that. It’s not 
that we didn’t try to report that. We were reporting what government officials, Democrats 
and Republicans, believed at the time. Not all of them, but most of them.” 
For Matt Wald, who writes about nuclear power and commercial aviation for the 
New York Times, the 9/11 attack implied new challenges in the information field. “It 
made some people in both the private and the government sector less willing to talk,” he 
said. Early after the attacks, Wald tried to do an article for which he needed to fly in the 
pilot's cabinet. Although he got the approval from the airline, the FAA denied that idea, 
even though he was well known among these officials, for security reasons. 
The reporter also thinks that many of the policies toward giving away information 
had more to do with the Bush administration than with the attacks. “They want to make 
sure that all communication is centralized and that there’s a gatekeeper, someone who 
knows what questions are being asked and what answers are being given.” Wald said that 
if the office where you made a request for information was related to security issues, then 
it was explicit the reasons they would not give you an answer. “But there are parts of the 
Department of Transportation that don’t have a big security significance where they 
won’t answer any question until one person who’s in charge of public affairs decides 
whether they’ll answer it or not. It goes up and down the chain of command before they 
spit out an answer, or before they spit out a decision about whether there will be an 
answer.”  
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Nuclear information also became a difficult beat to cover. “It’s a lot more difficult 
to get a tour of a nuclear plant. Companies used to be very happy to show you all the 
shiny new equipment, but not now,” Wald explained.  Once he tried to see a plant where 
a lot of money was invested to reopen it, he could not get permission “So I did not go. 
And they gave the excuse of September 11. I wrote a story, but I was not able to see the 
plant,” he said. “They say 9/11 more often. Well, nobody said 9/11 before 9/11. They say 
security more often. And I think sometimes it’s an excuse. Not always, but sometimes.” 
Wald also admitted that it has been more difficult to gain access to documents than used 
to be accessible before the attacks. 
As an investigative reporter for Los Angeles Times, Deborah Nelson considered 
that the biggest change after the attacks “was that you had to rely on sources more 
extensively because it was harder to get information through FOIA and through the front 
door of just asking.” Nelson believed that was a direct impact of the Ashcroft memo, 
which recommended not releasing information. “What’s happened in the last few years is 
it’s gotten harder and harder to independently corroborate information involving the 
federal government.” Nelson would take anonymous sources as tips and “when you write 
the story nobody ever knows that an anonymous tipster gave you information because 
you’ve documented on the records, through records, on-the-record sources. It takes more 
work to do that, but it’s worth the effort because you know you’re right and you’re 
protecting the person who’s giving you the information. “The problem after 9/11, she 
said, was that “you have to end up relying on inside sources to give you documents, to 
give you information. And of course the downside of that is that the inside sources then 
control what information you get.” 
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If we add to that perspective, the fact that many sources would not be willing to 
talk to reporters, the process of getting information becomes a nightmare. She added that 
many times you ended up with half of the checking, for example, in terms of confirming 
your information with the person who has it firsthand and would not say anything to 
avoid troubles. “Until the last, maybe, two years, did sources start rising up because they 
felt like they’d be investigated if something leaked? For the most part, even though 
there’s been all this talk of a chilling effect, for most reporters the chilling effect I think 
has been on documents and being able to get information in a straightforward way from 
the government.” Because of that, she believed that the ability to judge whether 
information is correct, accurate and complete “has been really hurt.” 
Others journalists did not go through such a hard time to get their sources to talk. 
David Lightman, the Hartford Courant’s Washington Bureau Chief for 23 years until 
October 2007, did not really find a difference in the relationship with his sources after 
9/11, but then, his main arena of coverage was Capitol Hill and the representation of 
Connecticut, where his newspaper was edited. “I know people think there was, but no. I 
think, because you still had partisan sniping, you still had conflict. There was more unity 
of purpose I think, but no, the kind of things we cover on the local level, there was still 
the same sort of thing.”  
However, since one of the main interests of the state is the defense industry, 
Lightman did find a change in content of what he had to cover after the attacks. “Instead 
of trying to figure out, for example, how to adapt to a peace time military or should the 
U.S. be building up its Navy for example, all of a sudden after 9/11 the argument 
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changed radically. It wasn’t so much a question of gee, do we need X number of military 
helicopters; it’s how many do we need and how fast can we get them.”  
Lightman also found more difficulties getting documents. “It did become harder 
to make freedom of information requests because all of a sudden things could be made 
secret in the name of national security. It’s a problem that’s still going on. It’s very hard 
for us as journalists on the outside to say please give us this because it won’t compromise 
national security, because how do we know? Maybe 20 years from now the files will be 
open and we’ll say gee the administration just went crazy classifying everything. I don’t 
know that, but it’s made people much more wary of giving you data easily.”  
Not long before the interview, Lightman asked to look at records of chemical 
plant inspections. They finally let him see the documents, but under the condition that he 
could not take copies, but only notes in a legal pad, and a person would be with him all 
the time. “If in fact those documents contained material valuable to terrorists, what’s the 
difference if I sat there taking notes or if I Xeroxed it?... Ultimately there was no story 
there because frankly the material was rather dull and didn’t tell us anything.” 
Glen Justice, a former reporter who was based in Washington, D.C, for The New 
York Times, used to cover campaign finance and lobbying and had to deal with official 
sources during 2004 election. Although he did not find great changes in his beats after 
9/11, he commented that lobbying was impacted quite a bit, “because of the access rules 
that changed, in terms of physically active in government buildings. A lot of lobbyists 
[were] not as free as they used to be to literally roam the halls of Congress, roam the 
administration buildings and the congressional office buildings to buttonhole people in 
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the hallway. It became physically tougher to get into the building.” It also became 
difficult for reporters to get into buildings to chat directly with official sources, he added.  
Justice believed that Bush’s White House has never been especially good in 
giving information to the press. “Having said that, I think it’s a matter of opinion as to 
whether things clamped down harder after 9/11.” One of his missions was to cover the 
Bush 2004 re-election campaign from the financial perspective. The atmosphere, Justice 
said, was to give as little information as possible. He tried to write a story about “the 
making of a fundraiser, the anatomy of a fundraiser.” The campaign connected with a 
fundraiser in Texas. “But they literally flew a press person out to babysit me on the first 
two interviews, to sit there with me. It was utterly ridiculous. And it was a young kid who 
really had no business being there,” Justice said. “Eventually the kid went away and I 
was able to do my interviews with the fundraiser. But I will say this – I never did do the 
anatomy of story because they didn’t give me enough access. …. They weren’t willing to 
give me enough information to write a proper story.” 
For Rafael Lorente, the correspondent for the South Florida Sun-Sentinel, the 
challenge was different. He was part of a two-person bureau that was expected to cover 
the whole government. Ironically, his relationship with sources improved during Bush 
administration, he said, but in part was because he did not have that many before as he 
had arrived a few years before and was finally getting settled.  
The aftermath of 9/11 added another focus, and for a small bureau like his, it 
meant that other beats were eliminated. “Where the source development from my point of 
view became more difficult after 9/11 – and this was happening before 9/11, by the way – 
is that every week or every year in Washington they add more security. … Now 
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everywhere you go somebody wants to look in your pocket to see if you’ve got a knife. 
Somebody wants to walk you through a metal detector. There’s a lot more barriers.” 
According to Lorente, that kind of barrier “slows you down and it discourages you from 
going” and try to develop your sources. Another evidence of the closeness of the 
administration, he said, was the difficulty to obtain a White House pass. “It was much 
harder with them to get hold of people further down the line. Every time you wanted to 
talk to somebody you have to talk to a spokesman or spokeswoman. You can’t get the 
actual person; you have to get their mouthpiece. So in that sense, it was much more 
difficult.” 
Lorente insisted that once you “get through security” and get to know your source 
on a personal basis, you might have a chance to develop a good relationship. “You’ve got 
to get to people, which makes it difficult if you’re not the New York Times or the 
Washington Post or the L.A. Times and you’re not there every day. Or you don’t have that 
name,” he said. “Making sources was always a challenge if you came from a small 
newspaper because you had other things to do.” 
Remembering the aftermath of the 9/11 and the reaction of the press, Lorente said 
that, “The government really, whether we wanted to admit it or not, really kind of 
intimidated us a little bit. In part you have the patriotic stuff. …But in part you also have 
this fear that, What if they’re right? What if my reporting really does get 3,000 more 
people killed? What if by writing this story, the terrorists really do win? And if you sit 
and think about that for about 35 seconds, it’s illogical. But in that atmosphere, it was 
difficult.” That being so, he also thinks that Bush administration “was closed to begin 
with, and 9/11 just gave them an excuse to be more closed.”  
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The testimonies and opinions given by this group of journalists and specialists in 
media issues tend to confirm that, at least after the attacks of September 11, there was a 
change in the relationship between reporters and official sources, but at different levels 
and with different emphasis. That change remains to be seen in different contexts. If a 
reporter is well experienced in his beat, his relationship with his longtime sources would 
not be affected. However, he might find more trouble in meeting or in having access to 
paper documents or he might be afraid of being subpoenaed to release the identity of his 
contact. If the journalist was new to the beat, he then may find more difficulties in getting 
someone to talk, besides public relations officers. Perhaps, with the policies applied to 
access to information, a reporter may find it more difficult to corroborate what a source 
had said in condition of not using until you get it from a different source.  
There seemed to be downsides for every case where a reporter had to deal with 





With the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, many things changed for the 
American people. Many of those changes affected the media and the way journalists did 
their work. Considering the data gathered, the interviews held for the study, and the 
analysis that resulted from reviewing these elements, it can be said with some certainty 
that, from journalists’ perspective, the relationship between official sources and 
Washington, D.C, print reporters changed after 9/11 and until 2005.  
Unexpected and shaking as the attacks were for people, they made the 
government and the press, rethink their approach to each other. And the result seemed to 
have affected the way journalists and official sources related, one to gain access to 
information, the other to reveal it. According to the sources taken into account for the 
study, the change in the relationship happened in comparison to the way they related 
before 9/11. Although it is difficult to generalize about the relationship between reporters 
and public sources on the whole, this research tries to give examples of those changes, 
based on the elements found during the research. 
Where this change could be seen in the relationship mentioned above? According 
to the information reviewed, fewer public officials were willing to talk to the press during 
the period of time considered for this study. Many of them did not want to talk because 
they were afraid of losing their jobs, or because they were committed to the Bush 
administration and therefore, they would not pass to the press information that the 
government did not want to give away. Or they feared the effect that leaks could have on 
the security situation of the moment, to mention a few examples.  
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Moreover, after the attacks, there were more restrictions to getting to sources, in 
the sense of having access to public buildings without being announced or previously 
checked by security. Getting press credentials to cover certain places in the government 
was more difficult for reporters than before, and most of the times these restrictions were 
attributed to security reasons. Others stories could not be investigated or sources could 
not be reached allegedly for the same security reason; a reason many journalists felt was 
an “excuse.” Because of all these measures, reporters found it more problematic to have 
access to their sources and also to build relationships with potential ones.  
Another feature that strongly developed during the period considered by the study 
was the existence of public relations persons, who acted as walls between reporters and 
official servants in government offices. Many persons within the government would not 
answer questions of reporters directly, but only through a public relations staffer. This PR 
person would go for the information required whenever was considered that could be 
released to the press. Yet, the reporter would not have access to the person who actually 
held the information, and therefore, would not develop a relationship with a source. Many 
felt that these new elements – restrictions to get into public buildings and public relations 
officials -- had a considerable impact in the way they used to relate with sources in the 
government. 
Most of those public servants who did talk with the press might be afraid of being 
caught speaking to a reporter. Therefore, the negotiations between journalists and sources 
started to be more laborious, as more things had to be considered before releasing the 
information. On the one hand, sources would be careful of the place they would meet 
with journalists –not their offices, for instances; the way they would contact each other –
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not through the office phone calls, not through the official e-mail, as both could be 
investigated later; the terms of their conversations –which issues were not going to be 
mentioned; or the way the information would be attributed once the article was ready. On 
the other hand, because of the trend to discourage terrorism-leaks cases within the 
government, what would happen if the journalist were subpoenaed to reveal his sources’ 
identity became another issue to negotiate. It could be seen that a source may have 
problems speaking if the journalist was not going to keep secret his or her identity before 
a grand jury, as well as it could be considered that a reporter may have problems to keep 
the source’s identity if he or she might end in jail for not disclosing it. 
Another external issue affected the relationship with sources during this period of 
time. A lot of public officials would give tips for journalists to confirm with other 
sources, mainly with official documents. However, since there was a new policy that 
ended up restricting the release of government documents, many of those tips could not 
be confirmed or released on stories. Furthermore, the lack of documentation could have 
an impact in the accuracy of many other stories, since journalists saw themselves 
depending on fewer sources instead of written documents. Likewise, in terms of 
accuracy, the lack of primary sources also could have affected other stories. Journalists 
would have to rely on secondary sources, which might not have been directly related with 
the subject of the story and might be echoing – with the risks that could bring -- what 
other officials said. 
Considering these examples of changes in the relationship between journalists and 
official sources, why have these changes happened? Which were the conditions that 
might have contributed to these changes? Three factors could be mentioned as having an 
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impact on the subject of this study, and have been reviewed in previous chapters. The 
interaction of the three of them seemed to create conditions for a “perfect storm” of 
circumstances that had an effect on the mentioned relationship. 
The government itself was a factor. As it has been said before, the Bush 
administration developed a strong policy of controlling the message delivered to the 
public by the presidency. This policy translated in fewer persons holding information, 
and many of them holding it in a need-to-know basis, meaning they had a partial view of 
the whole picture. The fewer the official servants having information, the fewer the 
potential sources reporters could go for information. In other words, if the press had not 
developed a strong relationship with an official source before, it was going to be really 
hard to get a tip, for example, from the White House, where the control of the message 
seemed to be tougher than in any other part of the government. 
In addition, after 9/11, the administration sent a severe message to all public 
employees: Leaks would be severely punished, especially those related to security issues. 
Every public office was under vigilance and the possibility of losing a job or being 
investigated, surely had a chilling effect on potential official sources. There were enough 
public examples to assure that the administration intention of sealing the government 
from any kind of leak was serious. The fact that many reporters were subpoenaed to 
reveal their sources’ identities in cases related to leaks may have fed the fear of being 
caught passing information to the press. Therefore, fewer public officials may have been 
willing to talk. 
The administration sent other signs, such as the restrictions imposed on the release 
of documents from the government with different memos. The new difficulties to have 
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access to information gave fewer documents as sources that could be used to check tips 
from within public offices. And again, it may have also had a chilling effect on officials. 
Meanwhile, those policies were developing in a war context that, in a certain way, 
could validate the restrictions for security reasons. Wars had historically been a scenario 
of restrictions for journalists, from their access to sources to their access to combat itself. 
And this one did not seem to be an exception. 
On the other hand, another factor that seems to have helped to change the 
mentioned relationship was the climate left by the 9/11 attacks. As it was said before, the 
United States entered a war scenario, after being hit by shocking attacks. People feared 
that a new attack could happen any moment. Many felt the necessity to enforce the unity 
of a nation. Those were times of patriotism, and that seemed to be expected from 
journalists as well. So neither the restrictions to the access to information, nor the 
difficulty to engage public officials to talk might have been perceived by the people as 
problem, but as a sort of patriotic duty. It can be seen how many reporters could have felt 
discouraged to pursue public officials for information, since everyone was expected to be 
“on the same boat” against terrorism.  
Likewise, fear was another factor that may have held journalists from going after 
sources for more information. Reporters may have felt the same fear everyone else was 
feeling at the time. And then, they could have felt an additional fear: What if they 
released information that could kill people? In any case, the climate that followed the 
attacks was not inviting to go aggressively after public sources that were clamming up. 
The state of the press after 9/11 could have been a third factor that impacted the 
relationship with sources. Besides the feeling of patriotism that could have affected their 
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work at least at the beginning, of course, journalists were not prepared to cover the 
aftermath of terrorist attack that led to a war on terrorism in two different countries. But 
certain circumstances seemed to aggravate that. Reduction of employees at the 
Washington, D.C., bureaus had left fewer reporters, many of them too young to have 
already a network of official sources. And to add something else to the complex situation, 
before the attacks the center of Washington’s bureaus coverage was not so much the 
traditional beats, like national security or defense, but others more direct to social and 
diverse issues – education, environment or health, to mention a few examples. Once the 
new beat – national security and terrorism -- arrived at newsrooms, many could have 
found that they did not have an old and secure network of longtime public officials as 
their potential sources. This could also have had an impact on the journalists’ perception 
that their relationship with official sources changed after 9/11. 
Even so, there are certain issues that ought to be considered within the context of 
this study that could explain why the change in the relationship may not apply as a whole 
to every situation. A reporter who has been covering the same beat for years might not 
have had any problem to get to his old sources, as he usually did before, as they may have 
grown up together professionally. However, the same person could find problems in 
trying to reach new sources within the government, especially those that depend on the 
administration itself.  If the journalist was working in a small bureau, he might have 
found it difficult to pursue official sources for the big stories. But for the stories that he 
had been working before – and which might not be directly related to the war in terrorism 
-- then he might have not seen any noticeable change in the contact with those sources. It 
also depended on the sources the reporter had to deal with: If he was covering issues for a 
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local newspaper, the congressional beat would be his best source for public information, 
or if he was after information that could be contrasted between public and private 
officials, changes might not have been so evident. In other words, the perspective of the 
coverage could save the reporters from having trouble getting access to their official 
sources. 
Another issue that must be considered is that there was little time between the 
beginning of the Bush administration and the attacks, so many authors and journalists 
consulted for this study found it difficult to be absolutely certain that the change in the 
relationship with sources happened as a result of 9/11. Many believed that there had not 
been enough time to fully discern whether the administration policy was going to be this 
one anyway. However, there is a considerable agreement that the events of September 11 
accelerated or established these policies with the press. 
Nevertheless, the change mentioned at the beginning has to be considered in the 
context that was developed in this study. What could be the consequences of a change in 
the relationship between sources and reporters? As I said before, the purpose of 
journalism is to provide people with information they need to make their decisions for 
them and their society. For that reason, the authors agree that journalism helps build 
democracies. In order to achieve this purpose, reporters have to get the information from 
sources and verify the information independently, to ensure that the data is trustworthy 
for their public. So what happens if a reporter does not have a proper access to official 
sources? It is more difficult to get information and to verify independently. Therefore, the 
amount and the quality of information released to the public might be compromised 
because of the lack of sources. Considering these elements, it can be said that not having 
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access to a variety of sources from the government prevents reporters from 
accomplishing the purpose of their work, which means that it becomes more difficult to 
inform the society about what is happening, thus affecting the process of making 
decisions. 
However, can it be said that these changes in the relationship of reporters and 
sources are new? And can it be said that they did not happen before in the United States? 
As the study showed, many factors are like other moments in history, where reporters 
complained about similar situations. A lot of the policies applied by the Bush 
administration have been applied before in similar contexts: with wars and national 
security issues on the front line of government. Official sources have clammed up in 
previous administrations where leaks were fought with every resource the government of 
the moment had.  
In that regard, William J. Small wrote, “It is thus that an adversary relationship is 
inevitable between a searching press and a government in power. Each is suspicious of 
the other. Each sees the weakness of the other. The press suspects government of wanting 
to lie and to cover up while government suspects the press wanting to expose, embarrass, 
and entrap it.”466 He also said that, “Periods of war and national hysteria lend themselves 
to political moves against the press. Unfortunately, a troubled electorate at such times is 
willing to look the other way when this happens.”467 He wrote these concepts in 1972. 
And in the particular situation that has been analyzed in this study, they apply again. 
But just because this situation affecting the access to public sources may have 
happened in the past, does not mean it should not deserve to be highlighted in this 
                                                
466 Small, Political Power and the Press, p. 52 
467 Ibid., p.71 
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particular moment in history. In fact, it becomes a stronger remainder, especially for 
journalists, of the importance of journalism during these periods where information is 
vital for a society. It does not matter how much governments change their policies to 
make it difficult to have access to sources, because reporting has not changed its essence. 
For reporters this should mean that in the worst scenario, when no source will speak to 
them, they ought to have the patience and the tenacity, and sometimes aggressiveness, to 




LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
Additional research can be done on this subject, which offers a rich potential for 
further examination from different points of view. Factors such as time, logistics and 
access limited the scope of this thesis to the proposed subject of study, leaving 
unresolved issues that could be picked for future research. The focus of the study is the 
journalist's perspective; so there are no interviews or opinions gathered from the official 
sources’ side. Members of the Bush administration and public employees that have been 
working in the government for years could add their perspective to the issue, and add 
more information on which kind of changes they felt in their relationship with reporters 
during those years. 
The thesis does not include any quantitative analysis to develop the argument. A 
quantification of the number of FOIAs presented and rejected during that period of time, 
at least in certain governmental offices – like the Department of Defense or 
Transportation -- could give an idea in numbers of the policy on access to information.  
Moreover, counting the number of journalists who received subpoenas during that 
time in cases related to leaks, compared to the number in previous administrations, could 
be a way of going deeper into the effect of these actions over potential sources. Another 
quantitative analysis possible within this subject could be to follow the use of anonymous 
sources in stories on the government, again, comparing administrations, or even during 
the same administration, both before and after the 9/11 attacks. 
The study only took the print press as the subject to apply the primary hypothesis. 
Even though newspapers and magazine reporters can deal in a different way with their 
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sources, it might be really interesting to see if the same hypothesis could apply for radio 
and television journalists, and how they handled these problems in the period of time.  
On the other hand, the scope of the thesis was restricted to the Washington press 
corps, but in further research it could be extended to other press corps outside the capital, 
or to foreign correspondents that also had to deal with public officials during that period.  
The selection of the interviews for this thesis looked for variety within print press 
members. Thus, there were reporters who were covering the national security beat or a 
local beat or something associated. The ages within the group were different, as well as 
their time in the beat. The study within journalists could be systematized in several 
different ways in future research. For example, newspapers and magazines could be part 
of a survey on how much the relationship with public officials changed after 9/11. Every 
reporter who was covering the terrorism beat, for example, could be asked a group of 
questions on the subject to compare their answers. Journalists who were covering other 
beats that somehow touched the government would have the same questionnaire, so 
answers of each group could be compared. 
In addition, the study did not attempt a review of the coverage done by the 
newspapers at the time considered. Possible research might review the tone used in the 
articles right after the attacks to the end of the administration. The idea of the feeling of 
being patriotic during those months could be measured by what the editorials were saying 
about the government and how that changed over time. To take one issue, like the 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and follow the coverage in two different newspapers 
and the amount of official sources they quoted, could be another comparison possible that 
may help to bring light to the object of this study. 
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An element that was not considered in this study was the effect of technology on 
the proposed issue. With many news outlets demanding news almost to the instant, to 
beat the competition, the work of journalists with their sources could have been affected 
in some way, and it may have been a considerable problem to keep a normal relationship 
with a source in an already complicated environment to get information. 
Likewise, the research for this thesis was done too close in time to the period 
studied. It is most likely that in a few months, if not already, more information could be 
collected for broadening the analysis of the topic. 
Regarding the historical context and as the administration changed, there will be 
more elements to do further research, as it can be compared with what was happening 
before. However, in the same sense, a comparison between a past administration and the 
Bush presidency could be done in each of the elements of the policy toward the press, in 
order to establish which elements remained the same as before, and which were added 
after 9/11 to restrict the access to official sources. 
A final point that might be analyzed in the future would be how much information 
could not be released at the time studied, because of the changes in the relationship with 
sources, considering there is a new administration with a new policy. That may be a way 
of measuring to what point a restrictive interaction with official sources could prevent a 







2. Which is your current position (Specify since when and where) 
3. Can you give me a summary of your previous work experience? 
4. Which is your current beat? Could you describe how do you normally cover that 
beat? 
5. How would you describe your relationship with government sources in a normal 
basis? 
6. Do you think that the relationship with the government sources have changed 
since 2001? 
7. If yes, in which way? Can you give me concrete examples of that change? 
8. In your experience, when did this change started to happening? 
9. In your opinion, why this relationship has changed?  
10. Which would you consider turning points for that relationship to have changed? 
11. Is it better or worst than before? Why? 
12. Have you covered government during previous administrations? If so, was it 
different? How? 
13. How this change affected your daily work? 
14. What did you do to get through those obstacles? 
15. Did the sources change their behaviors? Are they leaking less information? 
16. Are those sources asking more often for anonymity?  
17. Did you have to use more anonymous sources? In which cases? 
18. Do you think the use of anonymous sources is affecting the credibility of the 
press? 
19. How do you balance your information within your sources? Do you have to find 
more people to confirm something than you used to? 
20. Are you using any sort of new practice to get information from your sources? 
21. Do you think journalists let this change happen? How? Why? 
22. How is affecting the readers’ access to accurate information? 
23. Which will be your main critic to journalists? And to yourself? 
24. Do you think this change may affect this interaction between journalists and 
government sources beyond this period? In which areas or which examples can 





All the interviews were held in May 2007.  
 
- Lucy Dalglish, executive director of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
 
- John Harwood, reporter at The Wall Street Journal. 
 
- Glen Justice, former reporter based in Washington, D.C, for The New York Times. 
 
- Bill Kovach, acting director from Project for Excellence in Journalism.  
 
- Howard Kurtz, reporter for The Washington Post, covering media. 
 
- David Lightman, Hartford Courant’s Washington Bureau Chief for 23 years until 
October 2007.  
 
- Rafael Lorente, former Washington correspondent for the South Florida Sun-Sentinel. 
 
- Josh Meyer, reporter for Los Angeles Times, covering national security 
 
- Deborah Nelson, former investigative reporter at Los Angeles Times  
 
- Walter Pincus, reporter for The Washington Post, covering national security. 
 
- Matt Wald, reporter for The New York Times, covering transport and nuclear 
information. 
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